


# **CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION STAFF PLANNING BOOK**



FEBRUARY 1997

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**U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE  
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS**

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**CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION****Staff Planning Book**

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


**CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION**

## Appendix 1. USSOUTHCOM Organization

**USSOUTHCOM ORGANIZATION AND ASSIGNED FORCES**

To accomplish its stated mission, the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) is organized as shown here:



USSOUTHCOM has been structured to protect the US security interests in the southern region. The map on the following page shows the general area assigned to the Commander in Chief, US Southern Command (USCINCSO). The USSOUTHCOM area includes Central and South America but does not include Mexico or the Caribbean islands. Oceans are the responsibility of the US Pacific Command (USPACOM) and the US Atlantic Command (USACOM).

USSOUTHCOM has the normal service components: USArmy, South (USARSO); US Southern Command Air Force (USSOUTHAF) (12th Air Force at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base (AFB), Arizona) with its forward-deployed element Air Forces Panama; and the Navy's Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT). It also has a subordinate unified command, the US Special Operations Command, South (USSOCSO).

Most of the US forces assigned to USSOUTHCOM are in Panama. The approximately 10,000 permanent and 2,000 temporary duty (TDY), or rotational, personnel are grouped (primarily for planning and installation security) into Joint Task Force (JTF) Panama. The USARSO commander is also the JTF Panama commander.

JTF Bravo (JTFB) in Honduras has been in existence since the early 1980s, despite the normal rule that a JTF exists for a short period of time to accomplish a short-term objective. JTFB has approximately 1,200 personnel operating out of Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras. This base is a staging area for contingency operations, exercises, and so forth.

[illegible]

Also located at the major headquarters in Panama are the augmenters and the normal security assistance organizations (SAOs): Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs), Military Groups (MILGPs), military liaison offices (MLOs), and Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODCs). These augmentees play a major role in the commander in chiefs (CINC's) strategy in Latin America because of the somewhat limited number of intheater (when compared to the other regional CINCs) forces available to execute his strategy. Much of the ability of the USCINCSO to execute his strategy is through the use of these elements and through exchanges such as subject matter expert exchanges (SMEEs), combined exercises, deployments for training (DFTs), and mobile training teams (MTTs) with Latin American countries.

The Air Force and Navy elements operating in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR) are actually forward planning and liaison detachments representing the actual commanders and forces: Air Forces Panama for the 12th Air Force at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona, and CINCLANTFLT Detachment South for CINCLANTFLT at Norfolk, Virginia.

The actual combat forces in theater are limited. They include USARSO, which includes one infantry battalion and one company of the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) (SFG(A)) (which is actually controlled by USSOCSO). Also included are Air Forces Panama, whose intheater operational forces consist primarily of limited intheater airlift based at Howard AFB, and naval forces, which consist of a special boat unit (SBU) and a sea-air-land team (SEAL) or underwater demolition team rotated through Rodman Naval Base on the southern side of the Panama Canal.





**CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION**Appendix 2. USSOUTHCOM Strategic Estimate

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This strategic estimate will be the basis for all plans and actions that could occur in response to a crisis in the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) and situations where this command could be called onto support another theater of war. Whereas the commander's estimate is used for near-term decisions and may result in a course of action that leads to an operation plan, this document will result in a strategic concept that will be expanded into the Commander in Chief, US Southern Commands (USCINCO's) theater strategy (to be published separately). (See Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, p I-8; there is no doctrinal format for a theater strategy.)

**1. STRATEGIC DIRECTION**

This section includes strategic task, objectives, and authoritative directions from the global and regional components of the national security and military strategies; strategic guidance from other national sources; and guidance within alliance and coalition documents. This direction has as its basis the interests and objectives of the United States as enumerated in the National Security Strategic Document (NSSD) and National Military Strategy (NMS).

**a. Major components of national security strategy.****(1) Global components.**

(a) Maintain a forward presence. Maintaining a positive influence in distant regions requires that we demonstrate our engagement. The forward presence of our military forces often provides the essential cohesion in important alliance relationships and signals that our commitments are backed by tangible actions. Our presence can deter aggression, preserve regional balances, deflect arms races, and prevent power vacuums that invite conflict.

(b) Respond to a crisis. Despite our best efforts to deter conflict, we must be prepared to be challenged with force, often with little or no warning.

(c) Support and enhance alliances, coalitions, and anew United Nations. Our first priority in foreign policy remains solidarity with our friends and allies. The stable foundation of our security will continue to be focused on a common effort with peoples with whom we share fundamental moral and political values and security interests. Those nations with whom we are bound by alliances will continue to be our closest partners in building a new world order.

(d) Nurture democracy. A truly global community is being formed. We will increase our efforts to clarify what the United States has to contribute to the solution of global problems and to stress the place of democracy in the process.

(e) Support and enhance intelligence programs. The global reach of US intelligence capabilities is a unique national asset, crucial not only to our own security but also to our leadership role in responding to international challenges. We must track the threats posed by narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and the proliferation of advanced weapons.

(f) Support and enhance security assistance. We will focus our efforts and resources on five major challenges: promoting and consolidating democratic values, promoting market principles, promoting peace, protecting against translational threats (for example, terrorism and narcotics), and meeting urgent human needs.

(g) Support and enhance efforts to combat the cultivation and trafficking of illicit drugs. No threat does more damage to our national values and institutions. Trafficking organizations undermine the sovereign governments of our friends and weaken and distort national economies with a vast debilitating black market and large finding requirements for enforcement. Reducing the demand for drugs at home and attacking the international drug trade aggressively are the main elements in our strategy; they must be pursued together.

(2) Regional components. Latin Americans have long argued that US interests have fluctuated with the rise and fall of extrahemispheric threats to regional security. Our policy has sought to allay these fears, as it is founded on the principle of a common destiny and mutual responsibility. Despite successes, we realize that democratic institutions in much of Latin America remain fragile, and we are seeking ways to strengthen them.

(a) In our military-to-military relations, we will continue to promote professionalism, support for civilian authority, and respect for human rights.

(b) We will continue to press and enlist the help of our friends in the hemisphere for a free and democratic Cuba.

(c) In Central America, we support the regional trend toward negotiation and demilitarization. The nations most severely threatened by guerrilla forces or narcoterrorists—El Salvador, Colombia, and Peru—will receive appropriate support from the United States.

(d) Our interest in supporting both democratic and economic transitions in Latin America and the Caribbean is demonstrated by the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative.

b. Major components of national military strategy.

(1) Global components. The fundamental objective of the US Armed Forces will remain constant—to deter aggression and, should deterrence fail, to defend the nation's vital interests against any potential foe. While we emphasize operations under the auspices of international bodies such as the United Nations, we must retain the capability to act unilaterally when and where US interests dictate. In many ways, this new strategy is more complex than the containment strategy of the Cold War era.

(a) Forward presence. In addition to forces stationed overseas and afloat, forward presence includes periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, combined exercises, security and humanitarian assistance, port visits, and military-to-military contacts.

(b) Crisis response. Regional contingencies we might face are many and varied. Response might range from a single strike to the employment of overwhelming force to defeat a regional aggressor.

(c) Planning and employment.

1. Regional focus. By examining and anticipating the potential for stability or crisis, the regional commanders in chief (CINCs) develop plans for the employment of military assets and examine the complement economic, diplomatic, and political options. These options, used singly or in various combinations, can be carried out with the intent of deterring or averting crises. They vary widely from large joint

and combined operations and the deployment of task forces to small mobile training teams and low-level, military-to-military contacts.

2. Adaptive planning. Adaptive planning provides a range of preplanned options, Warning time or available response time is far more likely to be exploited by key decision makers if they have a menu of preplanned and gauged military options. The four general categories of operations that combatant CINCs must plan for and be prepared to execute are—

- Employment of strategic and nuclear forces.
- Active employment of resources on a day-to-day basis to build military and alliance readiness; promotion of stability, peace, human rights, and democracy and protection of US lives and property.
- Deployment and employment of forces to deter and, if necessary, to rapidly and decisively resolve a regional military conflict.
- Deployment and employment of reconstituted forces.

3. Forward-presence operations. Included are these newly defined roles for the military in the war on drugs and in providing humanitarian assistance:

- Operational training and deployments.
- Security assistance.
- Protection of US citizens abroad.
- Counterdrug operations.
- Humanitarian assistance.

4. Conflict resolution. Clearly stated, measurable, and attainable military objectives are key to the success of operations.

5. Planning for global conflict. As we will not retain the forces required for a global conflict, CINCs must plan for this eventuality but as a last priority. The uncertain world we face requires us to deal effectively with the unknown and unexpected, and we have done so with flexible options and adaptive plans,

## (2) Regional components

(a) The problems of drug trafficking, illegal immigration, the environment, lingering insurgency, and slow economic development are of concern to all.

(b) The United States must continue to support the developing democracies and the economic and social progress throughout the region.

(c) The United States will deal with emerging Atlantican military buildup and national instability through careful contingency planning and forward-presence operations in friendly neighboring countries.

## 2. THEATER STRATEGIC SITUATION

This section includes information on the characteristics of the theater operational environment; the intelligence estimate; national and international security considerations; the logistics estimate; the command,

control, and communications (C3) estimate; and the personnel estimate and level of tactical proficiency of assigned forces. (Joint Pub 3-0, p B-I.)

a. Characteristics of the theater. The USSOUTHCOM AOR extends nearly 6,000 miles from the southern border of Mexico to the tip of Cape Horn.

(1) It is a region of social, political, geographic, and economic extremes.

(2) It is also a theater in social, political, and economic transition from dictatorship to democracy and from economic stagnation to regional growth.

b. Intelligence estimate.

(1) Transition to peace in El Salvador remains a concern.

(2) Atlantican military forces continue to steadily grow. Honduras-based anti-Atlantican Government guerrillas continue their buildup. The prognosis is continued instability.

(3) Insurgency continues to trouble Guatemala, and in Honduras, criminal acts on a low but discernible scale continue to be carried out by terrorist groups professing Marxist-Leninist ideology.

(4) The situation in Panama is mixed. Crime, combined with drug trafficking and consumption, is being dealt with by the emerging Panamanian National Police (PNP). The Panama Canal Commission, headed by a Panamanian and with a workforce of over 80-percent Panamanians, is building a new master use plan for the canal following full receipt under the treaties.

(5) In the Andean Ridge, economic problems, coupled with forces of insurgency and narcotrafficking, pose short- and long-term dangers to democracies in this region.

(6) In the rest of South America, economies and democracies remain fragile. Burdens of debt and low economic growth are definite threats to potential stability.

c. Global implications.

(1) Conditions. The following conditions exist:

- Drug production and trafficking.
- National debts.
- Environmental damage.
- Emerging democracies.
- Growing awareness of interdependence.

(2) Circumstances.

(a) Emerging democracies focus on internal consolidation of legitimacy, strapped by economic stagnation.

(b) There is a continued condition of poverty.

(c) The imbalanced social structures include a small elite class and a majority of poor.

(d) Long-standing cultural differences remain.

(3) Influences.

(a) Drug production and trafficking affect the United States and other developed consumer nations.

(b) Capital flight distorts the world economy.

(c) National debts burden sponsoring nations.

(d) Regional leadership voids demand attention by developed nations.

(e) Emerging democracies hold the attention of the United Nations

d. Logistics estimate. Honduras and Panama allow pre-positioning of selected equipment. Host nation support (HNS) agreements are being improved and expanded. The region lacks the infrastructure to support long-term, large-scale operations. Weak economics frustrate national commitments to improving transportation networks, airports, and sea terminals that could enhance strategic and operational mobility.

e. Command, control and communications (C3) estimate. Current programs provide adequate support for peacetime operations. Emerging systems that are designed to provide an enhanced real-time exchange of counterdrug information and early warning and that are currently funded and underway will enhance current capabilities. USSOUTHCOM does not have a deployable C3 package to prosecute a contingency operation. Continued continental United States (CONUS)-based support in this area will be required.

f. Personnel estimate. The level of assigned personnel is adequate to conduct assigned planning missions. Continued deployments of both assigned forces and forces deployed from other combatant commands for exercises, training teams, and security assistance support must be maintained to demonstrate our resolve and enhance forward-presence benefits.

### 3. STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

a. Support counterdrug efforts.

b. Sustain the negotiated peace settlement in El Salvador.

c. Promote liberty in Panama.

d. Enhance professionalism in the militaries of South and Central America.

e. Plan for and train to meet regional contingencies.

(Each concept should be examined in terms of its military, diplomatic, economic, and sociopsychological dimensions and any other aspects deemed appropriate for study. See Joint Pub 3-0, p B-2.)

#### 4. SPECIFIC COURSES OF ACTION

This section outlines specific courses of action for each strategic concept and compares each with the threat or condition it addresses. (See Joint Pub 3-0.) The USSOUTHCOM staff has prepared individual estimates and studies for courses of action to support the five strategic concepts. These papers examine ours and the enemy's courses of action and then compare them.

#### 5. DECISIONS

##### a. Support counterdrug efforts.

(1) Supporting counterdrug efforts is the CINC's number one priority.

(2) Military forces are in the support mode.

(3) Ambassadors are in the lead.

(4) The USSOUTHCOM focus is at the operational level.

(5) USSOUTHCOM will perform theaterwide intelligence collection and provide ambassadors with fused intelligence.

(6) Host nation police and military conduct the actual fight. US forces assist with advice and training.

(7) USSOUTHCOM will foster host nation commitments and regional cooperation and promote positive solutions.

##### b. Sustain the negotiated peace settlement in El Salvador. The US military will—

(1) Enhance the El Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF) in areas where they can foster and assist reconstruction while working toward earning legitimacy as a military institution with democratic values.

(2) promote professionalism through continued engagement with the ESAF leadership at all levels through military exchanges, permanent liaison, and training assistance.

##### c. Promote liberty in Panama. The US military will—

(1) Not engage in the training of the Panamanian National Police (a Department of Justice responsibility) but will monitor performance and continue coordination and liaison.

(2) Work closely with the Panamanian Government for the effective transfer of US properties and facilities in accordance with the canal treaties.

(3) Promote continued good relations with the people of Panama.

##### d. Enhance professionalism in the militaries of South and Central America. The US military will—

(1) Impart democratic values while providing assistance and training.

(2) Encourage human rights training in the military educational institutions throughout the region

(3) Use US military staff judge advocate officers to provide assistance in helping host nations restructure their military justice systems.

e. Plan for and train to meet regional contingencies. The US military will—

(1) Engage all supporting commands and agencies in the planning process. Relate military visits to operational planning to foster familiarity with the region.

(2) Plan for interagency coordination in all aspects of planning.

(3) Base training exercises and deployments on established and emerging concept plans and operation plans.

(4) Build infrastructure databases for each region.

(5) Make every exercise a combined exercise unless directed or approved otherwise by the CINC.





**CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION**Appendix 3. Joint Planning Document

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**GENERAL INTRODUCTION**

The CGSC academic environment precludes the use of actual plans and documents of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). However, you must become familiar with the types of joint staff guidance available to commanders of unified and specified commands and chiefs of military services for accomplishing assigned tasks.

The M/S320C Joint Planning Document (JPD) complements instruction by providing Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)-type guidance so you can gain proficient in conducting planning exercises.

The M/S320C JPD is a fictional representation of the JSCP and is to be used for CGSC instructional purposes only. It contains guidance for developing plans in support of CGSC planning problems. To further avoid using classified material, information elements in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) are incorporated in parts C and D of the M/S320C JPD.

- Part A, Concept, Tasks, and Planning Guidance, provides the type of strategic guidance and taskings found in the JSCP.
- Part B, Force Apportionment and JSCP Annexes, provides the type of force and resource apportionment found in JSCP annexes.
- Part C, Miscellaneous Guidance, provides non-JSCP information and data that are essential for initial staff planning in M/S320C Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) instruction.
- Part D, Planning Data, consists of service manual data and airlift and sealift characteristics.



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PART A (JSCP):CONCEPT, TASKS, AND PLANNING GUIDANCE

Section 1. INTRODUCTION

1. PURPOSE. The JSCP provides strategic direction and guidance to commanders of unified and specified commands by presenting strategic appraisals of major factors that are likely to influence National Military Strategy (NMS) during its effective period. The JSCP provides strategic planning guidance similar to that found in parts A and B of this JPD.

2. IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS

a. M/S320C JPD is effective for M/S320C US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) planning requirements.

b. Planning will be conducted IAW the M/S320C Course Book and instructor or written guidance.

Section 2. STRATEGIC SETTING

1. GENERAL. M/S320C JPD implements, through the deliberate planning process, the National Military Strategy. The following summary relates aspects of deliberate planning to that strategy.

2. OBJECTIVES

a. National Military Objectives. These national military objectives support national security strategy:

(1) Deter or defeat aggression, singly or in concert with allies. Deter military attack by any nation against the United States, its allies, and other countries whose sovereignty is vital to our own, and defeat such attack, singly or in concert with others, should deterrence fail.

(2) Ensure global access and influence. Protect free commerce; enhance the spread of democracy: guarantee US access to world markets, associated critical resources, air and sea lines of communication (LOCs), and space: and contribute to US influence around the world.

(3) Promote regional stability and cooperation. Contribute to regional stability through military presence, mutual security arrangements, and security assistance, and discourage thereby, in concert with other instruments of national power, policies and objectives inimical to US security interests.

(4) Stem the flow of illegal drugs. Stem the production and transit of illegal drugs and their entry into the United States.

(5) Combat terrorism. Participate in the national program to thwart and respond to the actions of terrorist organizations.

b. Regional Objectives. Section 4 contains planning tasks for USSOUTHCOM. These tasks are based on NMS and fictional threats and capabilities.

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3. STRATEGIC CONCEPTS. The fundamental role of the US Armed Forces will remain constant: to deter war and, should deterrence fail, to defend the nation's vital interests against any potential foe. Our national strategy is founded on the premise that the United States will provide the leadership needed to enhance opportunities for global peace and security. Though remnants of the Soviet military might remain immense, improving East-West relations have shifted focus to regional threats of consequence to US vital interests. As the size of our Active and Reserve forces is prudently reduced, the United States must retain the capability to detect and respond decisively to tomorrow's challenges. In support of the national defense policy foundations, we are guided by a set of military strategic concepts, described in the subsequent paragraphs, that capitalize on our enduring strengths while exploiting the weaknesses of those who might challenge our interests. These concepts, not in order of priority, we described in a sequence corresponding to a progression of events that flows from peace through global war.

a. Deterrence. Deterrence remains the central concept guiding US military strategy. The United States must have a military establishment with global capabilities sufficient to convince adversaries that the cost of aggression will exceed any possible gain. A credible deterrent against the use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction requires a reliable warning system, modern strategic and theater nuclear forces, a spectrum of response options, the capability to hold offensive systems at risk, and a defensive system for global protection against limited strikes. Credible conventional deterrence relies on our capabilities to sustain credible forward presence in vital regions and to defeat or reverse an adversary's conventional attacks. Deterrence also rests on technological superiority across the board and technological supremacy in selected areas.

b. Readiness. As the size of the US military is reduced, it must be prepared for immediate deployment. Deterrence and crisis response dictate that the US military maintain a force that can respond quickly and can fight on arrival. This requirement demands joint teamwork at all levels, sufficient skilled personnel to staff units fully, a high peacetime operating tempo, sufficient war reserves, and intense training. In peacetime, officers and noncommissioned officers must acquire the skills and develop the confidence and initiative necessary to conduct complex joint and combined operations. Leadership skills are the most important, yet they are the most difficult to develop.

c. Forward Presence. Over the past 40 years, the day-to-day presence of US forces in regions vital to US national interests has been key to averting crises and preventing war. Our forces deployed throughout the world show our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting US influence and access. Forward presence includes forces stationed overseas, forces afloat, periodic and rotational deployment, access and storage agreements, intelligence sharing and cooperation, combined exercises, security and humanitarian assistance, port visits, and military-to-military contacts. Although the number of US forces stationed overseas will be reduced, the credibility of our capability and intent to respond to crises will continue to depend on judicious forward basing, deployments of varying duration, and pre-positioning of materiel. For deliberate planning, forward presence enhances our ability to plan for and conduct deterrent actions with replace forces. Forward presence also enhances our ability to transition from peacetime to conflict. Finally, forward presence demands plans for the protection of overseas forces and the evacuation of dependents.

d. Collective Security. Increasingly, we expect to strengthen world response to crises through multilateral operations under the auspices of international security organizations. Collective security arrangements coordinate common security interests; codify commitments, roles, and responsibilities; enhance combined doctrine and interoperability; and provide integrated command structures. In a future of declining defense budgets and reduced

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forward presence, we will rely increasingly on international security relationships to further our global interests. Although support of formal alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will continue to be fundamental to US military strategy, we must be prepared to fight as part of an ad hoc coalition if we become involved in a conflict where no

formal security relationships exist. We must, however, retain the capability to operate independently as our interests dictate. Collective security arrangements also influence our regional planning efforts. Where collective plans restrict or limit our planning, unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral plans achieving US military objectives must be developed.

e. Security Assistance. The bonds of collective security can be strengthened greatly, particularly with lesser developed nations, through programs designed to aid friends and allies in meeting the needs of their countries. Through security assistance, the United States can demonstrate commitment, reinforce alliance cohesion, build on bilateral relations, and provide a moderating influence vital to regional stability and cooperation. The use of US equipment, training, and professional military education can increase US influence and build relationships that help create the cooperative global infrastructure crucial to effective crisis response.

f. Arms Control. Arms control can reduce uncertain and reduce nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional arsenals. We engage in arms control not as an end in itself but as a means to enhance our national security. We seek to reduce military threats to our national interests, to inject greater predictability into military relationships, and to channel force postures in more stabilizing directions, while retaining vital military capabilities. The United States must have the capability to detect noncompliance and must preserve the latitude to respond effectively to treaty violations. During deliberate planning, arms control execution will affect both capabilities and concepts in US plans.

g. Crisis Response. Responding to regional crises is a key demand of our strategy. The regional contingencies we might face are many and varied and could arise on very short notice. US forces must, therefore, be able to respond rapidly to deter and, if necessary, to fight unilaterally or as part of a combined effort. Our strategy also recognizes that when the United States is responding to one substantial regional crisis, potential aggressors in other areas maybe tempted to take advantage of our preoccupation. The requirements of both deterrence and defense dictate that we not reduce forces to a level that would leave ourselves or our allies vulnerable to such aggressors. Therefore, this document tasks commanders in chief (CINCs) to develop responses not only for a crisis originating in their theater but also for a crisis concurrent with one in another theater.

h. Maritime and Aerospace Superiority. The importance of achieving and maintaining preeminence in the air, in space, and at sea is key to our continued success as a global leader. In peace, maritime superiority and aerospace superiority enhance our deterrent capabilities. In war, they are critical to the conduct and successful termination of conflict. Extended supply lines demand the unimpaired flow of assets. The ability to quickly establish control of the air, sea, and space both en route to and in the theater of operations provides for increased combat effectiveness, fewer losses, and efficient employment of combat power where it is needed most. Planning for the protection of lines of communication (LOCs) and for strategic defense remains a priority task.

i. Strategic Agility. The force needed to win is assembled by the rapid movement of forces from wherever they are to wherever they are needed. US forces stationed in the continental United States (CONUS) and overseas will be fully capable of worldwide employment on short notice.

j. Power Projection. Our ability to project power, both from the United States and from forward-deployed locations, has strategic value beyond crisis response. This ability is a constant contributor to deterrence, regional stability, and collective security. It becomes a critical part of our military strategy because overseas presence will be reduced and our regional orientation has expanded.

k. Technological Superiority. The United States must continue to rely heavily on technological superiority to offset the quantitative advantages of potential adversaries; to reduce the risk to US fighting forces; and to enhance the potential for swift, decisive termination of conflict. In peace, technological superiority is a key element of deterrence. In war, it enhances combat effectiveness and reduces loss of personnel and equipment therefore, continued advancement in technology is a national security obligation.

l. Decisive Force. Once a decision for military action has been made, half-measures and confused objectives extract a severe price in the form of a protracted conflict that can cause needless waste of human and material resources, a divided nation at home, and defeat. Therefore, one of the essential elements of our National Military Strategy is to rapidly assemble the forces needed to win—the concept of applying overwhelming force to terminate conflicts swiftly, decisively, and with a minimum loss of life.

m. Force Reconstitution. As we reduce the size of our military force structure in response to a changing strategic environment, we must preserve a credible capability to build wholly new forces should a resurgent global threat appear. Reconstitution is the ability to reestablish a global warfighting capability. Reconstitution includes mobilizing manpower; forming, training and fielding units; and activating the industrial base on a large scale. Reconstitution involves the creation of new fighting units. Preserving the potential for timely expansion of air, ground, and maritime forces (to the extent allowed by reaction time) will require the political foresight and courage to lay away infrastructure, stockpile critical materials, protect the defense industrial base, sustain a cadre of quality leaders, and invest in basic science and high-payoff technologies.

4. FORCE EMPLOYMENT AND PLANNING. The growing complexity of the international security environment makes it increasingly difficult to predict the circumstances under which US military power might be employed. The spectrum of conflict has not changed. Although the likelihood of global war has decreased, the probability of lesser conflict has actually increased because of the breakdown of a bipolarized world that tended to subjugate intraregional conflicts. As we approach the challenge of applying the strategic concepts to the tasks at hand, we will pursue four principal directions. While continuing to contend with the reality of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), we will emphasize active peacetime engagement in pursuit of our national interests worldwide, increase the regional orientation of our plans, provide for as much flexibility as possible to enhance our deterrence and warfighting capability, and provide multiple options to decision makers.

a. Contending With the Commonwealth of Independent States. As the world observes dramatic political developments that are reshaping the former Soviet nation forever, it is also clear that, for the foreseeable future, this emerging CIS will collectively remain a significant and unpredictable force on the global scene.

(1) Nuclear force. An imposing arsenal of diverse, modern, highly capable and survivable strategic nuclear offensive weapons is likely to remain during, and possibly long after, the political transition of the former Soviet state. Until and unless arms control and defensive alternatives produce dramatic breakthroughs, the United States will be best served by a triad of credible, ready systems and an integrated war plan with a variety of response options.

(2) Conventional Forces. CIS political intentions are shifting from those of a committed adversary toward a situation of uncertainty. Therefore, it remains essential to US and allied security to retain the plans and defense infrastructure necessary to hedge against a resurgent global threat. Our continued commitment to NATO remains an important component of our efforts to accommodate this enduring reality. The forward presence of our forces in Europe and elsewhere, although reduced in size, must remain sufficient to demonstrate our continued commitment to regions where this resurgent threat could emerge.

b. Peacetime Engagement. The bonds of friendship and alliances can be strengthened, particularly in the case of developing nations, through activities that assist governmental and socioeconomic development. These activities extend far beyond increasing host nation or indigenous military capabilities, peacetime activities that provide nation assistance can build influence and enhance stability. In concert with the needs and desires of the host nation, our forces can help improve a country's capability to carry out public functions and services in response to societal needs. Our peacetime engagement efforts can contribute greatly to promoting the ideals of democracy, reducing the need for military response, and enhancing the effectiveness of military forces should deterrence fail. Also, such efforts may well enhance host nation and international support for US regional objectives. Peacetime activities of particular importance are—

(1) Combating drug. The detection and significant reduction of the production and trafficking of illegal drugs is a high-priority national security mission of our Armed Forces consistent with the maintenance of air and maritime sovereignty. The President and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) have directed that we deal with this threat as a danger to our security. Under the president's National Drug Strategy, we are charged to help lead the attack on the supply of illegal drugs from abroad. A comprehensive program for attacking the flow of drugs at the source and in transit has been established. In CONUS, the military will support local, state, and Federal agencies as permitted by law. The US military is fully committed to this effort. The United States has established an effective communications network for Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. The military will continue to enhance its detection and monitoring capabilities and will encourage and assist other nations to develop the kind of aggressive and capable efforts necessary to stem the flow of drugs. This mission will require a sustained employment of properly trained and equipped forces for the foreseeable future. This requires deliberate regional plans to deter and combat drug suppliers.

(2) Humanitarian assistance. Increasingly, US forces will be called on and must be trained, equipped, and prepared to conduct humanitarian assistance, civil affairs and psychological operations, and disaster relief. As one of the few nations in the world with the means to rapidly and effectively respond to disaster, many nations depend on the United States for assistance. Not only must forces be prepared to provide humanitarian aid, but they also must be prepared to engage in conflict to assist and protect those in need.

(3) Combating terrorism. The proliferation of international terrorist organizations, whose activities are often conducted with state sponsorship, poses a threat to the United States and to the rest of the civilized world. The US Armed Forces have the mission to deter terrorist attacks on US and allied citizens and property outside the United States and to respond effectively when incidents occur. This calls for international cooperation and coordination and a military force manned, equipped, and trained to monitor terrorist activities, to anticipate and protect vulnerable targets, and to neutralize the threat. This calls for forces and deliberate plans to monitor terrorist training and movements, to anticipate vulnerable targets for terrorist acts, and to respond effectively to neutralize the threat and bring the perpetrators to justice.

c. Increased Regional Orientation. Although the strategy relies on our ability to reconstitute forces to

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counter the reemergence of a global threat, the principal focus of US operational planning is regional crisis response, to include a capability to respond to two concurrent, but staggered, regional contingencies. The precise nature of a US response to a regional crisis will be predicated on the criticality of the US interests at stake, our commitments to the nations involved, the level and sophistication of the threat, and the capabilities of US and coalition forces. Before committing US forces, it must be determined that US vital interests are at risk and that clear and attainable military objectives should be established. In concert with our allies and friends, we intend to resolve any conflict in which we become involved swiftly and decisively. Although striving to contain the conflict to the region of origin and to limit the conflict to conventional means, we must plan measures to deter or defend US interests and take other actions as necessary outside the region to ensure success. As a guide, any regional crisis that could evolve into a global conflict will receive priority.

d. Flexibility. To meet its unilateral and alliance responsibilities, the United States needs a diverse and operationally flexible range of military options. This makes it difficult for a potential adversary to anticipate how the United States may use military force in response to aggression.

5. REGIONAL STRATEGY, CENTRAL AMERICA

a. US Strategy. Factors influencing US strategy include—

- (1) Continued efforts by Cuba to influence revolutionaries inspired by Communist ideology.
- (2) The proliferation of illegal drug production, processing, and transportation throughout the region.
- (3) US interest in supporting both economic and democratic transitions throughout the area.

b. Strategic Importance

( 1 ) Unrestricted use of International air and sea LOCs in the Caribbean Sea and Panama Canal is essential to US and allied interests.

(2) The USSOUTHCOM area is on the southern flank of North America and is astride the routes from the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. It is rich in oil and other resources. Those realities, combined with the illegal narcotics trade, make Central and South America a strategically important area.

(3) Unrestricted use of international air and sea LOCs, including the Panama Canal and pipeline, is vital to the continued flow of resources from the Pacific to the east coast of the United States and to Europe.

c. Threats to US Interests

(1) Atlantica, located to the south and east of Honduras and extending to Costa Rica, continues to promote confrontation with the United States by supporting leftist insurgencies in neighboring states. These actions have serious implications for the stability and balance of power in the area.

(2) Locally precipitated military actions are always possible, with or without foreign assistance, as a result of traditional animosities or the ambitions of individual leaders.

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(3) Illegal narcotics traffickers undermine authority of democratic governments and divert national resources from the development of legitimate economic activities.

Section 3. PLANNING GUIDANCE

1. PURPOSE. This section provides guidance for operation planning.

2. GENERAL

a. Operation planning will be conducted in accordance with Joint Pub 5-03.1, *JOPES: Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures*.

b. Contingency plans will provide for—

(1) Deterrent options consisting of different sizes and types of forces designed to show US resolve in defense of US, allied, and friendly nation interests.

(2) Deployment of major US combat forces to achieve US objectives.

(3) Implementation of postcombat operations to assist governments in the reestablishment of essential civil services.

3. PRECONFLICT PLANNING CONSTRAINTS. Total or full mobilization will not be considered in the development of plans associated with M/S320C. Selective Reserve callup (200,000) by the President is assumed. (See part B in the M/S320C JPD for a brief discussion of mobilization.)

4. FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING

a. Major combat forces available to unified commanders for planning and the planned use of those forces in operation plans is governed by the guidance in part B.

b. Where possible, CINCs will accomplish tasks with assigned forces. CINCs will keep augmentation and supporting forces to a minimum, consistent with sound military strategy and operational considerations.

c. Planned Active force disposition is shown in part B. Required combat support and combat service support forces will be requested by component commanders through service channels.

d. CINCs will not plan for use of forces exceeding the apportionment in part B.

e. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), by direction of the SECDEF, will allocate forces at the time a plan is executed. Force allocations may differ from those apportioned in an operation plan (OPLAN) or concept plan (CONPLAN).

5. LOGISTICS. Logistic planning guidance is provided in part B, section 3, annex B.

6. STRATEGIC MOVEMENT. Guidance for the allocation of strategic airlift and sealift assets for planning is provided in part B, section 3, annex J.

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## 7. COMMAND

a. The National Command Authority (NCA) directs the combatant commanders. The CJCS passes NCA directives to the combatant commanders. The Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) provides strategic communications from the NCA and CJCS to the combatant commanders. (Information about communication systems is in part B, section 3, annex I.)

b. During both the planning and conduct of operations, commanders will exercise command IAW guidance in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*.

c. Unified commanders coordinate with US Embassies within their geographic borders for the protection and evacuation of noncombatants. In carrying out that duty, unified commanders—

- (1) Prepare necessary military supporting plans.
- (2) Prepare necessary operation plans.
- (3) Cooperate with chiefs of diplomatic missions in planning.
- (4) Implement military plans for the protection and evacuation of noncombatants as required.

d. All operation plans will include proposed command structure and command relationships.

e. The Commander in Chief, US Southern Command (USCINCSO), will—

(1) Exercise combatant command (COCOM) of all assigned forces and all augmentation forces assigned.

(2) Establish as required, joint task forces under designated commanders to execute military operations.

(3) Exercise operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) of any foreign national military forces when directed by the NCA IAW treaties or agreements between the US Government and the host nation government.

## 8. MUTUAL REINFORCEMENT AND FORCE INTERDEPENDENCE

a. Non-US military forces maybe employed in conjunction with US forces for accomplishing tasks for specific contingencies.

b. Non-US military forces will be employed IAW multilateral or bilateral agreements or as directed by the NCA.

c. Within the guidelines in subparagraphs 8a and 8b above, supported commanders will assess the capability of non-US military forces that could contribute to accomplishing assigned tasks for inclusion in operation plans.

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d. Non-US military forces of the host government should accomplish major efforts, but US unilateral support will be tailored to maximize the full capability of host government forces.

9. NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL. NBC planning guidance is in part B, section 3, annex F.

10. SECURITY ASSISTANCE. A unified commander conducts advisory and assistance operations, including supervision and administration of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) in his area of responsibility. He develops, executes, and evaluates the MAP through the US Ambassador by working through the established US military advisory group (for example, the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) and Military Group (MILGP)).

Section 4. TASKS

1. PURPOSE

a. Although the JSCP includes general and specific taskings for all unified commands, the material here has been abbreviated to expedite the CGSC curriculum by relating only to USSOUTHCOM.

b. When appropriate, established priorities for accomplishing tasks are identified. Priorities depend on changing conditions and events. Only a higher authority may alter priorities, but a unified commander may recommend changes to the CJCS.

2. TASKS COMMON TO EACH UNIFIED OR SPECIFIED COMMANDER. Each unified or specified commander—

a. Exercises authority and discharges responsibilities IAW guidance in the UCP and its supplement. Joint Pub 0-2, and Department of Defense (DOD) directives.

b. Provides for the security of US forces, citizens, installations, and resources in the area of operations.

c. Protects US interests in the area of operations.

d. Conducts joint training to ensure operational readiness of assigned forces.

e. Is prepared to provide disaster relief, evacuation, and other humanitarian acts.

f. Administers the MAP for each country in the area of responsibility.

g. Coordinates plans with other commanders regarding use of augmentation and supporting forces set forth in part B.

h. Coordinates with adjacent commanders regarding plans for antisubmarine warfare, antiair warfare, electronic warfare, and land warfare in defense of assigned areas.

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3. PLANNING TASKS FOR USSOUTHCOM. USSOUTHCOM will—

- a. Prepare an operation plan for the bilateral defense of Honduras along its southeastern border.
- b. Use these assumptions:

(1) Honduran Army combat forces in the area of operations will be under the operational control (OPCON) or the tactical control (TACON) of US commanders.

(2) Cuba will not interfere with US operations.

(3) Panama and El Salvador will grant overflight and staging rights.

(4) All other Central American and Caribbean nations will grant overflight rights for forces in transit.

(5) Cuba, Atlantica, and Costa Rica will deny overflight and staging rights.

(Other planning tasks are omitted.)

4. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

a. Combatant commanders disseminate NCA-approved rules of engagement (ROES) to subordinate forces. Responsibility for developing additional ROEs rests with the unified commander. The rules may vary with each operation or by geographic location within an area of responsibility.

- b. When developing ROES. CINCs should consider—

(1) The nature of the operation (peacetime operation, show of force, declared war, and so forth).

(2) The specific guidance from the higher authority. Rules may be modified because of situational changes.

(3) The political borders.

(4) The type of engagement. Land, air, and sea rules differ.

(5) The existing agreements: treaties, status of forces agreements, Geneva Convention, international law, and so forth.

(6) The sociological considerations. such as population. ethnic groups, and religion.

(7) Restrictive considerations, such as barriers, blockades, hot pursuit, overflight, and area borders.

- c. Additional ROES will be forwarded to the CJCS for approval.

- d. Each commander will provide a list of approved ROES for his area to—

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- (1) supporting commanders.
- (2) Component commanders.
- (3) Subunified and joint task force (JTF) commanders.

e. These are the ROES for the USSOUTHCOM contingent plan for the bilateral defense of Honduras:

(1) During execution of deterrent options and postcombat operations, there will be no violations of threat international borders or national waters (12 nautical miles) except for reconnaissance and surveillance. Self-defense of reconnaissance and surveillance elements is authorized.

(2) Self-defense for all forces is authorized.

(3) During combat operations, crossing the threat international border and entry into its national waters are authorized for hot pursuit.

(4) During combat operations, conventional ground force penetrations are limited to the range of threat indirect-fire weapons.

(5) All attacks are limited to threat armed forces personnel and facilities that are engaged in or are preparing for combat or are supporting the invading force.

Section 5. ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

1. PLAN PREPARATION. CINCs will prepare contingency plans IAW Joint Pubs 5-03.1 and 5-03.2, *JOPES: Volume II, Supplemental Planning Formats and Guidance*.

2. PLAN SUBMISSION. CINCs will submit OPLANs and CONPLANs for review IAW the J5 annual planning schedule.

3. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS FOR USSOUTHCOM

a. UCP, dated 1 June 199., established the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) with its area of responsibility comprising Central and South America and their coastal waters.

b. Semite components for USSOUTHCOM are US Army, South (USARSO): US Air Force, South (USAFSO): and US Navy, South (USNAVSO) and are provided by Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT). USSOUTHCOM has one subunified command, the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

c. Each USSOUTHCOM component commander—

(1) Commands all service component forces not under operational control (OPCON) of another component, subunified command, or joint task force.

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(2) Exercises administrative control (ADCON) of all service component forces under OPCON of another commander. Inherent in this authority is the provision of logistic and administrative support to all service component forces.

(3) Provides logistic support to other component forces as directed in USSOUTHCOM contingency plans or other agreements or directives.

d. USCINCSO will coordinate contingency plans with supporting combatant commanders and agencies. These are the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), US Atlantic Command (USACOM), US Space Command (USSPACECOM), US Pacific Command (USPACOM), US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

e. USCINCSO will support commanders of transient forces of other commands that pass or stage through USSOUTHCOM as directed by higher authority and as mutually agreed between the commanders. In the event of a major emergency, USCINCSO may assume temporary command of all available forces except those with specified missions.

f. USCINCSO will establish, as required, joint task forces under the commanders he designates.

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PART B. FORCE APPORTIONMENT AND JSCP ANNEXES

Section 1. GENERAL FORCE AVAILABILITY OF ACTIVE AND RESERVE FORCES

1. GENERAL

a. Part B of the MS320C JPD supplements the information in part A and is effective for planning purposes on receipt and for operations during the period FY 9\_.

b. Forces available to unified commanders for planning purposes are as listed in the tables in sections 1 and 2 of this part. The forces listed are in addition to those assigned to the unified commands. The SECDEF assigns forces to the combatant commanders during peacetime in the "Forces for Unified and Specified Commanders Report."

c. Major combat forces identified in sections 1 and 2 of part B provide for two levels of involvement:

(1) Forces available for contingencies that require partial mobilization.

(2) Forces available for support of allies and lesser regional contingencies that require no mobilization.

d. The forces listed in the tables in sections 1 and 2 are major combat forces only. Support of major combat forces is the responsibility of the services and military departments as indicated in section 2.

2. COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FORCES. Unified commanders, through their component commanders, are responsible for determining the combat support and combat service support force requirements to support the combat forces. Service plans and procedures are used to identify these forces.

3. SERVICE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

a. The statutory authority, basic policies, and procedures for mobilizing elements of the Reserve Component are set forth in Title 10, United States Code; DOD Directive 1235.10; and other related DOD memorandums and instructions.

b. The President and Congress may exercise callup and mobilization authority when more units and organizations are needed for national security than are in the Regular components of ground and air forces. The levels of mobilization may vary as follows:

(1) Selective Reserve callup. The expansion of the Active Armed Forces with Reserve Component units and/or individuals, by the authority of the President, to satisfy an emergency requirement. It is limited to 200,000 Reserve and National Guard personnel. (S-day is the day the President authorizes Selective Reserve callup.)

(2) Partial mobilization. The expansion of the Active Armed Forces, short of full mobilization, resulting from action by Congress or the President, to mobilize Reserve Component units and/or individual reservists to meet all or part of the requirements of a particular contingency and/or operational war plans or to meet the requirements incident to hostilities. Units mobilized to meet such requirements will be ordered to Active duty at

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authorized strength. Partial mobilization differs from Selective Reserve callup in that it would normally be associated with requirements for contingency plans involving external threats to the national security.

(3) Full mobilization. The expansion of the Active Armed Forces by mobilizing all units in the existing approved forces structure and all individual reservists and the materiel resources needed for these units. (M-day is the day the Secretary of Defense, based on a decision by the president and/or Congress, directs a mobilization to begin.)

(4) Total mobilization. The expansion of the Active Armed Forces by organizing and/or activating additional units beyond the existing approved force structure and the mobilization of national resources needed to supply and sustain such forces.

4. PLANNED ACTIVE FORCE DISPOSITIONS IN PEACETIME. Tables 1 through 3 depict normal peacetime stationing of US military forces.

**Table 1. Planned Peacetime Disposition of US Army-Assigned Forces**

Element	Total	USEUCOM	USSOCOM	USPACOM	FORSCOM	USSOUTHCOM	INDCOM
Army HQ	5	1		1	1	1	1
Corps HQ	4	1				3	
Div	12	2			3	7*	
Bde	4	1			3		
Regt	2	1				1	
SFG	4	3		1/3	1/3	1/3	
AD bde	2	1				1	
FAB	5	1				4	

\*One division located in CONUS but assigned to USEUCOM.

**Table 2. Planned Peacetime Disposition of US Navy-Assigned Forces**

Element	Total	USPACOM	USACOM	INDCOM
Aircraft carrier	13	6	6	1
Cruiser	30	14	14	2
Destroyer	134	55	70	9
Frigate	81	35	35	11
Attack sub	97	38	57	2
Ballistic missile sub	33	2	31	
Amphibious ship	65	31	30	4
Mine countermeasures sqdn	1		1	
Mobile logistics	53	26	24	3
MEF	3	2	1	

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**Table 3. Planned Peacetime Disposition of US Air Force-Assigned Forces**

Element	US- Total	US- EUCOM	US- PACOM	US- ACC	US- SOUTHCOM	INCOM	AMC	US- SPACECOM	US- SOCOM
Numbered AF	12	1	2	5	1	1	2		
Bomber sqdn	18			18					
Tanker sqdn	28			28					
Missile sqdn	20			20					
TFS	48	16	6	25		1			
FI sqdn	6			6					
Mil airlift sqdn	35							35	

Section 2. FORCES AVAILABLE FOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING  
(Selective Reserve Callup Authorized)

1. **INTRODUCTION.** The major combat forces listed in tables 4 through 7 are available to the unified commander for regional contingency planning and are in addition to those forces regularly assigned.

2. **USE OF FORCES FOR REGIONAL CONTINGENCY PLANNING**

- a. Forces listed in the tables maybe deployed to or in support of another command.
- b. During execution or implementation planning, if more than one supported commander plans to use forces listed in the table, the CJCS will establish priorities.
- c. Strategic mobility assets for the movement of the forces listed herein will be planned for in accordance with annex J.
- d. Forces will be available for deployment at their home station IAW the time listed in the table, Times indicated are based on the notification date for deployment. Loading, deployment, and forward staging times are additional planning considerations.
- e. Forces envisioned for deployment in support of a contingency plan must be kept within the support commander's capability to receive, redeploy or employ, and support.

3. **DESCRIPTION OF TABLES**

- a. Tables 4 through 7 provide types and quantities of force elements available for planning. Tables are provided for Army, Navy, and Air Force combat elements. Where more than one unified command may plan to use the same force, CJCS establishes priority during execution.
- b. The first column indicates the number of force elements that USSOUTHCOM may plan to use. The next column provides the force element description. The next column shows the amount of time in days required after notification before the force element could depart its home station. The last two columns show geographical location and the owning command.

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**Table 4. US Army Forces Available for Planning**

USSOUTHCOM	Element	N+Day Aval Date	Location	Source
1	Corps HQ	1	CONUS	FORSCOM
1	Inf div (lt)	1	CONUS	FORSCOM
1	Inf div (mech)	1	CONUS	FORSCOM
1	Abn div	1	CONUS	FORSCOM
1	SFG	1	CONUS	USSOCOM

NOTE: Combat support and combat service support forces will not exceed 30 percent of the Army force structure.

**Table 5. US Air Force Forces Available for Planning**

USSOUTHCOM	Element	N+Day Aval Date	Location	Source
	TFS		CONUS	ACC
1	F-15	1		
1	F-16	1		
1	A-10	1		
1	F-4G (WW)	1		
1	TRS (RF-4C)	2	CONUS	ACC
2	Tac airlift sqdn (C-130E)	2	CONUS	AMC
1	Tac EW sqdn	1	CONUS	ACC
1	SOG	1	CONUS	USSOCOM
1	TASS (Ov-10)	3	CONUS	ACC
1	ARS	1	CONUS	ACC
1	ACCS (EC-130)	2	CONUS	ACC
3	AWACS (E-3)	1	CONUS	ACC

NOTE: Combat support and combat service support forces will not exceed 20 percent of the Air Force force structure.

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**Table 6. US Navy Forces Available for Planning**

USSOUTHCOM	Element	N+Day Aval Date	Location	Source
1	CVBG Amphib TG	2	Norfolk	USACOM
1	w/MEU	6	Norfolk	USACOM
1	w/MEB	8	San Diego	USPACOM

NOTE: Combat support and combat service support will not exceed 15 percent of the Navy and Marine Corps force structure.

**Table 7. Joint Communications Support Element**

USSOUTHCOM	Element	N+Day Aval Date	Location	Source
1	JTF spt package	1	CONUS	CJCS

### Section 3. JSCP ANNEXES

The JSCP annexes provided in normal planning guidance are—

Annex A (Intelligence).

Annex B (Logistics).

Annex C (Nuclear).

Annex D (Psychological Operations).

Annex E (Special Operations).

Annex F (Chemical Warfare: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense: Riot-Control Agents; and Herbicides).

Annex G (Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy).

Annex H (Counter-C3).

Annex I (Command and Control Systems)

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Annex J (Mobility).

Annex K (Deception).

Annex L (Civil Affairs).

Annex M (Electronic Warfare).

Annex N (Mobilization).

Annexes C, G, H, K, and N are an integral part of the JSCP documentation; however, they are omitted from the M/S320C JPD.

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ANNEX A (INTELLIGENCE)

1. PURPOSE. This annex lists essential elements of information (EEI) required in joint planning
2. GENERAL. EEI contained in paragraph 3 depict the type of information that would emanate from the CJCS. This information requires continual updating in order to assess enemy military capabilities, vulnerabilities, and area characteristics: to receive advance warning of the imminence of hostilities; to carry out initial wartime operations; and to fulfill the intelligence requirements of higher authority.
3. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION. EEI for the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility follow:
  - a. Will any country, acting separately or in concert with other powers, initiate combat operations? Where?
  - b. What countries are most capable of pursuing independent military courses of action? Under what circumstances and to what extent?
  - c. In what countries of strategic importance to the United States do conditions of incipient insurgency exist?
  - d. In what country do narcotics traffickers threaten legitimate government?

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ANNEX B (LOGISTICS)

References:

Joint Pub 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*  
Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*  
DOD Directive 4140.25, *Management of Petroleum Products*  
DOD Directive 5100.61, *International Agreement Concerning Military Facilities, Operating Rights, and Status of Forces Matters*  
DOD Directive 5160.10, *Single Manager Assignment for Ocean Transportation*  
DOD Directive 5160.2, *Single Manager Assignment for Airlift Service*  
DOD Directive 5160.53, *Single Manager Assignment for Military Traffic, Land Transportation, and Common-User Ocean Terminals*  
AFM 76-2, *Airlift Planning Factors*  
FM 101-10-1/1, *Staff Officers' Field Manual: Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data (Volume 1)*  
FM 101-10-1/2, *Staff Officers' Field Manual: Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data Planning Factors (Volume 2)*  
FM 700-58, *Logistics*  
NAVMAT P-4000-2, *Logistic Reference Data*  
NWIP II-20(C), *Missions and Characteristics of US. Navy Ships and Aircraft (U)*

1. GENERAL

a. This annex provides policy and guidance for the conduct of logistics operations in unified and specified commands and joint task forces (JTFs).

b. Policies outlined herein are consistent with published joint publications and directives

c. Unified commanders will—

(1) Exercise directive authority in the area of logistics to assure economy and efficiency of operations and to eliminate duplication and overlapping of operations.

(2) Review reports, budgets, and requirements of service components for adequacy, as required, consistent with service directives.

(3) Coordinate priorities and programs to effectively use supplies, facilities, and personnel within the theater.

(4) Coordinate the total logistic effort through service components and other subordinate commands as required.

(5) Allocate common-user resources to components and subordinate commands.

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(6) Establish joint boards and offices at the unified command level, as required, to assure economy and efficiency of operations.

(7) Establish coordination with other DOD supporting commands.

(8) Make maximum use of interservice support and common- or cross-servicing agreements to eliminate unnecessary duplication.

(9) Establish policies within the command in functional areas of logistics to assure economy and efficiency of operations consistent with existing joint publications.

(10) Assume temporary operational control of all logistic forces in case of an emergency, consistent with Joint Pub 0-2.

d. Component commanders will—

(1) Provide for logistics support of assigned forces within their command except as provided for by cross or common servicing.

(2) Forward logistic requirements to the unified commander when directed.

(3) Communicate directly with appropriate service departments on all logistic matters except those directed by the unified commander to be forwarded through him.

(4) Identify logistic forces required to support operation plans.

(5) Use standard service planning factors as outlined in approved publications except as otherwise directed.

(6) Provide qualified personnel to serve on joint boards and in offices as required

e. Logistic responsibilities of subunified commands and joint task forces and their assigned components parallel those of the unified command, less directive authority. Service components of such subordinate commands communicate service requirements through the service components of the unified command.

2. SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION

a. General

(1) Supply responsibilities of the unified commander and assigned components follow those outlined in paragraph 1 above.

(2) Maximum use will be made of common or cross servicing to eliminate duplication.

(3) The unified commander will establish priorities for critical materiel.

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(4) Planning data outlined in M/S320C JPD, part D, will be used.

(5) Theater supply levels will be established at 30 days for all classes of supply except class III (paragraph 2b). Requests for variations born this policy must be approved by the CJCS. Time phasing of supplies into the theater will be established by the unified commander, and this should be accomplished as soon as possible.

(6) Standard requisitioning procedures will be established by service components within the theater as soon as practical.

(7) Supplies will be provided to forces of allied nations and indigenous personnel only as directed by higher authority. Emergency authority maybe granted by the unified commander as necessary.

b. Petroleum

(1) A Joint Petroleum Office (JPO) will be established by the unified commander to coordinate petroleum supply requirements within the theater. Subarea Petroleum Offices (SAPOs) maybe established as necessary.

(2) Unified commanders will monitor petroleum supply levels in the theater and submit requirements for bulk fuels and packaged products JAW procedures established by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).

(3) Theaterwide management of petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) will be assigned to a service component.

(4) Service components are responsible to determine POL requirements for assigned forces.

(5) Theater level of supply for petroleum products is established at 15 days

c. Procurement. The unified commander will coordinate all procurement activities within the theater to ensure minimum service competition for limited resources. A Joint Procurement Coordinating Board may be established consistent with the policies outlined in Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*.

3. MAINTENANCE. The unified commander is responsible for coordination of maintenance within the command, The services shall attain a self-sufficient capability for direct maintenance support to their tactical elements, Where practical and without jeopardizing military effectiveness of tactical units. maintenance facilities for joint use should be established. Evacuation policies will be established by the unified commander.

4. MEDICAL SERVICES

a. The unified commander will establish policies and procedures for a coordinated medical service program within the theater.

b. Service components are responsible for providing medical services to assigned forces except as provided for by interservice support agreements or directed by higher authority.

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c. To the maximum extent feasible, joint use of medical facilities will be encouraged to avoid duplication. Joint casualty collection points may be established as necessary.

d. A Joint Medical Regulating Office (JMRO) will be established.

e. Non-US medical facilities will be used only in extreme emergencies.

f. Treatment of foreign nationals will be authorized only when deemed essential by the unified commander and will consist of minimum emergency care.

g. Theater evacuation policy is 5 days.

h. Air evacuation of casualties is the standard mode of transportation.

i. A Joint Blood Program Office (JBPO) will be established as necessary. Whole blood management in the theater will be assigned to a service component.

5. MOBILITY AND TRANSPORTATION

a. The unified commander will allocate common-user transportation and assign priorities as required. Service component commanders will provide resources as directed.

b. For operation plans, the unified commander will document movement requirements in the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) LAW JOPES volumes I and II to provide for strategic movement planning.

c. USTRANSCOM Components

(1) The US Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) is responsible for military traffic, land transportation, and operation of common-user terminals in CONUS.

(2) The US Military Sealift Command (MSC) is responsible for providing military common-user ocean transportation services.

(3) The Air Mobility Command (AMC) is responsible for providing common-user airlift services and tanker support.

(4) The unified commander will establish liaison with USTRANSCOM to coordinate actions and/or requirements in support of the unified command mission.

d. Standard service planning factors will be used as outlined in part D of this document.

e. The unified commander will establish a Joint Transportation Board (JTB) to coordinate theater transportation requirements.

f. Transportation resources allocated for planning from DOD agencies are outlined in annex J. Transportation resource characteristics are shown in part B of this document.

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g. The CINC designates a component or components to be responsible for the establishment and operation of airport and seaport facilities.

6. CIVIL ENGINEERING SUPPORT

a. Requests for negotiation of new or revised agreements for use of bases will be initiated by the unified commander when operational or political situations dictate. Requests will be validated by the CJCS.

b. Maximum use will be made of existing facilities in the theater to maximize civil engineering support requirements.

c. The unified commander will allocate real estate and facilities consistent with existing agreements. A Joint Facilities Utilization Board (JFUB) agency maybe established if deemed necessary.

d. The unified commander will coordinate civil engineering support requirements and establish centralized control of programs when deemed necessary. Theater civil engineering support programs will be consistent with approved plans.

e. Construction standards will be held to the lowest level consistent with mission requirements. Only construction considered operationally essential will be approved for short-term operations.

f. The unified commander will establish civil engineering support priorities as required.

g. Service components will provide resources for completion of civil engineering support programs.

h. Service components are responsible for identifying civil engineering support requirements in support of assigned forces.

i. Contract instruction for all services will be negotiated by the service designated as construction agent for the geographic area concerned.

7. SECURITY ASSISTANCE. General guidance (M/S320C JPD part A, section 3, paragraph 10).

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## ANNEX D (PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS)

1. PURPOSE. This annex provides information and guidance for use by unified commanders during joint psychological operations (PSYOP) planning.

### 2. GENERAL

a. The Secretary of State has responsibility for overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental psychological activities of the US Government in overseas areas. PSYOP policies will be disseminated through US Information Agency (USIA) channels to US Information Service (USIS) representatives in a host country.

b. In a theater of operation, the USIA will provide representatives to assist the staff of the unified commander as necessary to provide advice and guidance to military PSYOP planners.

c. Unified commanders will control the execution of all psychological warfare operations under the policy guidance of the Department of State.

d. When US combat forces are committed to an overseas operation short of a declaration of war or at the request of a friendly foreign government, PSYOP will be conducted by the military under the overall guidance of the US Ambassador in country or the Secretary of State in the absence of a US Ambassador.

e. Where insufficient guidance exists or conflicts arise regarding joint operational employment of forces, the matter will be referred to the CJCS for decision and/or policy guidance.

### 3. SPECIFIC PLANNING GUIDANCE

a. All PSYOP plans developed under the cognizance of a unified commander must stem from national policy and strategy concerning a particular country or area.

b. Unified commanders will ensure the integration of supporting PSYOP plans into the operation plans.

c. The unified commander's responsibilities regarding PSYOP planning include—

(1) Preparation of PSYOP plans, orders, directives, and requests for support.

(2) Coordination of PSYOP intelligence requirements.

(3) Analysis of target audiences.

(4) Determination of psychological objectives.

(5) Coordination and allocation of PSYOP resources, to include friendly foreign military and civilian support and facilities that may be available.

(6) Analysis of PSYOP effectiveness.

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(7) Provision of PSYOP technical support to subordinate and supporting commanders

(8) Coordination of psychological planning requirements with other interested staffs and agencies.

NOTE: In PSYOP planning, particular attention must be paid to enemy courses of action, availability of indigenous resources, assets of all US agencies, and the time available to produce and pretest PSYOP information and propaganda materials.

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ANNEX E (SPECIAL OPERATIONS)

1. PURPOSE. This annex provides information and planning guidance regarding special operations. to include unconventional warfare and the use of special operations forces (SOF) within the unified command area of responsibility (AOR).

2. GENERAL PLANNING GUIDANCE

a. When so directed by higher authority, unified CINCs will facilitate and/or conduct special operations as required (and regardless of conditions) in support of US national interests.

b. Coordination and control of SOF shall be retained at the highest level possible. consistent with the conventional warfare mission (if any), command relationship agreements, and assets available.

c. Subject to any joint support agreements, component commanders are responsible for the administration and logistic support of their service elements assigned to the intheater special operations command (SOC).

d. Emphasis should be placed on any political. economic. sociological, and psychological factors that may be exploited in support of special operations.



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ANNEX F (CHEMICAL WARFARE; NUCLEAR BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL DEFENSE; RIOT-CONTROL AGENTS; AND HERBICIDES)

1. PURPOSE. This annex provides broad guidance to unified and specified commanders when planning for nuclear and chemical operations and biological defense.

2. GENERAL. Planning for the employment of nuclear and chemical weapons requires adherence to the same basic principles and procedures that apply to the planning process for the employment of conventional weapons. However, special consideration is necessary to ensure that these weapons will be used with the utmost discrimination because of their increased destructive power and wide area of coverage. Operation plans developed by unified commanders will contain supporting nuclear, chemical, and biological defense plans as deemed appropriate.

3. RELEASE AUTHORITY. The decision for US forces to use nuclear or chemical weapons rests with the President of the United States. Following presidential authority, the unified and specified commanders exercise the sole releasing authority for weapons within their respective commands. Unified and specified commanders may further delegate this authority to major subordinate commanders. (See paragraph 5 for additional releasing authority for chemical weapons.)

4. NUCLEAR POLICY. (Omitted.)

5. CHEMICAL POLICY

a. The pattern and objectives for the use of chemical agents will depend on such variables as US foreign policy, the requirements of the military situation allied participation, the nature of the enemy, and related factors. Once the decision has been made to conduct chemical operations, the authority to use chemical weapons may be delegated to the lowest echelons responsible for the area within which the effects of the chemical agents will extend.

b. The policy for FY 9\_ is as follows:

(1) US forces will not initiate the use of lethal chemical weapons but will plan for the use of these weapons under conditions of retaliation.

(2) All operation plans will include defensive measures to be employed in the event the enemy uses chemical weapons.

(3) Following release by the President, commanders are authorized to employ flame, incendiaries, smoke, riot control agents, and defoliants to support the concept of operations in the basic plan.

c. All US forces will be trained, equipped, and supplied for chemical defensive operations

6. BIOLOGICAL POLICY. (Omitted.)

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7 . AUGMENTATION, SUPPORTING, AND DEPLOYING FORCES

a. Supporting commanders deploying forces in support of or in augmentation of supported commanders will ensure that such forces are deployed with nuclear and chemical delivery system capabilities IAW supported CINC directives.

b. Nuclear and chemical weapons allocation, handling, and storage will be IAW approved plans.

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ANNEX I (COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS)

1. PURPOSE. This annex provides information and guidance to unified commanders on joint command, control, and communications (C3 ) systems support, responsibilities, and procedures.

2. GENERAL

a. The required communications capability will be provided from the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), from other National Communications System (NCS) operating agency systems, or from other DOD communications systems (tactical and special purpose). Regardless of the source, communications personnel provided to a commander will be under his combatant command, and they will be an integral part of his command and control system.

b. It is imperative that communications and automatic data processing (ADP) systems be compatible with and make maximum use of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS). While WWMCCS is an overall C3 system at the national level, communications and ADP systems are each component parts.

c. The CJCS, through the unified and specified commands, the DISA, and the military services, will ensure that the commander at each echelon has the communications necessary to accomplish his assigned mission.

3. COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

a. National Communications System

(1) The NCS encompasses the DISA and selected communications assets of the Department of State, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the General Semites Administration (GSA), the Departments of Commerce and the Interior, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the USIA, and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).

(2) The objective of the NCS is to ensure that the important Federal telecommunications resources are so interlined that the aggregate will function as a single system.

(3) The Secretary of Defense is the executive agent for the NCS, and the director, DISA, is the manager for the NCS.

b. Defense Communications System

(1) The Defense Communications System (DCS) is a single, worldwide complex comprising a composite of certain DOD communications systems and networks under the management, control, and operational direction of the DISA. DCS includes all nontactical, long-haul, point-to-point, and switched network telecommunications facilities, personnel, and material within DOD.

(2) Organic facilities of the field armies, air forces, and fleet marine forces, posts, camps, bases, stations, and air defense facilities are excluded.

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c. Defense Information Systems Agency

(1) The DISA is an agency of DOD under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense responsive to CJCS and unified command C3 systems requirements. The agency supports worldwide DCS through subcommands or DISA field organizations located with unified commands and at major military or governmental population centers,

(2) Unified command, subunified command, and JTF nontactical communications support, to include command and control, operations intelligence, weather, logistics, and administrative functions, are provided through the DCS facilities and managed by the DISA field organizations. DISA field organizations further serve as the point for integration of the station or tactical communications, excluded in paragraph 3b(2) above, into the worldwide communications system.

4. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

a. Chiefs of DISA field organizations and service component commanders are responsive to the operational needs of the unified commanders.

b. Unified commanders will develop agreements that clearly delineate their relationships with DISA field organizations within their areas of responsibility.

c. Unified commanders have operational command authority over the service operating elements of the DCS through the service component commander, and DISA field organizations exercise operational direction over the DCS operating elements. Hence, the operating elements are subject to authoritative direction from different sources. To avoid conflict the unified commander will exercise those aspects of operational command involved in the direct operation of DCS by expressing his DCS operational requirements to the senior DISA field organization serving his area of responsibility.

d. The unified commander is authorized to assume temporary operational control of the DISA field organization and DCS within his assigned geographic area in the event of a major emergency.

e. The authority and responsibilities of the unified commander include control, review, and coordination of assigned communications resources and/or actions affecting such resources.

f. The unified commander is responsible for the review and coordination of major DCS communication requirements, projects, systems, networks, and resources related thereto initiated within his command.

g. The unified commander will designate the points at which interface of various communications services between the DCS and tactical communications systems shall occur. Such points will normally include—

(1) Component command headquarters.

(2) JTF headquarters.

(3) Other subordinate element headquarters directly controlled by the unified command.

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h. The component commanders have common functions and responsibilities as they pertain to joint operations. They—

(1) Provide communications personnel, equipment and supplies for the effective prosecution of assigned tasks.

(2) Provide, organize, and train communications personnel for joint operations.

(3) Provide, operate, and maintain C3 systems facilities organic to the tactical forces of the components.

(4) Provide, operate, and maintain assigned facilities of the DCS and terminal equipment of DCS access circuits.

(5) Provide, operate, and maintain communications for distress, disaster, emergency, and safety as directed and IAW mutual agreements.

(6) Provide the capability of meeting the DCS interface standards.

(7) Cooperate with and assist other services in the accomplishment of their communications functions as appropriate.

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ANNEX J (MOBILITY)

1. GENERAL

a. Purpose. This annex provides guidance for the allocation of strategic airlift and sealift assets for planning.

b. Requisition of Shipping. The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 states that—

“Whenever the President shall proclaim that the security of the national defense makes it advisable or during any national emergency declared by proclamation of the President, it shall be lawful for the Secretary of Commerce to requisition or purchase any vessel or other watercraft owned by citizens of the United States or for any period during such emergency, to requisition or charter the use of any such property.”

NOTE: This authority is not limited to ships flying US flags but ships registered under any flag if the owners are US citizens. This would have a grave impact on the commerce of the United States; therefore, it is believed that the President would be reluctant to involve this authority for minor contingency situations.

2. GUIDANCE

a. For regional contingencies requiring Selective Reserve callup, the airlift and sealift assets shown in appendixes 1 and 2 will be used for planning.

b. Appendix 2 shows sealift availability times at selected locations and the number of ships available with and without requisitioning. For planning purposes, the authority to requisition shipping coincides to M-day.

c. Refer to part D of this document for characteristics of airlift and sealift.

Appendixes:

1. Airlift Available Without Mobilization.

2. Sealift Available Without Mobilization.



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APPENDIX 1 (AIRLIFT AVAILABLE WITHOUT MOBILIZATION) TO ANNEX J

1. The following strategic airlift assets maybe used for planning contingencies that do not require mobilization:

Airlift	Number Available
C-5A	50
C-141	180
C-130	144

Characteristics of the above aircraft can be found in part D

2. An availability rate for C-5A andC-141 aircraft of 10 hours per day per aircraft will be used for planning during the 30-day surge periods, and 8 hours per day per aircraft will be used thereafter.

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APPENDIX 2 (SEALIFT AVAILABLE WITHOUT MOBILIZATION) TO ANNEX J

1. The following strategic sealift assets may be used for planning for contingencies that do not require mobilization:

Ship Type	Number Available
FSS	8
Slow, BB	17
Fast, BB	16
NSS containership	18
SS containership	7
LASH	4
RO/RO	3
Sea barge	3
Tankers, small	12
Tankers, medium	3
Tankers, large	6

2. Refer to part D for characteristics of the above ships.

3. The following paragraphs show availability times and number of ships at selected locations:

a. Fast Sealift Availability. The number of ships shown below is available on the dates shown:

Days	East Coast	Gulf Coast	West Coast
N+2	1	1	1
N+5	1	0	0
N+8	0	0	1
N+15	1	1	0
N+20	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	1
Total	3	2	3

b. Slow BB CargoShip Availability. The number of ships shown below is available on the dates shown:

Days	East Coast	Gulf Coast	West Coast
N+2	1	2	1
N+5	2	1	1
N+8	0	2	0
N+15	2	1	2
N+20	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	6	7	4

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- c. East BB Cargo Ship Availability. The number of ships shown below is available on the dates shown:

Days	East Coast	Gulf Coast	West Coast
N+5	2	1	1
N+8	1	1	0
N+12	1	2	2
N+15	2	0	2
N+20	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	6	5	5

- d. NSS Containership Availability. The number of ships shown below is available on the dates shown:

Days	East Coast	Gulf Coast	West Coast
N+5	1	0	0
N+8	2	1	0
N+12	1	2	2
N+20	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>
Total	6	6	6

- e. SS Containership Availability. The number of ships shown below is available on the dates shown:

Days	East Coast	Gulf Coast	West Coast
N+5	1	1	0
N+8	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
Total	2	3	2

- f. LASH/Sea Barge Availability. The number of ships shown below is available on the dates shown:

Days	East Coast	Gulf Coast	West Coast
N+5	1	1	0
N+7	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	2	1	1

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- g. RO/RO Availability. The number of ships shown below is available on the dates shown:

Days	East Coast	Gulf Coast	West Coast
N+3	1	0	0
N+5	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	1	1	1

- h. Sea Barge Availability. The number of ships shown below is available on the dates shown:

Days	East Coast	Gulf Coast	West Coast
N+5	1	0	0
N+7	0	1	0
N+10	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	1	1	1

- i. Tankers, Small. The number of ships shown below is available on the dates shown:

Days	East Coast	Gulf Coast	West Coast
N+5	1	0	1
N+7	1	1	1
N+10	2	1	1
N+20	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	4	4	4

- j. Tankers, Medium. The number of ships shown below is available on the dates shown:

Days	East Coast	Gulf Coast	West Coast
N+7	1	0	0
N+10	0	1	0
N+20	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	1	1	1

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k. Tankers, Large. The number of ships shown below is available on the dates shown:

<b>Days</b>	<b>East Coast</b>	<b>Gulf Coast</b>	<b>West Coast</b>
N+7	0	0	1
N+10	1	0	1
N+15	0	1	0
N+20	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	2	2	2

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ANNEX L (CIVIL AFFAIRS)

1. PURPOSE. This annex provides information and guidance regarding principles, responsibilities, and authorities for joint planning of civil affairs operations in the unified commands.

2. GENERAL

a. The term “civil affairs” has three common usages:

(1) Civil affairs concept. Embraces the totality of the relationships of a military commander with his civilian environment.

(2) Civil affairs operations. Obtains for a military commander essential civilian support and assists in the attainment of his politico-military objectives. This may involve the performance by military forces in an area of operations of some or all of the functions normally performed by civil government.

(3) Civil affairs organization. Consists of staffs and units particularly designed and trained to supervise and conduct civil affairs operations in support of military forces in the conduct of tactical operations.

b. The planning for and the conduct of civil affairs are the responsibility of every echelon of command.

c. Each commander of a military unit, regardless of size or organizational position, must comply with the applicable provisions of international law, treaties, or agreements with respect to inhabitants, governments, and economics of occupied, liberated, or host countries.

3. RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY. The assignment of responsibilities within the US Government for civil affairs is as follows:

a. Department of State. This agency is primarily charged with the formulation of foreign policy and has primary or collateral interest in policies concerning—

(1) The governments with which US Armed Forces will deal.

(2) The degree to which commanders of US forces will intervene in the government of a particular country.

(3) The level at which the economy of a given country will be maintained by civil affairs operations.

(4) The level of Agency for International Development (AID) support.

(5) The matters that involve psychological warfare, information, and propaganda.

(6) The plans for turning civil affairs activities over to civilian control.

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b. Department of Defense. This organization coordinates with other Federal departments and agencies and prescribes DOD policies affecting civil affairs activities.

c. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CJCS will—

(1) Formulate policies within broad policy guidance obtained from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (O SD) for transmittal to unified commanders necessitated by military situations.

(2) Ensure adequate coverage of civil affairs in all joint plans

(3) Establish a Joint Civil Affairs Committee, if necessary, at the outbreak of hostilities.

d. Commanders of Unified Commands. Each commander—

(1) Will plan for the conduct of such civil affairs operations as may be appropriate in his area of responsibility as an integral part of his mission.

(2) Will secure, through the CJCS, civil affairs units and personnel required to execute his plan in the same manner other forces are secured.

(3) Will, as required provide for a political adviser on his staff to be obtained from the Department of State.

(4) Will be authorized, but is not required to delegate his authority for civil affairs to one of the service components of his command. The Army component commander will normally be delegated such authority.

(5) Will ensure the adequacy of civil affairs planning by all subordinate commanders.

e. Services and Semite Components. The services have responsibilities as follows:

(1) The Army will—

(a) Act as executive agent for the CJCS for civil affairs planning.

(b) Train and provide civil affairs units and personnel required in the unified commands except where such responsibility is assigned to other services.

(c) Furnish to the other services, at their request, necessary civil affairs personnel as may be required.

(2) The Navy and/or the Marine Corps will—

(a) Train and deploy civil affairs personnel required to support the operations of the forces, activities, and facilities of the Navy and the Marine Corps.

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(b) Provide specially qualified personnel to the Army as instructors or specialists in the Department of the Army civil affairs training and operational units as required.

(3) The Air Force will furnish to the Army, as requested, specially qualified personnel for service in the Department of the Army civil affairs training and operational units as instructors or specialists in matters of primary concern to the Air Force.

(4) All components will perform such missions in the field of civil affairs as maybe directed by the appropriate authority.

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ANNEX M (ELECTRONIC WARFARE)

1. PURPOSE. This annex provides planning guidance for the use of electronic warfare (EW) and integration operations.

2. GENERAL. The increased application of electronics in the development of weapon systems control and guidance systems, command and control communications, and reconnaissance systems has created new requirements for EW.

a. Electronic Warfare. EW is military action involving the use of electromagnetic energy to determine, exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum and action that retains friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. There are three divisions of EW:

(1) Electronic warfare support measures (ESM). ESM is that division of EW involving actions taken to search for, intercept, locate, record, and analyze radiated electromagnetic energy to exploit such radiations in support of military operations. Thus, ESM provides a source of EW information required to conduct electronic countermeasures (EC M), electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM), threat detection, warning avoidance, target acquisition, and homing.

(2) Electronic countermeasures. ECM is that division of EW involving actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum. ECM includes—

(a) Jamming. The deliberate radiation reradiation, or reflection of electromagnetic energy to impair the enemy's use of electronic devices, equipment, or systems.

(b) Deception. The deliberate radiation, reradiation, alteration, absorption, enhancement, or reflection of electromagnetic energy to mislead an enemy in the interpretation or use of information received by his electronic systems. There are three categories of deception:

1. Manipulative deception is the *alteration* of *friendly* electromagnetic emission characteristics, patterns, or procedures to eliminate revealing or convey misleading telltale indicators,

2. Simulative deception is the *creation* of electromagnetic emissions to represent *friendly* national or actual capabilities.

3. Imitative deception is the *introduction* of electromagnetic radiation *into enemy* systems, thereby imitating enemy emissions.

(3) Electronic counter-countermeasures. ECCM is that division of EW involving actions taken to ensure friendly effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum despite enemy use of EW.

b. Signals Intelligence. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is the generic term that includes communications intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), and telemetry. SIGINT planning is not discussed in this document. However, the scope and responsibilities for these activities are in DOD Directives S3115.7, *SIGINT*; S3115.4, *COMINT*; S3115.2, *ELINT*; and Joint Pub 3-51, *SIGINT and EW Support (U)*.

### 3. EW POLICY

a. EW Program. The establishment and maintenance of superiority in EW are essential to the successful conduct of modern warfare. Therefore, a dynamic and progressive EW program must be implemented and maintained to support the missions of US forces.

b. Unified and Specified Commands. Commanders of unified and specified commands are responsible for planning and conducting EW operations in support of objectives, missions, and tasks assigned by the CJCS. Authority to employ ECM may be delegated to subordinate commanders of unified and specified commands or joint task forces. Commanders at all echelons have authority to perform ESM and ECCM. Commanders of unified and specified commands will disseminate command policy guidance pertaining to EW.

c. Service Responsibility. Services are responsible for implementing the joint EW policy as follows:

(1) Develop, plan, program, budget for, organize, train, test, maintain, and employ EW forces, capabilities, and systems required to support US military objectives.

(2) Advise the CJCS of any inability to provide the EW forces or capabilities required to meet US objectives.

(3) Keep the CJCS and the commanders of unified and specified commands and their components fully informed of EW developments and requirements.

(4) Frequently exercise the EW system, to include military C3 systems and weapon systems, through planned maneuvers.

(5) Maintain close liaison with the other services to preclude duplication of effort in EW programs and equipment that may be readily adaptable to multiservice requirements. Coordinate use of service-unique assets in joint training exercises.

(6) Establish signals security (SIGSEC) measures (electronic emission control (EMCON) for the Navy) and security restrictions for use in employing electronic equipment, techniques, and tactics.

(7) Periodically review and update the EW assistance program for equipment, training aids, training courses, and publications releasable to the reserve force and friendly foreign governments.

4. AUGMENTATION, SUPPORTING, and DEPLOYING FORCES. Supporting commanders deploying forces in support of or in augmentation of supported commanders will ensure that such forces are deployed with their full EW system capability.



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PART C. MISCELLANEOUS GUIDANCE

Section 1. MEMORANDUM: ASSIGNMENT OF FORCES

THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1 October 199\_

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDERS IN CHIEF, US UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS

SUBJECT: Assignment of Forces for Unified and Specified Commands

1. The assignment of forces indicated by the enclosure is effective immediately.
2. Commanders in chief of each unified and specified command will exercise combatant command over assigned forces. Military departments are responsible for administrative and logistics support of their respective forces.

/s/ Secretary of Defense

Enclosure

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**US ARMY FORCES ASSIGNED TO USSOUTHCOM**

<b>Unit</b>	<b>Location</b>
US Army, South (UJSARSO) HQ	Panama
111th Sep Bde (Theater Defense)	Panama

**US AIR FORCE FORCES ASSIGNED TO USSOUTHCOM**

<b>Unit</b>	<b>Aircraft</b>	<b>Location</b>
US Air Force, South (USAFSO) HQ		Panama
1155th TASS	C-130	Panama

**US NAVAL FORCES ASSIGNED TO USSOUTHCOM**

<b>Unit</b>	<b>Location</b>
US Navy, South (USNAVSO) HQ	Panama

Encl

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Section 2. SEARCH AND RESCUE

1. PURPOSE. This section provides information and guidance for the planning and the conduct of search and rescue (SAR) operations within the unified command.

2. SAR AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES

a. Within his AOR the unified commander will—

- (1) Exercise authority and responsibility for SAR operations.
- (2) Establish joint SAR centers to direct and coordinate all available SAR facilities
- (3) Delegate SAR authority to subordinate commanders, as appropriate.
- (4) Establish standing operating procedures (SOPS) for the conduct of joint SAR operations
- (5) Designate an SAR commander with the overall responsibility and authority for the operation of the joint SAR center.
- (6) Ensure coordination of support rendered by component commanders.
- (7) Ensure coordination with adjacent area commanders and provide mutual support in SAR matters of common concern.
- (8) Assume temporary operational control of forces not assigned but based or operating in his area as required in support of SAR operations.
- (9) Prepare SAR plans to support contingencies

b. The service and component commanders will-

- (1) Provide facilities for SAR in support of their own operations.
- (2) Provide sufficient personnel to ensure adequate reaming of component SAR controller positions when participating in the operation of a joint SAR center.
- (3) Exercise control of their assigned forces through their component SAR controllers when participating in joint operations.
- (4) Provide all assistance practicable to the other services.

3. OTHER SAR PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

a. Base commanders will normally be responsible for local base SAR operations.

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- b. Task force commanders will be responsible for SAR operations in support of a naval task force.
- c. Tactical commanders will be responsible for SAR operations in support of tactical operations in a battle area.

Section 3. PERSONNEL

1. PURPOSE. This section provides broad policy and guidance on various aspects of joint personnel procedures.

2. GENERAL

- a. With respect to personnel procedures, unified commanders will—
  - (1) Establish personnel requirements by service for manning joint activities in their commands.
  - (2) Establish such personnel policies as are required to ensure uniform standards for—
    - (a) Military conduct.
    - (b) Reporting procedures.
    - (c) Replacements.
    - (d) Personnel center operations.
    - (e) Rotation policies
    - (f) Postal operations
    - (g) Currency and currency exchange.
  - (3) Set personnel requirements based on minimum requirements essential to accomplish assigned tasks.
  - (4) During planning, gear buildup rates to service capability to billet, support, and use.
  - (5) Provide for the protection of US noncombatants IAW joint logistics and personnel policy guidance.
  - (6) Make maximum practical use of local national civilian labor in support of military operations in overseas areas consistent with operational requirements. and establish central control over the use of local national civilian labor.
  - (7) Establish uniform policies in overseas commands with respect to welfare and morale standards for—
    - (a) Equitable opportunity in the use of recreational activities.

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- (b) Discipline measures.
- (c) Leave, liberty, and pass privileges.
- (d) Awards and decorations for personnel in joint assignments.
- (e) Personnel services.
- (f) Special money allowances.
- (g) Spiritual and legal service availability.
- (h) Exchange activities.

b. Component commanders of joint commands are responsible for—

- (1) Determining the personnel requirements of their component.
- (2) Ensuring the readiness and training of the personnel of their component.
- (3) Maintaining units of their component at authorized levels consistent with operational requirements.
- (4) Providing for the administration of their own personnel.
- (5) Providing funds to support the local national civilian labor hired in support of their service.
- (6) Developing and implementing policy on morale, welfare, and recreation required by their service.

### 3. OTHER OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

#### a. Military Police Policies

- (1) Unified commanders will establish uniform policies and procedures within their commands.
- (2) Component commanders are responsible for providing forces and for executing assigned military police-type tasks.
- (3) Component commanders retain responsibility for military police-type functions in areas used exclusively by one service.
- (4) Joint or mutual support agreements should be instituted. where possible, when more than one service is operating in the same area.

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b. Captured and Missing Personnel

(1) The unified commanders have initial responsibility for returnees, pending their delivery to appropriate service control.

(2) The respective services have inherent responsibility for reporting captured and missing US personnel and processing returned personnel.

c. Enemy Prisoners of War

(1) Unified commanders are responsible for overall supervision of detained persons programs within their areas of responsibility and will—

(a) Provide broad guidance to service component commands for development of uniform procedures and plans.

(b) Designate a service component to assume overall responsibility for development, coordination, and implementation of detained persons programs.

(c) Ensure the establishment and operation of collecting points and medical treatment centers.

(d) Designate a component commander to operate the theater US Prisoners of War/Civilian Internee Information Center.

(e) Ensure cooperation with the International Red Cross and enforce the Geneva Convention concerning the treatment of prisoners of war (PWs).

(2) Each service component will develop implementing procedures for—

(a) Early and continuous accounting of PWs.

(b) Initial classification and administrative processing of PWs.

(c) Operating facilities IAW assigned tasking and responsibilities.

(d) Ensuring awareness of US military personnel concerning the laws of war.

d. Miscellaneous Personnel Services. Service components have primary responsibility for the services listed below; however, some may be applicable to interservice support agreements:

(1) Finance and disbursing services.

(2) Legal services.

(3) Postal services.

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(4) Courier services.

e. Mortuary Affairs

(1) Unified commanders will—

(a) Assume responsibility for overall supervision of mortuary affairs and for the disposition of personal effects within their area of responsibility.

(b) Establish and operate a jointly staffed Joint Central Graves Registration Office (JCGRO) and subarea offices to the extent necessary.

(c) Designate a service component responsible for operating collecting points and disposing of remains.

(d) Provide procedural guidance concerning transfer of enemy and allied remains to the custody of another government.

(e) Make maximum effort to evacuate all remains of US personnel to next of kin for burial. Use interment in temporary military cemeteries in the area of operations only in emergencies and until other arrangements are made for disposition of remains. Use concurrent return procedures to the maximum.

(2) The services are responsible for the provision of mortuary affairs and for the disposition of personal effects for their own forces. Provision for such services may be accomplished IAW joint or prior mutual agreements.

Section 4. PUBLIC AFFAIRS

1. PURPOSE. This section sets forth objectives, responsibilities, and authority of the unified commands concerning public affairs (PA).

2. OBJECTIVES OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS. PA objectives are to —

a. Promote the public support of the Armed Forces in preserving US security and in fulfilling US national objectives in CONUS and overseas areas.

b. Disseminate information about US activities that will contribute to good relations between the DOD and all segments of the public at home and abroad.

c. Plan for DOD national public media censorship activities in the event of a declared national emergency.

3. RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS

a. General. Responsibility for PA matters is held by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (ASD(PA)), who has the sole release authority in DOD. Additionally, the ASD(PA) implements PA policies and procedures to the three military departments and establishes facilities for that purpose.

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b. ASD(PA). The ASD(PA)—

- (1) Is the principal staff assistant to the SECDEF for PA and community relations.
- (2) Coordinates on operational matters with the CJCS and, as appropriate, with the military departments.
- (3) Maintains direct communications with the unified commands IAW DOD directives on PA matters.

c. Unified Commands

(1) Unified commanders are responsible to the SECDEF for public information and community relations pertaining to assigned forces within their geographic area of responsibility.

(2) Command programs will be carried out within the resources available and will provide the American people with maximum information consistent with national security. In overseas areas, activities will be conducted in collaboration with US Ambassadors and USIA posts.

d. Military Services. The services will maintain direct communications with appropriate service component commands as required to discharge their responsibility for the administrative and logistic support of the PA efforts within the services.

4. UNIFIED COMMAND AUTHORITY. To properly fulfill their assigned responsibilities in the field of public affairs, commanders of unified commands are specifically delegated authority to—

- a. Issue instructions appropriate to carry out PA policies approved by higher authority.
- b. Provide policy guidance for PA activities, including releasing official information, conducting information programs, and obtaining reports.
- c. Coordinate and/or approve military participation in public exhibitions, demonstrations, and ceremonies.
- d. Act as the sole DOD coordinator for all PA matters with field representatives of departments and agencies of the Government in the geographic area of responsibility.

5. UNIFIED COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

a. The unified command shall cooperate with the ASD(PA) to ensure that PA activities reflect efficient and economical administration. The channel of communications for directives and guidance in PA matters will be directly between the unified commands and the OSD. Coordination will be effected with the CJCS on operational PA considerations.

b. Unified commands will coordinate PA aspects of actions not covered by existing policy with the ASD(PA).

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c. Military departments will support the joint efforts of the unified commands and will ensure that administrative and logistic support are provided to the appropriate service component.

Section 5. ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES

1. PURPOSE. This section provides guidance for planning environmental services support within the unified command.

2. GENERAL

a. Unified commanders must determine what meteorological support oceanographic support, and terrestrial support, including air weather reconnaissance, weather communications, and weather service capabilities, are available within their areas of responsibility.

b. Responsibilities to coordinate and provide such support to maximize the common use of available support should be assigned to the specific subordinate commands that possess environmental services support capabilities. When feasible, specific major units should be tasked.

c. Availability of support from non-US and US nonmilitary agencies should be considered during operation planning.

3. SPECIFIC

a. During operation planning, unified commanders will-

(1) Indicate channels of control for environmental services support if different from the command relationships outlined in normal operations.

(2) Identify significant environmental conditions that could influence the execution of a plan.

(3) Outline any special communications requirements applicable to providing such support, to include—

(a) Instructions to cover periods during which communications circuits are not operational.

(b) Transmitting information at echelons where specific circuits are not available.

(c) Instructions for implementation of weather control.

b. The US National Weather Service is responsible for providing the basic observation network, the broadscale analysis and prognosis, the related facilities, and the coordination with foreign national meteorological services.

c. The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) will provide specialized regional environmental data as necessary.

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PART D. PLANNING DATA

Section 1. AIRLIFT PLANNING

1. Troop requirements for an airlifted force are determined by the mission, terrain, weather in the objective area, enemy dispositions and capabilities, availability of aircraft, probable length of time an airborne force must be supported by air lines of communication (ALOCs), availability of administrative support, and other pertinent factors. The complete dependence of an airlifted force on a single communication system—an ALOC—until a surface line of communication is established demands that troop requirements be determined carefully for each airlift operation being planned.

2. In selecting aircraft or combinations of aircraft by which to transport a unit, careful consideration must be given to the primary mission of the unit and the requirement for the unit in the objective area. During the initial stages of airlift, units transported to the objective area may use a combination of parachute delivery and assault landing. Subsequent to the initial assault and after landing facilities have been prepared, medium transport aircraft may be used in the airlanded role. When facilities are developed sufficiently to handle heavy transport aircraft, units requiring this means of transportation can be brought into the objective area.

3. For purposes of planning, the aircraft capabilities as outlined in M/S324 JPD are to be used. Aircraft requirements for an airlift operation are calculated on the basis of tonnage and personnel spaces for units and, for the most part, on a tonnage basis for resupply and supply buildup.

4. The CINC's staff must determine whether there are sufficient aircraft to lift the forces at specified times. When planning at higher command levels, the commander is concerned with the broad capabilities. He is not concerned with the detail of what goes into each aircraft nor whether the type and number of aircraft fit exactly with the scheme of maneuver. If he can be shown that, within certain limits, there is sufficient lift to meet the requirements, then the staff has fulfilled its function of assisting him in making a decision on a transportation-feasible concept of operations. Detailed, specific loading plans are worked out by the service components.

5. Airlift feasibility testing is done during the plan development phase of deliberate planning. Joint planners use the transportation feasibility estimator (TFE) and other service-unique programs.

Section 2. AIRLIFT CHARACTERISTICS

1. DEFINITIONS (Reference: Air Force Regulation 76-1)

a. Average Payload. The payload that may be expected over a large number of sorties when the fuel requirements, volume limitations, and so forth, have been considered.

b. Nonairtransportable Cargo. Any single piece of cargo that cannot be loaded on a C-5A.

c. Outsize Cargo. Cargo that exceeds the dimensions of the C-141 or C-130 aircraft and requires the use of the C-5 aircraft.

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d. Oversize Cargo. Cargo that exceeds the size of a standard 463L pallet (104 inches long by 84 inches wide by 96 inches high).

2. MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE AIRCRAFT LOADS (M/S320C planning only)

Aircraft	Tons	Pax
C-5	73.7	73 <sup>a b</sup>
C-141B	28.8 <sup>c</sup>	200
C-130E	20.5 <sup>d</sup>	91

<sup>a</sup>Based on the distance from Charleston South Carolina, to Soto Cano. With aerial refueling, the C-5 can airlift the maximum payload (102.5 tons) over any critical leg.

<sup>b</sup>The C-5 will not normally be planned for a pure troop role since the emergency egress from the lower decks is limited. It can carry 267 troops under unusual circumstances in addition to the 73 normally carried on the upper deck.

<sup>c</sup>Based on the distance from Charleston, South Carolina, to Soto Cano. If passengers and cargo are mixed, the allowable cargo load (ACL) must be reduced by 300 pounds per passenger.

<sup>d</sup>Based on the critical leg from Dover, Delaware, to Soto Cano. If passengers and cargo are mixed, cargo ACL must be reduced by 300 pounds per passenger.

Section 3. SEALIFT PLANNING

1. GENERAL

a. The J4 and members of his staff coordinate the logistic effort involved in sealift operations. This logistic effort is a tremendous undertaking, and success depends on the adequate and timely provision of facilities and materiel necessary for the three major phases of a sealift operation: embarkation, movement to the objective area, and the debarkation phase of the operation.

b. Due to the masses of data that must be assimilated in dealing with sealift, this section presents much of this data in condensed form. Extracts from actual movement studies are paraphrased and included. Actual sealift requirements would be performed by USTRANSCOM using the Computerized Deployment System (CODES) automation program.

c. In performing a sealift feasibility test as required by M/S320C, the following must be considered:

(1) Quantities of materiel. The quantity of materiel can be derived from tables of organization and equipment (TOES) or estimated by using planning factors.

(2) Quantities of materiel that can be loaded in assigned ships. Since no two ships are identical, even within a class of ships, notional or average ships are used. The capacities of ships must be expressed in the same units of measure as the materiel to be moved.

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(3) Variables in the overall transportation problem. These variables must be examined in sufficient detail to determine the governing factors.

2. MOVEMENT TO THE AREA OF OPERATIONS. This paragraph matches the computation of the requirements against the availability lift. Convoy escorts and protective combatant forces will be available.

a. General Information

(1) The solution of any problem involving sealift requirements makes it necessary for the J4 to have certain basic information before he can proceed logically and realistically with his estimates. He must know the—

- (a) Mission of the force.
- (b) Size of the force phasing into the objective area.
- (c) Location of the port of debarkation.
- (d) Supply plan in general terms.
- (e) Availability of shipping.

(2) In the initial planning stages, the joint staff probably will have the above information in the broadest terms. Detailed and precise computations will not be possible or necessary at this time, nor will the CINC's staff normally be concerned with such detail. As the planning progresses to subordinate echelons and more information is available, shipping requirements and capabilities will be studied in greater detail.

b. Terms Used in Shipping

(1) Units of measure

- (a) Short ton (STON): 2,000 pounds or 2.4 measurement tons (MTONs).
- (b) Long ton (LTON): 2,240 pounds.
- (c) MTON: 40 cubic feet or 0.4166 STON.
- (d) Cubic bale capacity: total volume of a ship that can be used for cargo. Allowance should be made for lost space.

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(2) Ship and landing craft nomenclature

Letter Designation	Name
LCC	landing craft. control
LPA	amphibious transport
LKA	amphibious cargo ship
LST	landing ship, tank
LSD	landing ship, dock
LPD	amphibious transport dock
LPH	amphibious assault ship (helicopter)
LCM	landing craft, mechanized
LCU	landing craft, utility
LVTP	landing vehicle. track. personnel
LCVP	landing craft, vehicle, personnel
LVTH	landing vehicle, tracked howitzer
AO	fleet oiler
MSO	minesweeper, ocean
LHA	amphibious assault ship (general purpose)
AOG	gasoline tanker
T-AOG	MSC gasoline tanker
T-AK/T-AKR	MSC cargo ship
T-AO	MSC oiler

(3) Types of loading (Reference: NAVMAT P-4000-2, p 8-12)

(a) Combat and selective loading. Combat and selective loading are used for any operation in which opposition from the enemy is anticipated. These types of loading sacrifice economy of space to gain speed and flexibility of discharge. Combat loading is used for the assault elements of an amphibious operation. Selective loading is used for shipping scheduled to arrive in the objective area prior to the time that normal port discharge operations are established.

(b) Administrative (commercial) loading. Administrative loading makes maximum use of troop billeting and cargo spaces and is used when normal port and beach operations are established in the objective area. Maximum containerization is used.

(4) Determination of shipping requirements. The determination of shipping requirements is described below in paragraph 2c. The requirements for shipping will vary, of course, depending on the type of loading used.

(5) Discharge times

(a) Combat and selective loaded shipping must be calculated on a time-discharge factor for personnel and cargo.

(b) For administrative loaded shipping, compare the total tonnage (STONs/MTONs) loaded on the vessel with the discharge capability (cargo handling/terminal service companies) at the destination.

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c. Determination of Shipping Requirements

(1) To test the adequacy of the shipping lift, the planners must determine requirements for shipping and compute capabilities. There are several methods of equating troop movements in terms of shipping requirements and of determining shipping capabilities to match these requirements. All of these methods recognize that the governing requirement is the movement of equipment and supplies, not personnel. If the amphibious-type shipping is adequate to move the equipment and supplies, it will usually be found to provide ample personnel space.

(2) Three methods of determining shipping requirements can be used. These are—

(a) A measurement-ton-per-man factor to express the requirement for lifting equipment and supplies. The available lift must be expressed in the same terms; that is, MTONs. This method is typically used for determining shipping requirements for forces administratively loaded and for followup supplies.

(b) A weight-ton-per-man factor to express the requirement for lifting equipment and supplies. Again, the shipping must be stated in the same terms. This factor also is used for administratively loaded and for followup supplies.

(c) A combined vehicle ratio and tons-of-supplies-per-man factor to describe requirements. By this method, the number of vehicles to be lifted is determined by establishing a ratio of vehicles to men, and the tonnage of supplies and other equipment is stated in terms of STONs per man. To use this method, the shipping lift must be stated in terms of vehicles and tonnage capacity for each type of ship. This will be an approximation, but it will be sufficient for the staff planner at this preliminary stage of the planning.

d. Naval shipping The naval organization of amphibious shipping is designed to afford great flexibility in adapting itself to the requirements of the landing force. The determination of a suitable composition of the shipping for the assault echelon is a matter of judgment. Two factors that influence this determination are the suitability of individual vessels for specific tasks and the need to reserve sufficient shipping lift for troops not in the assault but scheduled to arrive in the objective area prior to the time the vessels in the assault may make a subsequent trip.

3. LOGISTICS-OVER-THE-SHORE OPERATIONS

a. Logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS) operations provide for the movement of cargo and personnel over the shore between ocean transportation and shoreside facilities. Beaches and other more difficult shorelines are used to the extent required.

b. LOTS operations include—

(1) Unloading cargo and personnel from ships into landing craft, lighters, barges, and/or amphibians.

(2) Moving cargo and personnel by landing craft, lighters, barges, and/or amphibians from ships to shore.

(3) Unloading landing craft and/or amphibians at beaches.

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- (4) Unloading amphibians at transfer points.
- (5) Moving cargo from landing craft to temporary storage and/or segregation areas or to the destination.
- (6) Unloading at storage areas or transfer points.
- (7) Discharging bulk fluids from ship or barge via floating or submersed pipeline to shore.

c. Planning factors for LOTS operations are essentially the same as those for fixed terminal operations. Using the ship's gear, temporary floating cranes and causeways, and stevedore labor provided by the forces offshore, ships normally can discharge cargo into special landing equipment as fast as beaches can receive and clear the loaded landing craft and amphibians. In an amphibious operation, the site selections for subsequent LOTS operations are included in the base development plan. Where LOTS operations are established independently, the terminal commander (in consultation with the proper naval authorities) selects possible beach sites by extensively studying maps and hydrographic charts and by referring to pertinent intelligence surveys when available. Final determination of the feasibility of operations at possible sites is made after detailed ground and water reconnaissance has been conducted.

d. In some operations, extensive damage to existing port facilities and/or requirements for dispersion will force the planner to consider transshipment of cargo from vessels to beaches via lighterage.

e. Beach gradients may preclude dry ramping of larger craft, particularly the LST. (Note the beaching limits for dry ramping shown in NAVMAT P-4000-2, p 9-21, for an LST.) If, for example, an LST has to be beached to land tanks, then its load could be only ten 50-ton tanks. If this same LST could discharge to a causeway, then the 500-LTON beaching limit would not apply, and the ship could carry its maximum capacity.

#### 4. PORT AND BEACH CLEARANCE FACTORS

a. Stevedore Capability. In an amphibious force, there is sufficient organic stevedore capability to unload all ships in the assault echelon (NAVMAT P-4000-2, chapter 9.) Follow-on shipping will be discharged by Navy cargo-handling and port groups (NAVCHAPGRUs) and Army terminal service companies.

(1) When fully manned, either by emergency augmentation or mobilization, NAVCHAPGRUs will have an extensive combat terminal operations capability. A NAVCHAPGRU will be capable of performing its functions on three 8-rig commercial cargo ships on a round-the-clock basis. The three ships may be worked simultaneously. Operations can be conducted over the shore (when supplemented by lighterage) or through established port facilities. The productivity of this group is, of course, affected by such factors as the availability and types of ships, lighterage, transportation, enemy action, and climatic conditions. For worldwide planning purposes, the following rates apply to mixed cargo:

- (a) Loading: 50 LTON (56 STON) per rig per shift.
- (b) Discharge: 65 LTON (73 STON) per rig per shift.

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## UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

(2) Army terminal service companies (SRC 55-124). operating on one ship on a two-shift basis or on two ships on a one-shift basis, at piers or over beaches, discharge 2,500 STONs of cargo per day or load 1,250 STONs of cargo per day. (Reference: FM 55-15. *Transportation Reference Data*, table 5-1a)

b. Marine Landing Support Battalion Capability. The landing support battalion is the organization responsible for controlling traffic at the beach or helicopter landing area and for transshipping cargo to nearby dumps. A landing support battalion is organic to the force service support group (FSSG). A Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) will normally have organized elements as necessary to accomplish the primary mission. The battalion is capable of providing sufficient support to simultaneously operate two beach support groups and one helicopter support group, or any combination necessary. The battalion can receive and clear 1,000 STONs of selective loaded cargo per day during the assault phase. For Army units, the transshipment capability is determined by the number of transportation terminal service companies. Each company, when augmented with a truck company, is capable of transshipping 720 STONs per day when vessels are loaded administratively.

c. Availability of Lighterage. The amphibious force has a large number of landing craft. All amphibious ships carry landing craft in varying numbers and types. Generally, in a balanced amphibious force, there is a greater capability to lift cargo in the ship-to-shore movement than the shore party can handle. When MSC shipping is used, augmentation of lighterage will be necessary.

### Section 4. SEALIFT CHARACTERISTICS

1. MEASUREMENT TON. A ship's capacity is normally expressed in measurement tons, which is an expression of volume and *not* weight. An MTON equals 40 cubic feet. and the weight of an MTON varies by commodity. An MTON of ammunition weighs approximately 1 STON wherein an MTON of rations weighs only 0.5 STONs.

2. APPLICATION OF FACTORS. Ship capacities are stated in MTONs, and unit movement characteristics are defined in MTONs and/or cubic feet. You *cannot* determine shipping requirements solely on this basis. The ships must be loaded by a combination of square feet of deck space for vehicles, cubic feet for bulk cargo, and so forth. In addition, because of broken stow factors, all the capacity of a ship cannot be used. In an administrative load, about 80-percent capacity is optimum. The average ship capacities shown in paragraph 3 below must be considered accordingly and should be used only for gross assessment of sealift capacity.

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3. AVERAGE SHIP CHARACTERISTICS (Reference: NAVMAT P-4000-2, table 8-12) (for gross assessments only)

Ship Type	Average speed	Maximum Draft	Average MTONs	Capacity ft <sup>2</sup>	Offload Time
FSS (T-AKR)	30.0	35	51,500	185,000	2 days
Slow, BB	16.2	33	14,818		72 hours
Fast, BB	20.5	35	20,874		120 hours

Ship Type	Average speed	Maximum Draft	Average MTONs	Capacity ft <sup>2</sup>	Offload Time
Container					
Slow, SS	16.1	30	24,520		70 hours
Fast, SS	20.0	32	13,881		35 hours
Slow, NSS	16.4	33	19,197		16 hours
Fast, NSS	22.7	34	36,988		32 hours
RO/RO	23.5	34	38,755	155,330	2 days
LASH	22.5	37	42,042		48 hours
Sea barge	20.5	39	42,400	131,000	10 hours

Ship Type	Average speed	Maximum Draft	Capacity	Average MTONs	Offload Time
Tankers					
Small	15.1	36		160,778	30 hours
Medium	16.1	45		306,780	48 hours
Large	20.0	70		892,875	72 hours

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## Section 5. FORCE STRATEGIC MOVEMENT REQUIREMENTS

The table below provides gross planning factors for movement of units indicated using airlift and/or sealift. These factors are valid for M/S320C planning.

Strategic Unit Movement Requirements Point of Embarkation (POE) to Point of Debarkation (POD)							
Airlift				Sealift			
				Number/Type Ship			
Unit Name . C-141 sorties	S-5 sorties	Pax flown	Residual Pax				
FSS.	RO/RO	BB/CC					
AASLT div	1,222	82	8,329	7,841	3.32	3.00	25.19
Abn div	893	21	6,394	6,715	0.65	3.00	15.84
Armd div	1,023	787	12,343	4,578	6.80	3.00	37.88
Inf div	1,220	329	9,011	7,927	4.97	3.00	30.96
Inf div (lt)	618	18	6,282	4,589		2.67	11.34
Mech div	1,065	757	12,352	4,883	6.67	3.00	37.08
ACR	301	251	3,844	819		2.73	11.29
Sep armd bde	181	228	3,051	996		2.11	8.61
Sep inf bde	261	14	1,382	2,642		1.25	5.21
Sep mech bde	213	200	3,084	1,316		2.10	8.44

NOTES: 1. The sealift portion shows the number of ships and containers required with minimum containerization.

2. The standard requirement code (SRC) is used to quantify movement requirement by TOE unit.

3. There are eight fast sealift ships.

4. There are three *Cape Henry* class ships (RO/RO).

5. There are more than 58 BB and CC ships.

6. The seaport data is extracted from the Military Traffic Management Command Transportation Engineering Agency (MTMCTEA) Report OA 90-4f-22. *Deployment Planning Guide*. August 1991.

7. The passengers flown travel with the equipment and cargo: residual passengers travel by contract air.

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8. The aircraft calculations are based on—

C-141	26 pax	26.6 STONs
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C-5	73 pax	66.5 STONs
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B-747	328 pax	
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9. The Air Force squadron aircraft will self-deploy: personnel and equipment will deploy by military airlift.

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**CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION**Appendix 4. General Situation

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**1. GENERAL**

As a unified commander, US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) has general and specific planning tasks. One of its tasks is to prepare an operation plan (OPLAN) for the defense of Honduras.

The USSOUTHCOM staff is organized conventionally, with the J5 directorate responsible for complying with the taskings of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Developing an OPLAN for Honduras is only one of several assigned planning tasks.

The fictitious events in the USSOUTHCOM area that caused the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), with guidance from the Secretary of Defense, to add Honduras to the contingent planning tasks are presented below.

**2. SCENARIO CHRONOLOGY**

1980s	A period of unrest throughout the isthmus of Central America.
1989	United Nations prevents civil war and supervises free elections in Atlantica.  Free elections in Atlantica place Ramon Bujia of the Party for Democratic Atlantica (PDA) into power.
1989-1991	A deteriorating economy exists in Atlantica as it struggles to transition from a centralized government economic structure to a market-based economy.  People's Popular Army (PPA) leaders continue to consolidate their military strength, draining the fragile economy.
1991	In December, Bujia resigns as president and PDA leader; his resignation is based on failed economic programs and resulting public pressure.  Jose Morazan, an academic and economist for the PDA, replaces Bujia. He promises increased foreign aid, debt amnesty, and economic turnaround.
1992	Humberto Sierra, leader of the Marxist Atlantican People's Party (APP), is killed in a mysterious boating accident after a series of conciliatory speeches directed at compromise with the Morazan-led PDA reforms.  Alfredo Marti emerges as the leader of the APP. Marti was a former colonel in the PPA, having served as a defense attache in Cuba, Libya,

and North Korea. Marti believes that Atlantica must cease to depend on US aid and seek unity with other Marxist nations.

In August, the PPA conducts a successful but violent military coup. Twenty-nine people are killed inside the presidential residence, Morazan and his family escape unharmed. Morazan seeks and obtains asylum in the United States.

The United States maintains fragile diplomatic relations with Atlantica.

1993

Economic instability is overshadowed by Marti's "public service program." consisting mainly of mass conscription into the militia.

PDA leaders begin development of a shadow government and insurgent military force based along the Honduran-Atlantican border frontier.

CJCS publishes a change to the M/S320C Joint Planning Document, directing the Commander in Chief, US Southern Command (USCINCSO) to develop an OPLAN to deter an Atlantican violation of Honduran sovereign territory and, if deterrence fails, to conduct bilateral military operations to assist Honduras in reestablishing its territorial integrity.

### 3. SCENARIO

a. The 1980s witnessed continued unrest throughout the isthmus of Central America. In Atlantica (located to the south of Honduras), free elections in 1989 resulted in victory for Ramon Bujia of the Party for Democratic Atlantica. The United Nations-supervised elections were the result of agreements reached among Central American nations to halt a civil war in Atlantica. The war had pitted members of the PDA, known as the Contras, against the Atlantican Government which was controlled by the Communist Party of Atlantica. It appeared that the Communist Party, renamed the Atlantican People's Party, had been thwarted in continuing its grip on the government. However, the former APP still controlled a majority of the national assembly and, more importantly, the People's Popular Army and the trade unions. The Bujia government had little success in reviving the economy and, under pressure, Bujia stepped down in December 1991 to be replaced by Jose Morazan. Morazan, an academic, was ill equipped to lead Atlantica out of its economic chaos. A series of strikes and demonstrations in the spring and summer of 1992 further weakened his position. Concurrently, a new APP leader, Alfiedo Marti, emerged to replace Hurnberto Sierra, who was killed in a boating accident off Belize in April 199\_. In August, Marti led a successful military coup that overthrew Morazan's government. Support for the coup came from all elements of the APP and the trade unions; they were dissatisfied with high unemployment, runaway inflation, and the deterioration of social services.

b. Former members of the PDA Contras, fearing arrest, have moved into the area along both sides of the Honduran-Atlantican border to the east of Choluteca and reestablished their guerrilla movement. They have rebuilt an insurgency infrastructure, organized and equipped guerrilla units, and directed a recruiting effort in rural and urban areas. The Contras' stated goal is to overthrow the APP regime. The Contras have received military aid from groups in Central America, the United States, and Europe. Overt humanitarian assistance has been provided by the United States and Honduras.

c. The APP, supported by Cuba, North Korea, and Libya, is conducting limited counterinsurgency operations with light forces. The heavy units and elite light forces have been refurbishing equipment and have

been conducting combined arms training. The air force has been training for counterair training operations with its fighters and close air support with its gunships. The navy has increased coastal patrols and has repositioned mines to Las Pozas on the Gulf of Fonseca.

#### 4. ATLANTICAN ARMED FORCES

The primary goal of the APP has been to avoid, for as long as possible, a direct US invasion, thus giving the APP more time to consolidate power to many of Atlantica's leaders who think an invasion may be inevitable. The PPA is the largest of the Atlantican armed services. As in Cuba, the armed forces are the armed branch of the party and not of the state. The defense minister is the third most powerful man in the country behind the president and the interior minister.

#### 5. HONDURAN ARMED FORCES

a. Overview. Honduras has a small professional officer corps primarily trained at a national military academy. As is the case with other Latin American nations, the Honduran military is based on fierce loyalty to those who graduate in the same class for promotion. Currently, it is the sixth promotion (those holding the rank of colonel) who are in the ascendant, while much pressure is being exerted by the seventh. the lieutenant colonels.

Traditionally, the elite branch in Honduras has been the air force, which is considered superior to those of neighboring counties. The equipment is old by international standard and is in short supply.

b. Structure. Honduras is divided into six military zones. The first runs from the capital, Tegucigalpa, north to La Ceiba on the Atlantic coast, where most of the Honduran Air Force is located. The second encompasses the San Pedro Sula area and the region bordering northeast Guatemala. The third is the Choluteca region in the southwest. The fourth, headquartered at Nueva Ocotepeque, lies in the northwest and covers most of the Salvadoran border. The fifth is headquartered in Juticalpa in the south-central portion of the country, while the sixth, headquartered at Trujillo, covers Cabo Gracias a Dios in the extreme southeast. In addition to the country's regular armed forces, there is a Presidential Guard Company, which is responsible for protecting the President and his Cabinet. Honduras also has a 3,000-man Special Security Corps (*FUSEP*) (separate from but under direct army control) that is responsible for internal security and police matters.

(1) Total armed forces: 15,000

(2) Paramilitary forces: 4,500 (public security forces: police and urban counterinsurgency military units).

(3) Available manpower: 1,136,000; 67,000 are fit for military service.

(4) Service period: 24 months (conscription)

(5) Annual military expenditure: \$80 million (estimated)

c. Army Order of Battle.

(1) Manpower: 15,000

(2) Six military zones with a total of four infantry brigades; each brigade has three infantry battalions and one artillery battalion.

(3) Three independent infantry battalions.

(4) One armored cavalry regiment.

(5) One Presidential Guard Company

(6) Four artillery regiments.

(7) One engineer battalion.

(8) One special forces unit.

(9) Equipment:

(a) Tanks: 13 Scorpions, light.

(b) Armored personnel carriers: 1 Sultan and 3 Scimitars.

(c) Armored cars: 12 RBY MK-1s and 70 Saladins.

(d) Artillery: 12 74-mm packs, 24 105-mm howitzers, 12 155-mm howitzers.

(e) Recoiless rifles: 57-mm and M-40A1 106-mm.

(f) Mortars: 60-mm, 81-mm, Soltam 120-mm, and Soltam 160-mm.

(g) Antitank: 84-mm Carl Gustav.

d. Novilia Order of Battle (Coast Guard).

(1) Manpower: 150.

(2) Fleet:

(a) 3 swift ships 103-ton patrol craft.

(b) 1 swift ship 50-ton patrol craft.

(c) 5 swift ships 33-ton patrol craft, 8 river patrol craft, 2 coastal patrol craft, 3 small patrol craft, 1 buoy tender, and 1 survey launch.

(d) 2 EMB III aircraft.

(3) Naval bases: Amapala and Puerto Cortes.

e. Air Force Order of Battle.



(1) Manpower: 1,500.

(2) Organization:


(a) 1 fighter-bomber squadron with 10 F-5E Tiger IIs.

(b) 1 counterinsurgent squadron with 15 A-37Bs.

(c) Transport with 2 C-130s, 10 C-47s, 1 IA1 Arava, and 1 Lockheed Electra.

(d) Other: 22 UH-1B/Hs, 10 Bell 412SPs, 12 EMB-3 12 Tucanos, 8 Hughes 500s, and 12 Mirages.

(3) Major air bases: La Mesa (San Pedro Sula), Toncontin (Tegucigalpa), Goloson (La Ceiba), and San Lorenzo.





**CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION**Appendix 5. OPREP-3 PINNACLE Situation Report

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VOICE REPORT (012000ZDEC9\_ )

“This is a PINNACLE from Commander in Chief, US Southern Command (USCINCSO), for the National Military Command Center (NMCC). A report from the US Embassy in Tegucigalpa indicates that an attack has been made on the US mission in Managua. A car bomb exploded outside the first floor of the mission, which was unoccupied at the time. No US casualties have been reported, but the individuals in the car appear to have been members of the Atlantican Army. One of these individuals was killed; the other critically injured. Both were removed from the scene by Atlantican Army personnel. In response to this incident, US forces in Joint Task Force Bravo (JTFB) will maintain an increased alert posture and will be prepared to assist the Honduran Government as required. Support will initially be limited to aerial warning and surveillance capability using RC-135 and E-3A aircraft currently in place at Howard AFB, PA, for Exercise BLAST FURNACE 9-. Confirmation message will follow.”

MESSAGE REPORT

FLASH

FROM: USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PA//  
TO: NMCC WASHINGTON DC

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

OPER / - //

012330ZDEC9\_/OPREP-3P/036/USCINCSO/ /  
REF/A/MSG/CRITIC/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA //  
// B/VGM/USCINCSO/011800ZDEC9x //  
AMPN/VOICE REPORT TO NMCC //  
GENTEXT, COMMAND ASSESSMENT/

1. ATLANTICAN ARMY PERSONNEL HAVE CAR-BOMBED THE US MISSION IN MANAGUA. ATLANTICAN ARMY PERSONNEL QUICKLY REMOVED THE TWO MEN IN THE CAR. THE APPARENT DRIVER WAS KILLED INSTANTLY. THE OTHER MAN APPEARED TO BE CRITICALLY INJURED, NO US CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN REPORTED.
2. JTFB HAS REPORTED THAT ATLANTICAN FORCES OF APPROXIMATELY COMPANY-SIZED UNITS HAVE INFILTRATED ACROSS THE BORDER AND HAVE ATTACKED A CONTRA BASE CAMP LOCATED IN THE DANLI REGION APPROXIMATELY 40 MILES INSIDE HONDURAS,
3. ADDITIONAL REPORTS INDICATE THAT ATLANTICA HAS POSITIONED APPROXIMATELY TWO MOTORIZED INFANTRY REGIMENTS SUPPORTED BY AN ADDITIONAL MOTORIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT ALONG THE PAN-AMERICAN HIGHWAY SOUTHEAST OF CHOLUTECA

97FEB/MS320CA5

NEAR THE HONDURAN BORDER BATTALION-SUED ATLANTICAN FORCES ARE LOCATED IN THE VICINITY OF THE TOWN OF SOMOTO. ROAD MOVEMENT FROM MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS INDICATES SUPPLY AND SUSTAINMENT ACTIVITIES FOR THESE FORCES ARE IN FULL SWING.

4. INTENTIONS OF ATLANTICAN FORCES ARE UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME, BUT IT APPEARS THAT AN ATTACK INTO HONDURAS TOWARD CHOLUTECA WITH A SIGNIFICANT MOTORIZED INFANTRY FORCE MAYBE IMMINENT. ANOTHER ATTACK WITH UP TO THREE INFANTRY BATTALIONS COULD SUPPORT THIS EFFORT ALONG THE HIGHWAY BETWEEN SOMOTO AND CHOLUTECA TO THE NORTH.

5. JTFB IS ON INCREASED ALERT AND WILL BE PREPARED TO ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT OF HONDURAS AS REQUIRED.

6. SUPPORT WILL BE LIMITED TO AERIAL WARNING AND SURVEILLANCE USING RC-135'S AND E-3A'S CURRENTLY IN PLACE IN PANAMA.

7. ANTICIPATE FURTHER OPREP-3 REPORTS ON THIS INCIDENT. //  
DECL/OADR //

DISTR: CJCS/DJS/SJCS/J3/J4/J5/C3S/CAT/DIAN/ASD(ISA) / / ASD: PAJ3/NMCC//DOC DIV

**CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION**Appendix 6. OPREP-3 PINNACLE/CINC Assessment

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FLASH

FROM: USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PA/ /  
TO: AIG 8790

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

OPER/ - //

020600ZDEC9\_/OPREP-3PCA/037/USCINCSO //  
REF/A/MSG/OPREP-3P/USSOUTHCOM/012330ZDEC9\_  
// B/MSG/CRITIC/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA //  
// C/VGM/USCINCSO/011800ZDEC9x //  
AMPN/VOICE REPORT TO NMCC //  
GENTEXT, COMMAND ASSESSMENT/

1. AT 011835ZDEC94 THE US MISSION IN MANAGUA WAS CAR-BOMBED BY WHAT APPEARED TO BE ATLANTICAN ARMY PERSONNEL. THIS ACT, IN CONCERT WITH OTHER INTELLIGENCE INDICATIONS, APPEARS TO CONFIRM THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ATLANTICA IS PREPARING TO ATTACK HONDURAS WITHIN THE NEXT 2 WEEKS.
2. THERE WERE NO US CASUALTIES. THE DRIVER OF THE VEHICLE WAS KILLED, AND THE PASSENGER WAS SERIOUSLY INJURED.
3. MY ASSESSMENT IS THAT UNLESS THE UNITED STATES RESPONDS RAPIDLY, ATLANTICA WILL INITIATE HOSTILE ACTION; HOWEVER WE MUST ACT CAREFULLY SO AS NOT TO REVEAL INTELLIGENCE METHODS AND SOURCES.
4. FORCES IN HONDURAS HAVE INCREASED READNESS. WATCHCON 1 IS IN EFFECT FOR ATLANTICA.
5. RECOMMEND THAT USCINCSO OPLAN 5500-9\_ BE PUT INTO EFFECT FOR EXECUTION PLANNING.

97FEB/MSC320C



**CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROTECTION**

Appendix 7 CJCS Warning Order

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FLASH

FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC//CJCS//  
TO: USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PA  
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL  
USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE  
CINCFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA  
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI  
USCINCSpace PETERSON AFB CO  
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL  
USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE  
USCINCTrans SCOTT AFB IL  
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD  
COMACC LANGLEY AFB VA

INFO WHITE HOUSE SITROOM WASHINGTON DC  
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC  
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
CSA WASHINGTON DC  
CNO WASHINGTON DC  
CSAF WASHINGTON DC  
CMC WASHINGTON DC  
CDRUSELNORAD PETERSON AFB CO  
CDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VA  
COMSC WASHINGTON DC  
DCA WASHINGTON DC  
DLA WASHINGTON DC  
DLA WASHINGTON DC  
DMA WASHINGTON DC  
CIA WASHINGTON DC  
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

OPER/TIERRACALIENTE//  
021500ZDEC9\_/ORDER/CJCS//  
AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//  
ORDTYP/WARNORD/CJC S//

97FEB/MS320C

TIMEZONE/Z//  
ORDREF/OPLAN/USCINCSO 5500-9\_/HEADING/TASK ORGANIZATION//

5UNIT/

/UNITDES                    /UNITLOC            /CMNTS

/JTF-B

/JCSE

/21 AB CORPS

/102 AB DIV

/17 IN DIV (LT)

/51 ENG BDE

/301 CA BDE

/96 CA BN

/7 PSYOP GP

/CVBG

/MARITIME PREPO SHIPS

/1 MEB

/52 AF (TAC)

AMPN/SUFFICIENT AMC AERIAL TANKER ASSETS TO SUPPORT THIS OPERATION ARE APPORTIONED FOR PLANNING NARR/THIS ISA WARNING ORDER. REQUEST USSOUTHCOM COMMANDERS ESTIMATE WITH ALTERNATE COURSES OF ACTION FOR NCA CONSIDERATION BY 031800 DEC 9\_. USTRANSCOM WILL PROVIDE PRELIMINARY DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATES AND FORCE CLOSURE PROFILES TO THE SUPPORTED CINC ON HIS REQUEST.

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. THE SITUATION IN HONDURAS IS EXTREMELY TENSE FOLLOWING INCURSIONS BY ATLANTICAN FORCES INTO HONDURAS AND A BUILDUP OF ATLANTICAN FORCES ALONG THE HONDURAN-ATLANTICAN BORDER SOUTHWEST OF CHOLUTECA. THE HONDURAN GOVERNMENT HAS REQUESTED US MILITARY ASSISTANCE THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

2. THE HONDURAN GOVERNMENT WILL ASSIST US FORCES AND PROVIDE NECESSARY ACCESS TO FACILITIES AND HOST NATION SUPPORT WHERE FEASIBLE.

3. EL SALVADOR MAY BE EXPECTED TO DENY BASING AND OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS TO SUPPORT THIS OPERATION.

GENTEXT/MISSION/

4. WHEN DIRECTED BY THE NCA, USCINCSO WILL CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE HONDURAN GOVERNMENT TO PROTECT AND DEFEND HONDURAN STRONGPOINTS AND LOC'S.

5. COURSES OF ACTION. US ASSISTANCE MAY INCLUDE BUT NOT BE LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING TASKS: ASSIST IN NEO, CONDUCT SHOW OF FORCES, PROTECT AND DEFEND HONDURAN STRONGPOINTS AND LOC'S, CONDUCT OTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED, AND PARTICIPATE IN A PEACEKEEPING ROLE.

A. MAJOR FORCES ARE ALLOCATED AS FOLLOWS:

ARMY FORCES:

21 ABN CORPS

97FEB/MS320C



102 ABN DIV  
17 INF DIV (LT)  
301 CA BDE  
96 CA BN  
7 PSYOP GP

13 SF GP  
1101 SIG BDE

AIR FORCES:

920 TRS (RECON)  
913 TFS (WILD WEASEL)  
912 TFS  
950 SOS (GUNSHIP)  
951 ACCS (ABCCC)  
952 SOG (VOLANT SOLO (PSYOP))  
910 TFS  
955 ARS (SAR HEL)  
915 TASS  
970 TAC AIR CON WING  
980 TAC AIRLIFT GP

NAVY FORCES:

CVBG (PACOM)  
TF 45 (1 MEB EMBARKED) (PACOM)  
SEAL TM 3

MARINE CORPS FORCES:

MEB

B. USCINCPAC. PROVIDE ONE CARRIER BATTLE GROUP TO USCINCSO.

C. USCINCPAC. DIVERT ONE AMPHIOUS TASK FORCE COMPRISED OF 1 MEB AND REQUISITE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIPPING TO USCINCSO.

D. DIRNSA. PROVIDE SIGINT SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

E. DIA. PROVIDE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

F. OPSEC AND DECEPTION GUIDANCE. EACH COURSE OF ACTION SHOULD BE EVALUATED IN TERMS OF THE OPSEC MEASURES NEEDED TO ENSURE THE CONDITIONS OF ESSENTIAL SECRECY REQUIRED FOR EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION.

6. PSYOP GUIDANCE

A. PSYOP MISSION STATEMENT. (OMITTED)

B. PSYOP OBJECTIVES

(1) PERSUADE OPPOSING FORCES NOT TO FIGHT.

(2) PERSUADE LOCAL POPULACE NOT TO INTERFERE.

c. PSYOP THEMES TO STRESS

- (1) US ACTIONS ARE LAWFUL.
- (2) US FORCES ARE SUFFICIENTLY STRONG TO WIN.

D. PSYOP THEMES TO AVOID

- (1) STEREOTYPES OF RELIGION, RACE, ETC.
- (2) PROMISES THAT CANNOT BE KEPT.

7. INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE. (OMITTED)

8. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

A. AOR DESCRIPTION. THE AOR WILL CONSIST OF ALL LAND AREAS AND WATERS WITHIN A BOX BOUNDED BY THE EQUATOR ON THE SOUTH TO NORTH LATITUDE 20 BETWEEN WEST LONGITUDE 96 AND WEST LONGITUDE 80 EXCEPT MEXICO. USCINCSO IS GIVEN COMBATANT COMMAND OF ALL FORCES WITHIN THE AOR.

B. TENTATIVE C-DAY AND L-HOUR 081200ZDEC9\_.

C. ANTICIPATED D-DAY. (TBD)

D. ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION. IN EXCESS OF 30 DAYS.

E. DEFCON AND DEPLOYABILITY POSTURE, AS DETERMINED BY USCINCSO.

F. KNOWN OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS

(1) MILITARY OPERATIONS WILL BE LIMITED TO HONDURAS AND ATLANTICA AND THEIR ADJACENT WATERS.

(2) ANY FORCE HOSTILE TO HONDURAS AND WITHIN THE HONDURAN BORDERS. AIR SPACE, OR SEA SPACE WILL BE ENGAGED AND REPELLED FROM HONDURAS.

(3) NO US MILITARY FORCE WILL CROSS INTO ATLANTICA WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY THIS INCLUDES AIRCRAFT IN HOT PURSUIT.

(4) THE NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES RETAIN AUTHORITY TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

G. NO OTHER CHANGES IN USCINCSO ROE ARE EXPECTED.

H. SUPPORTING COMMANDERS WILL COORDINATE AND MONITOR DEPLOYMENTS AS REQUIRED BY SUPPORTED COMMANDERS; E. G., USCINCSO WILL PROVIDE AIR-REFUELING SUPPORT AS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS.

I. UNITS MOVE WITH APPROPRIATE MISSION-ORIENTED PROTECTIVE POSTURE (MOPP) GEAR.

J. DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED  
GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

9. TRANSPORT

A. AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY. 1B2

B. ALLOCATION OF STRATEGIC LIFT RESOURCES, AS PER INITIAL PLANNING, IS SUBJECT TO FURTHER REFINEMENT IN PLANNING, ALERT, DEPLOYMENT, AND EXECUTE ORDERS.

(1) GENERAL. FOR PLANNING, SELECTIVE MOBILIZATION WAS AUTHORIZED ON 2 DEC 9\_ IN SUPPORT OF USCINCSO OPLAN 5500-9.. AIRLIFT PLANNING WAS BASED ON USTRANSCOM WITH NO CRAF. SEALIFT PLANNING WAS BASED ON USTRANSCOM-CONTROLLED FLEET PLUS THE RRF AND SELECTIVE REQUISITIONING OF US FLAG MERCHANT MARINE OVER AND ABOVE THE RRF.

(2) AIRLIFT. USCINCSO MAY CONTINUE TO PLAN ON JSCP, ANNEX J, APPORTIONMENT

(3) SEALIFT. USCINCSO CAN CONTINUE TO PLAN ON USING ASSETS APPORTIONED BY JSCP, ANNEX J, IN THE APPROPRIATE TABLES UNDER PATROL MOBILIZATION CONDITIONS, TO INCLUDE USTRANSCOM AND ASSETS FROM THE RRF AND SRP.

(4) THE JOINT TRANSPORTATION BOARD (JTB) HAS DETERMINED THAT A MINIMUM OF 30 PERCENT OF TOTAL AIR AND SEALIFT CAPABILITY MUST BE ALLOCATED TO SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS IN OTHER THEATERS AND TO MAINTAIN ESSENTIAL LOC'S. IF USCINCSO OPLAN 5500-9\_ IS IMPLEMENTED ALONE. USCINCSO MAY PLAN ON ALL REMAINING CAPABILITY. USCINCTrans AND APPROPRIATE SUPPORTING COMMANDERS, IN COORDINATION WITH USCINCSO, WILL APPLY THE APPROPRIATE AIRCRAFT AND SHIP TYPES AND CONFIGURATIONS NEEDED TO MEET CARGO AND PAX MOVEMENT REQUIREMENTS. IF JTB MUST ADDRESS ALLOCATIONS BY TYPE (E. G.. C-5 AIRCRAFT OR RO/RO SHIPS). INCLUDE ALL NECESSARY DATA AND RATIONALE TO SUPPORT JTB ACTION IN TIME FOR ALERT ORDER.

(A) LOAD PLANNING FACTORS. USE JSCP, ANNEX J. WITH DIRECT LIAISON AUTHORIZED BETWEEN ALCON IF SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ARISE.

(B) FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS WILL NOT BE PROVIDED BY THE JOINT STAFF. PARENT SERVICE(S) OF DEPLOYING UNIT(S) MUST PROVIDE FUND CITES FOR MOVEMENTS. SERVICES WILL PROVIDE FUNDING GUIDANCE TO USTRANSCOM IN ANTICIPATION OF DEPLOYMENT AND EXECUTE ORDER(S), IF THE SUPPORTED CINC OR PROVIDING ORGANIZATIONS REQUIRE NON-OPORD INTRATHEATER LIFT SUPPORT PRIOR TO EXECUTE AND DEPLOYMENT ORDERS, THE PARENT SERVICE(S) OF UNITS BEING SUPPORTED WILL FUND USTRANSCOM TARIFF CHARGES AS APPLICABLE.

10. JOPES WILL BE USED TO DEVELOP COA. COORDINATE WITH USTRANSCOM DBA TO ENSURE THAT APPROPRIATE JOPES SITES (TO INCLUDE NMCC) ARE ON NETWORK DISTRIBUTION FOR EACH COA PID.

11. FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATORS (FAD'S) WILL BE AS ISSUED BY THE APPROPRIATE SERVICES.

12. KNOWN LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS

(A) STRATEGIC AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT ARE INADEQUATE TO PROVIDE TIMELY SUPPORT TO DEPLOYMENT AND SUSTAINMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR SIMULTANEOUS IMPLEMENTATION OF MULTIPLE REGIONAL PLANS. CINC(S) DESIGNATED FOR LESS THAN TOP PRIORITY FOR LIFT ALLOCATION MUST CONSIDER EXTENDING FORCE ARRIVAL DATES AND/OR CHANGING MODES OF LIFT. HAVING ONLY SELECTIVE MOBILIZATION AGGRAVATES THE SITUATION.

(B) SOME SUSTAINMENT COMMODITIES. ESPECIALLY HIGH-TECHNOLOGY WEAPONS, ARE IN SHORT SUPPLY.

(C) EXPANSION OF THE INDUSTRIAL BASE IS NOT VIABLE IN THE SHORT TERM. ESPECIALLY ON PARTIALLY MOBILIZED FOOTING.

13. CODE WORD ASSIGNED THIS OPERATION IS TIERRA CALIENTE.

14. USCINCSO IS AUTHORIZED TO USE OPREP-1 REPORTING PROCEDURES AS REQUIRED. AFTER COMPLETION OF THE OPERATION, SUBMISSION OF DETAILED AFTER-ACTION REPORTS TO CJCS IS REQUIRED AS FOLLOWS: FIRST-IMPRESSION REPORT (FIR) BY AUTODIN MESSAGE WITHIN 10 DAYS; FINAL REPORT (FR) BY MAIL, COURIER OR WIN WITHIN 90 DAYS.

15. CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCINCSO OPLAN 5500-9\_.

16. PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

(A) PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION ABOUT THIS OPERATION IS NOT AUTHORIZED. PUBLIC AND NEWS MEDIA QUERIES CONCERNING THIS OPERATION SHOULD BE TAKEN AND REFERRED TO OASD(PA) THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (OCJCS). PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER DURING REGULAR DUTY HOURS, CALL DSN 225-7678 OR 224-5225, 76628, STU III CAPABLE AFTER DUTY HOURS, CONTACT THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER THROUGH THE NMCC, DSN 227-8322 OR 225-1858. IF NECESSARY, ADDITIONAL PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE WILL BE FURNISHED BY SEPARATE COMMUNICATIONS.

(B) PROVIDE PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE ABOUT THIS OPERATION BY SEPARATE MESSAGE DIRECT TO JOINT STAFF INFO OASD(PA). TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING: PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS POLICY. ACTIVE OR PASSIVE; DRAFT RESPONSE TO QUERY OR RELEASE WITH SUPPORTING QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS. PLANS FOR TROOP AND FAMILY INFORMATION, SECURITY REVIEW. DAILY UNCLAS OPERATIONS SUMMARY, AUDIOVISUAL DOCUMENTATION. COMMUNITY RELATIONS. JOINT INFORMATION BUREAU (JIB) ESTABLISHMENT, AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS FIELD COMMUNICATION NET; RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING MEDIA ACCESS TO THE AREA OF OPERATIONS. WHETHER OPEN ACCESS CAN BE ACCOMMODATED OR WHETHER POOLS WILL BE REQUIRED (NUMBER OF MEDIA THAT CAN BE HANDLED), GROUND RULES AND GUIDELINES, BRIEFINGS, INTRATHEATER AND INTERTHEATER TRANSPORTATION, ACCREDITATION, AND OTHER MEDIA SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS; AND JIB PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT AUGMENTATION REQUIREMENTS.

17. COMBAT CAMERA EXPEDITE DELIVERY OF PROCESSED OR UNPROCESSED IMAGES TO THE 1361 AUDIOVISUAL SQUADRON/DO, ATTN: JOINT COMBAT CAMERA CENTER BUILDING 3720, ANDREWS AFB, MD 20331-5997, FOR REPRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION TO APPROPRIATE AGENCIES. DURING REGULAR DUTY HOURS, CALL DSN 858-7786/7783 OR COMMERCIAL (301) 98 1-7786/7783. AFTER DUTY HOURS, CONTACT THE ANDREWS AFB COMMAND POST AT DSN 858-5058/5059 AND ASK FOR THE SQUADRON DUTY OFFICER. FILM AND VIDEOTAPE MAY ALSO BE SENT TO ANY OF THE WASHINGTON, DC. AREA AIRPORTS. NOTIFY THE SQUADRON DUTY OFFICER OF THE AIRLINE, FLIGHT NUMBER. ARRIVAL TIME. ETC., AND SQUADRON WILL PICK UP THE MATERIAL.  
GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL./

18. COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. WHERE CRITICAL COMMUNICATION RESOURCES ARE NOT SATISFIED BY AUGMENTING OR SUPPORTING UNITS, USCINCSO (THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER) WILL VALIDATE AND FORWARD REQUIREMENTS FOR CJCS-CONTROLLED MOBILE AND TRANSPORTABLE COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH CJCS MOP 3. BECAUSE OF LIMITED SATELLITE CAPACITY, USCINCSO WILL BE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND RELATIVE PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATE CHANNELS AND CIRCUITS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS OPERATION. INCLUDING THOSE OF THE SUPPORTING COMMANDERS.

19. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. USCINCSO IS THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER. USCINCEUR, USCINCPAC, CINCUSACOM, USCINCCENT, USCINCSpace, USCINCTrans, CINCFORSCOM, AND CINCSoC ARE SUPPORTING COMMANDERS. COMACC IS A SUPPORTING RESOURCE MANAGER. DIRNSA, DMA, AND DIA ARE SUPPORTING AGENCIES. USCINCSO WILL EXERCISE OPCON OVER ATTACHED FORCES FROM THE SUPPORTING COMMANDERS.  
AKNLDG/Y

DECL/OADR



**CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION**

Appendix 8. JTFSO Activation Order

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FLASH

FROM: CDR FORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//  
TO: CDR 21ST ABN CORPS FT BRAGG NC//

INFO AIG 8790

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

OPER/TIERRA CALIENTE//

040001ZDEC9\_/EXORD/001/USCINCFOR/  
REF/A/MSG/WARNORD/001/CJCS/031800ZDEC9\_//  
/ / B/MSG/CRITIC/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA //  
/ / C/03P/USCINCSO/012330ZDEC9\_//  
/ / D/03PCA/USCINCSO/020600ZDEC9\_ //  
AMPN/VGM/FORSCOM DCSOPS AND 21ABC G-3 //  
GENTEXT//THIS IS AN EXECUTE ORDER //

1. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY 21ST ABN CORPS IS DIRECTED TO BEGIN PLANNING FOR OPERATIONS AS JTF SOUTH IAW USCINCSO OPLAN 5500-9\_.
2. CDR, 21ST ABN CORPS. IS DESIGNATED COMJTF SOUTH FOR PLANNING AND POSSIBLE EXECUTION OF FORCE-PROJECTION OPERATIONS IN HONDURAS.

3. DIRLAUTH

DECL/OADR





**CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION**

## Appendix 9. Commander's Estimate of the Situation

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(Adapted from Joint Pub 5-03. 1)

## SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Issuing Headquarters  
Place  
Day, Month, Year, Hour, Zone

## COMMANDERS ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

- ( ) REFERENCES:
- a. Maps and charts
  - b. Other pertinent documents

1. ( ) Mission. State the assigned or deduced task and its purpose. If the mission is multiple, determine priorities. List any intermediate tasks, prescribed or deduced, necessary to the accomplishment of the mission.

2. ( ) The Situation and Courses of Action

a. ( ) Considerations Affecting the Possible Courses of Action. Determine and analyze the factors that will influence the choice of COA as well as those that affect the capabilities of the enemy. Consider any of the following and other factors that are involved. include under each a statement of each fact (or an assumption, if necessary), and deduce the probable influence on enemy or friendly actions.

(1) ( ) Characteristics of the Area of Operations

(a) ( ) Military Geography

1. ( ) Topography. Consider factors of relief and drainage, vegetation, surface materials, and similar characteristics because they affect such elements of an operation as observation, maneuver, fire support, concealment. cover, air and surface movement LOCs, avenues of approach. key terrain, nuclear and CB weapons employment, electronic emissions of all type, and unconventional, psychological, and other significant activities.

2. ( ) Hydrography. Include the characteristics of offshore sea areas, approaches to the beaches. currents. tides. the beaches themselves, ports, docks, and similar maritime considerations.

3. ( ) Climate and Weather. Determine and state extremes of temperature, wind velocities, cloud cover. visibility, precipitation, and other such factors that can affect military operations. Sunrise, sunset, and twilight data are normally given in this subparagraph.

(b) ( ) Transportation. Indicate characteristics of roads, railways, inland waterways, and airfields, including such factors as size, capacity, conditions, and other facts that affect enemy capabilities and friendly COAs.

(c) ( ) Telecommunications. List radio, cable, landline, and other communications facilities in the area of operations that might aid in the exercise of command over military forces. Facilities considered by this subparagraph are not those in the organic capabilities of the opposing forces, but rather those present in the area.

(d) ( ) Politics. Include such considerations as political stability, alliances, relations with other countries, aspects of international law, control over subversion and dissidence, and similar factors that may influence selection of the best COA. Neutrality or nonneutrality of neighboring states in the area is often listed here.

(e) ( ) Economics. Include the organization of the economy and sometimes its mobilization capacity; the industrial base of the antagonists to support hostilities, finance, and foreign trade; and similar influences as they affect selection of a COA.

(f) ( ) Sociology. Consider social conditions, which run a wide range from the psycho-logical ability of the populace to withstand the rigors of war to health and sanitation conditions in the area of operations. Language, social institutions and attitudes, and similar factors that may affect selection of the best COA must be considered.

(g) ( ) Science and Technology. Although little immediate military impact may result from the state of science and technology in a target area, consider the long-range effects of such factors as technical skill level of the population and scientific and technical resources in manpower and facilities in cases where they may affect the choice of a COA.

## (2) ( ) Relative Combat Power

### (a) ( ) Enemy

1. ( ) Strength. Give number and size of enemy units committed and those available for reinforcement in the area. This is not intended to be a tabulation of numbers of aircraft, ships, missiles, or other military weaponry. Rather, it is a study of what strength the enemy commander can bring to bear in the area in terms of ground units committed and reinforcing; aircraft sortie rates; missile delivery rates; and other strengths the commander thinks may affect the balance of power.

2. ( ) Composition. Include order of battle of major enemy combat formations, equivalent strengths of enemy and friendly units, and major weapon systems and armaments in the enemy arsenal and their operational characteristics.

3. ( ) Location and Disposition. Indicate geographic location of enemy units; fire support elements; command and control facilities; air, naval, and missile forces; and other combat power in or deployable to the area of operations.

4. ( ) Reinforcement. Estimate the enemy reinforcement capabilities that can influence the battle in the area under consideration. This study should include ground, air, naval, and missile forces; nuclear, CB, and other advanced weapon systems; and an estimate of the relative capacity to move these forces about, to, and in the battle area.

5. ( ) Logistics. Summarize enemy ability to support the capabilities with which it has been credited and include such considerations as supply, maintenance, hospitalization and evacuation, transportation, labor, construction, and other essential logistics means. Broadly speaking, this is a feasibility test for enemy capabilities.

6. ( ) Time and Space Factors. Estimate where and when initial forces and reinforcements can be deployed and employed. Such a study will normally include distances and travel times by land, sea, and air from major bases or mounting areas into the battle area.

7. ( ) Combat Efficiency. Estimate enemy state of training, readiness, battle experience, physical condition, morale, leadership, motivation tactical doctrine, discipline, and whatever significant strengths or weaknesses may appear.

(b) ( ) Friendly. In general, follow the same pattern used for analysis of the enemy when appraising the commander's own force. The descriptions of what to consider and the approach to the problem in subparagraph 2a(2)(a) apply to the analysis of friendly forces and should include strength, composition, location and disposition, reinforcements, logistics, time and space factors, and combat efficiency.

(c) ( ) Assumptions. Assumptions are intrinsically important factors on which the conduct of the operation is based and must be noted as such in paragraph 2 of the Commander's Estimate.

b. ( ) Enemy Capabilities. State the enemy capabilities, obtained from the intelligence estimate, that can affect the accomplishment of the mission.

c. ( ) Own Courses of Action. State all practicable COAs open to the commander that, if successful, will accomplish the mission.

3. ( ) Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action. Determine the probable effect of each enemy capability on the success of each of the commander's own COAs. Derive governing factors from this analysis, with which to compare the commander's COAs in paragraph 4, below.

4. ( ) Comparison of Own Courses of Action. Weigh the advantages and disadvantages of each of the commander's COAs with respect to the governing factors. Decide which COA promises to be the most successful in accomplishing the mission.

5. ( ) Decision. Translate the COA selected into a concise statement of what the force as a whole is to do, and as much of the elements of when, where, how, and why as may be appropriate.

(Signed) \_\_\_\_\_  
Commander

ANNEXES: (As required, by letter and title)

DISTRIBUTION: (According to policies and procedures of the issuing headquarters)



**CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION**

Appendix 10. CJCS Alert Order

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FLASH

FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC//CJCS//

TO: USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PA  
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL  
CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE  
CINCFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA  
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI  
USCINCSpace PETERSON AFB CO  
CINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL  
USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE  
USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL  
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD  
COMACC LANGLEY AFB VA

INFO WHITE HOUSE SITROOM WASHINGTON DC

SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC  
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
CSA WASHINGTON DC  
CNO WASHINGTON DC  
CSAF WASHINGTON DC  
CMC WASHINGTON DC  
CDRUSELNORAD PETERSON AFB CO  
CDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VA  
COMSC WASHINGTON DC  
DCA WASHINGTON DC  
DIA WASHINGTON DC  
DLA WASHINGTON DC  
DMA WASHINGTON DC  
CIA WASHINGTON DC  
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

OPER/TIERRA CALIENTE//

051100ZDEC9\_/ORDER/CJCS//

REF/A/012330ZDEC9\_/OPREP-3PCA/USCINCSO//

REF/B/021500ZDEC9\_/ORDER/CJCS//

REF/C/031630ZDEC9\_/OPREP-1/USCINCSO//

97FEB/MS320C10

REF/D/USCINCSO OPLAN 5500/23 OCT 91//  
AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS/-/NOTAL//  
REF/A/012330ZDEC9\_/OPWP-3PCA/USCINCSO/-/NOTAL//  
REF/B/021500ZDEC9\_/ORDER/CJCS/-/NOTAL//  
REF/C/031630ZDEC9\_/OPREP-1/USCINCSO  
REF/D/USCINCSO OPLAN 5500/23 OCT 91/-/NOTAL//

NARR/CJCS WARNING ORDER, COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION, USCINCSO  
OPLAN 5500-9\_//  
ORDTYP/ALORD/-//  
TIMEZONE/Z//

NARR/THIS IS AN ALERT ORDER THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS AUTHORIZED EXECUTION  
PLANNING FOR USCINCSO OPLAN 5500-9\_. SUPPORTED CINC OPORD OR IMPLEMENTING  
INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED BY 7 DEC 9\_//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. SEE CJCS WARNING ORDER.

GENTEXT/MISSION/

2. SEE CJCS WARNING ORDER.

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

3. COURSE OF ACTION. THE NCA APPROVED COA NUMBER 2 AS CONTAINED IN REF C.
4. MAJOR COMBAT FORCES. APPROVED AS PER REF A.
5. USCINCTRANS IS AUTHORIZED TO MOVE AIRCRAFT AND STAGE CREWS TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS.
6. OPSEC AND DECEPTION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING ORDER.
7. PSYOP GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING ORDER.
8. INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING ORDER.
9. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.
  - A. PROPOSED C-DAY, L-HOUR IS 081200ZDEC9\_. REQUEST USTRANSCOM COORDINATE WITH SUPPORTING CINCS AND RECOMMEND FIRM C-DAY, L-HOUR TO CJCS.
  - B. TARGET DATE FOR EXECUTION IS (TBD).
  - C. SUPPORTING COMMANDS' DEPLOYMENT AND MOVEMENT DATA ARE REQUIRED TO USTRANSCOM BY 071200ZDEC9\_. MOVEMENT SCHEDULES ARE REQUIRED BY 081200ZDEC9\_.

D. USTRANSCOM WILL COORDINATE AND MONITOR DEPLOYMENTS AS REQUIRED BY USCINCSO AND SUPPORTING COMMANDERS.

E. OTHER COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS AS PER WARNING ORDER.

F. DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

10. TRANSPORT. ALLOCATION OF STRATEGIC LIFT FOR REVISED PLANNING. SELECTIVE MOBILIZATION AUTHORIZED 2 DEC 9\_. AIRLIFT PLANNING IS BASED ON USTRANSCOM WITHOUT CRAF. SEALIFT PLANNING IS BASED ON USTRANSCOM-CONTROLLED FLEET PLUS THE RRF AND SELECTIVE REQUISITIONING OF US FLAG MERCHANT MARINE OVER AND ABOVE THE RRF.

A. AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY. 1B2.

B. AIRLIFT ALLOCATION. THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, HAS APPROVED THE FOLLOWING STRATEGIC AIRLIFT ASSETS TO SUPPORT USCINCSO OPLAN 5500-9\_ OPERATIONS:

PERIOD	ASSETS
C-DAY THROUGH C+14	45 C-5 180 C-141
C+15 THROUGH C+29	55 C-5 195 C-141

C. SEALIFT. FOR EXECUTION PLANNING. THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, HAS APPROVED THE FOLLOWING STRATEGIC SEALIFT ASSETS TO SUPPORT USCINCSO OPLAN 5500-9\_ OPERATIONS:

PERIOD	ASSETS
C-DAY THROUGH C+14	105 FSS 6 BB (SLOW) 4 BB (FAST) 10 RO/RO 16 CNTNR (SS) 18 CNTNR (NSS) 10 TANKER 3 LASH 3 SEA BARGE/SEA TRAIN

C+15 THROUGH C+45

7 FSS  
14 BB (SLOW)  
12 BB (FAST)  
16 RO/RO  
21 CNTNR (SS)  
32 CNTNR (NSS)  
18 TANKER  
3 LASH  
3 SEA BARGE/SEA TRAIN

D. IF REQUIRED, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS WILL BE ADDRESSED BY THE CJCS EXECUTE ORDER.

11. FAD. SEE CJCS WARNING ORDER.

12. FUND CITATIONS WILL BE ISSUED SEPARATELY.

13. KNOWN LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS. SEE CJCS WARNING ORDER.

14. PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA. SEE CJCS WARNING ORDER.

15. REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH JOINT PUBS 1-03.8 AND 6-04.

16. CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING ORDER.

17. PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING ORDER.

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

18. COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE SEE CJCS WARNING ORDER.

19. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. AS SPECIFIED IN THE CJCS WARNING ORDER.

AKNLDG/Y//

DECL/OADR//

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE



**CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION**

Appendix 11. CJCS Execute Order

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FLASH

FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC//CJCS//  
TO: USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PA  
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL  
CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE  
CINCFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA  
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI  
USCINCSpace PETERSON AFB CO  
CINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL  
USCINCSSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE  
USCINCSTRANS SCOTT AFB IL  
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD  
COMACC LANGLEY AFB VA

INFO WHITE HOUSE SITROOM WASHINGTON DC  
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC  
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
CSA WASHINGTON DC  
CNO WASHINGTON DC  
CSAF WASHINGTON DC  
CMC WASHINGTON DC  
CDRUSELNORAD PETERSON AFB CO  
CDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VA  
COMSC WASHINGTON DC  
DCA WASHINGTON DC  
DIA WASHINGTON DC  
DLA WASHINGTON DC  
DMA WASHINGTON DC  
CLA WASHINGTON DC  
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

OPER/TIERRA CALIENTE//

080600ZDEC9\_/ORDER/CJCS//

AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//  
REF/A/012330ZDEC9\_/OPREP-3PCA/USCINCSO//  
REF/B/021500ZDEC9\_/ORDER/CJCS//

96FEB/MS320CAI 1

REF/C/031630ZDEC9\_/OPREP-1/USCINCSO//

REF/D/USCINCSO OPLAN 5500/23 OCT 91//

REF/E/051100ZDEC9\_/ORDER/CJCS//

AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS/-/NOTAL//

REF/A/012330ZDEC9\_/OPREP-3PCA/USCINCSO/-/NOTAL//

REF/B/021500ZDEC9\_/ORDER/CJCS/-/NOTAL//

REF/C/031630ZDEC9\_/OPREP-1/USCINCSO

REF/D/USCINCSO OPLAN 5500/23 OCT 91/-NOTAL//

REF/E/051100ZDEC9\_/ORDER/CJCS/-/NOTAL//

NARR/CJCS WARNING ORDER, COMMANDERS ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION, USCINCSO OPLAN 5500-9\_, CJCS ALERT ORDER//

ORDTYP/EXORD/CJCS//

NARR/THIS IS AN EXECUTE ORDER. THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS DIRECTED EXECUTION OF OPERATION TIERRA CALIENTE.//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. IN RESPONSE TO ATLANTICA'S INCURSIONS INTO HONDURAS AND WITH THE BUILDUP OF ATLANTICAN FORCES ALONG THE HONDURAN BORDER THE HONDURAN GOVERNMENT HAS FORMALLY REQUESTED SUBSTANTIAL US MILITARY ASSISTANCE BE DEPLOYED TO HONDURAS. THE NCA HAS AUTHORIZED THE EXECUTION OF OPLAN 5500-9\_.

GENTEXT/MISSION/

2. SEE CJCS WARNING ORDER.//

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

3. COURSE OF ACTION. COA NUMBER 2 CONTAINED IN REFERENCE C IS APPROVED WITH FOLLOWING RESTRICTIONS, BEGINNING C-DAY. DEPLOYMENT OF ONLY 1 X DRB, 1 X TFS, ELEMENTS OF JSOTF, AND COMJTF HQ TO HONDURAS (4-DAY CLOSURE) IS AUTHORIZED. IF THIS DOES NOT DETER ATLANTICA. FOLLOW-ON FORCES WILL DEPLOY TO HONDURAS OO.

4. MAJOR COMBAT FORCES. USE FORCES AS STATED IN REF A.

5. OPSEC AND DECEPTION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING ORDER.

6. PSYOP GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING ORDER.

7. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

A. AS STATED IN CJCS WARNING AND ALERT ORDERS.

B. EXECUTE BY 8 DEC 9\_.

96FEB/MS320CA11

C. ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATIONS IN EXCESS OF 30 DAYS. TERMINATE OPERATIONS WHEN DIRECTED.

D. ROE AS CONTAINED IN USCINCSO OPLAN 5500-9\_.

E. USTRANSCOM WILL COORDINATE AND MONITOR DEPLOYMENTS AS REQUIRED BY USCINCSO AND SUPPORTING COMMANDERS.

F. DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

8. FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS. ISSUED SEPARATELY.

9. PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA. SEE CJCS WARNING AND ALERT ORDERS.

10. REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. NORMAL OPERATIONAL REPORTING AS PRESCRIBED IN JOINT PUBS 1-03.8 AND 6-04.

11. MOVEMENT OF FORCES WILL BE REPORTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPROVED CJCS PROCEDURES.

12. CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING AND ALERT ORDERS.

13. KNOWN LOGISTICS CONSTRAINTS. SEE CJCS WARNING AND ALERT ORDERS.

14. PUBLIC AFFAIRS. SEE CJCS WARNING AND ALERT ORDERS.

15. COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING AND ALERT ORDERS.

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

16. SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING CINCS, RESOURCE MANAGERS. AND SUPPORTING AGENCIES AS STATED IN CJCS WARNING ORDER.

AKNLDG/Y//

DECL/OADR//



**CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION**Appendix 12. JTF SO OPORD 9\_-5

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Joint orders are governed by the formats and materials in Joint Pub 5-03.2. *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System: Volume II, Supplemental Planning Formats and Guidance, March 1992*. While every effort has been made to make this plan conform to the joint publication, some alterations were necessary due to limitations of space and printing constraints. For example, the contents page of this order lists some annexes as "not used" and "omitted." In accordance with the joint pub, annexes that are not needed (or do not apply) in a specific joint order are not published but are listed with the notation "not used." The annexes listed as "omitted" would normally be used in such an operation but, because of limitations, have not been written for this order. For more information on the format and organization of joint orders, see Joint Pub 5-03.2.

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JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH

7 DEC 199\_-

JTF SOUTH OPORD 9\_-5 ( )

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HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH  
FORT BRAGG, NC 28307  
7 December 199.

JTF SOUTH OPORD 9 -5 ( )

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HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH  
FORT BRAGG, NC 28307  
7 December 199.

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OPERATION TIERRA CALIENTE ( )

- ( ) REFERENCES:
- a. ( ) USCINCSO OPLAN 5500.-9..
  - b. ( ) CJCS Warning Order, DTG 031800ZDEC9\_-.
  - c. ( ) COMJTFSO OPREP-1, DTG 062300DEC9\_-.
  - d. ( ) Maps:
    - ( ) Series USACGSC 50-355, HONDURAS, sheet 1 (SAN LORENZO), edition 1982, 1:50,000.
    - ( ) Series USACGSC 50-356, HONDURAS, sheet 1 (CHOLUTECA—EL TRIUNFO), 1:50,000.
    - ( ) Series USACGSC 50-357, HONDURAS, sheet 1 (SAN MARCOS DE COLON), 1:50,000.
    - ( ) Series USACGSC 50-358. HONDURAS, sheet 1 (SOTO CANO—TEGUCIGALPA), 1:50,000.
    - ( ) Series TPC, BELIZE—L SALVADOR—GUATEMALA—HONDURAS—MEXICO, sheet K-25A, edition 3, 1:500,000.
    - ( ) Series TPC, EL SALVADOR—HONDURAS—NICARAGUA, sheet K-25B, edition 5, 1:500,000.
    - ( ) Series TPC, COSTA RICA—NICARAGUA—PANAMA. sheet K-25C, edition 3.1:500,000.

( ) TASK ORGANIZATION. Annex A.

1. ( ) Situation

a. ( ) General. This operation is planned in response to indications of increased hostilities against the government of HONDURAS (GOH) and the Contra and Miskito people by the government of ATLANTICA (GOA).

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b. ( ) Area of Concern

(1) ( ) Area of Responsibility. The Joint Task Force SOUTH (JTFSO) area of responsibility (AOR) is the country of HONDURAS and the northern portion of ATLANTICA south to the 12° north-south latitude. JTFSO AOR includes sea approaches to the GULF OF FONSECA and all ports on the north coast of HONDURAS to the distance shown on the JTFSO operation overlay. Overlay 4-1, JTFSO Operation Overlay.

(2) ( ) Area of Interest. JTFSO area of interest includes the countries of HONDURAS and ATLANTICA.

(3) ( ) Area of Operation. JTFSO joint operations area (JOA) is identical to the AOR. Maneuver in the JOA must be conducted in accordance with the rules of engagement (ROE).

c. ( ) Deterrent Options. JTFSO will execute a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)-directed emergency deployment readiness exercise (EDRE) into HONDURAS with the minimum force required to establish a credible defense against possible attack by ATLANTICA. Headquarters (HQ), JTFSO, to include necessary command and control (C2) systems, will be established in preparation for future combat operations. Deploying Army ground combat forces will be prepared to establish forward defensive positions in conjunction with Honduran forces in the CHOLUTECA region to block Atlantan armored attacks. Additional special operations forces (SOF) will be deployed to support in-place SOF and establish liaison with Honduran military forces. Deploying air forces will establish operating bases, conduct show-of-force flights along the ATLANTICAN-HONDURAN border, establish the joint force air component command (JFACC) structure and communications, and prepare to conduct combat operations. Naval forces operating in support of the Commander in Chief, US Southern Command (USCINCSO), will conduct show-of-force operations along the Atlantan littoral, with emphasis on the coastal areas adjacent to MANAGUA.

d. ( ) Enemy Forces. Annex B

e. ( ) Friendly Forces

(1) ( ) Honduran Forces

(a) ( ) General. The Honduran Armed Forces comprise an army, an air force, a coastal navy (including a small marine corps), and a paramilitary national police force. The Honduran Army underwent a significant buildup in response to the Sandinista threat of the mid-1980s. In the early 1990s, the army was reduced as a result of democratic elections in ATLANTICA and the peaceful end to hostilities in EL SALVADOR. The small but capable air force and navy were retained at their 1980s force structure.

(b) ( ) Honduran Army Forces. Currently, the Honduran Army is mobilizing. Indications are that the GOH will agree to place Honduran forces under the operational control (OPCON) of Commander, Joint Task Force SOUTH (COMJTFSO), for combat operations. There are two militarily viable units available in the zone of action.

1. ( ) Brigada 110 (HQ currently in DANLI (EL5550)) is responsible for the southern

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region, which consists of all territory within Areas of Operations (AOs) CASTLE and SHIELD. Brigada 110 comprises three infantry battalions and one artillery battalion.

2. ( ) Regimiento de Caballeria Blindada (armored cavalry regiment (ACR)) (HQ currently in PUERTO LEMPIRA (KG0390)) is responsible for the northern region, which consists of all territory within AO LANCE. The Honduran ACR consists of four armored cavalry squadrons ( 18 Saladin armored cars each), one armored reconnaissance squadron, one tank squadron(12 Scorpions, 3 Scimitars, and 1 Sultan), and three artillery battalions (105 -mm). This unit is currently being re-positioned in the CHOLUTECA region to meet the potential Atlantican armored threat in the CHOLUTECA Gap.

3. ( ) Other Honduran Army Forces

a. ( ) Brigada 105 (HQ currently PUERTO CORTES (CN9941 ) is responsible for the northern coastal region of AO DRAGON. Forces in this region are oriented on coastal defense, defense of the HONDURAN-GUATEMALAN border, and internal defense. These forces will not be available for operations in AOs SHIELD, CASTLE, or LANCE. Brigada 105 consists of three infantry battalions and one artillery battalion (105-mm).

b. ( ) Brigada 101 (HQ currently in TEGUCIGALPA (DL8050)) is responsible for the defense of the interior and provides support to the Honduran Ministry of Defense as required. Brigada 101 consists of one infantry battalion, one engineer battalion, and one communications battalion, and it provides support to the Honduran special forces battalion. The special forces battalion will be employed at the direction of the Ministry of Defense; the other forces will not be available for operations in AOs CASTLE, SHIELD, or LANCE.

c. ( ) Bridada 115 (HQ currently in TEGUCIGALPA) is being formed as HONDURAS mobilizes. Due to the nature of the mobilization base, Brigada 115 is not anticipated to be ready for combat operations for a minimum of 120 days.

(c) ( ) Honduran Air Forces. The Honduran Air Force (HAF) is one of the most powerful air forces in the region. It was largely unaffected by the drawdown of the military. The HAF is equipped with 10 F-5E, 15 A-37, and 12 Mirage (French-produced jets) combat aircraft. The HAF also is equipped with 2 C- 130 and 10 C-47 cargo aircraft and approximately 30 helicopters of various makes and models.

(d) ( ) Honduran Naval Forces. Honduran naval forces are primarily concentrated along the CARIBBEAN coast. They will not provide militarily significant forces for this operation. Naval special forces units may be employed by the Ministry of Defense to support special forces operations.

(2) ( ) US Forces and Agencies

(a) ( ) DEPARTMENT OF STATE (DOS)

1. ( ) Obtains third country basing, staging, and overflight rights as required.

2. ( ) Provides support for US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) psychological operations (PSYOP) under the auspices of the US Information Agency (USIA).

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3. ( ) Provides an adviser-liaison officer to COMJTFSO.

4. ( ) Provides US policy guidance and country team assistance to COMJTFSO.

5. ( ) Coordinates with Department of Defense (DOD), USSOUTHCOM Public Affairs (SCPA), and JTFSO public affairs for public affairs matters.

6. ( ) Coordinates, supervises, and provides funding for humanitarian assistance and postconflict operations.

(b) ( ) NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA)

1. ( ) Provides and/or coordinates cryptological support requirements for implementation of this plan or any portion thereof. Provides signals intelligence (SIGINT) and support as required.

2. ( ) Provides a cryptological support group to HQ JTFSO and HQ Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) as required.

3. ( ) Works with supported and supporting commands in developing effective electronic warfare (EW) strategies and advising the commands of potential losses in intelligence.

(c) ( ) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

1. ( ) Provides support in the fields of intelligence, counterintelligence, covert action, cover and deception, PSYOP, unconventional warfare, technical services, and other specialized activities as required. Command and control will remain with the parent agency except as mutually agreed at the JCS and CIA levels.

2. ( ) Provides advisers-liaison officers to the COMJTFSO and Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force (COMJSOTF).

(d) ( ) DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA). Provides intelligence support and liaison to COMJTFSO and COMJSOTF as required.

(e) ( ) DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY (DMA). Provides mapping, charting, and geodesy support as required.

(f) ( ) DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY (DISA). Provides communications support as required.

(g) ( ) DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (DOT). Provides US Coast Guard (USCG) forces, support, and liaison to COMJTFSO as required.

(h) ( ) US INFORMATION SERVICE (USIA)

1. ( ) Coordinates foreign information policy guidance with DOS, DOD, and USSOUTHCOM public affairs entities.

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2. ( ) Conducts radio broadcasts over Voice of America (VOA) facilities in support of USSOUTHCOM, as may be mutually agreed on between USIA and DOD.

3. ( ) Provides liaison officers to USCINCSO, COMJTF SO, COM JSOTF, and Commander, Joint Psychological Operations Task Force SOUTH (COMJPOTFSO) as required.

(i) ( ) JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (JCS)

1. ( ) Directs the deployment of communications assets and strategic airlift in support of this order.

2. ( ) Directs supporting US commands to provide resources in accordance with this order when directed by the National Command Authority (NCA).

3. ( ) Provides joint communications support element (JCSE) support to COMJTF SO and COMJSOTF as required.

(j) ( ) DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (DN)

1. ( ) Provides logistic support to naval and Marine forces.

2. ( ) Coordinates and provides for interface with joint, DISA, and other service signal systems as required.

3. ( ) Provides personnel replacements and administrative support as required.

4. ( ) Provides air and naval gunfire liaison company (ANGLICO) support to COMJTF SO for air and naval gunfire operations as required.

5. ( ) Provides US Navy and US Marine Corps personnel to augment HQ JTF SO as required.

(k) ( ) DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (DA)

1. ( ) Provides logistic support to Army forces.

2. ( ) Coordinates and provides for interface with joint, DISA, and other service signal systems as required.

3. ( ) Provides personnel replacements and administrative support as required.

4. ( ) As tasked by the JCS and coordinated by DIA, provides service elements that can provide clandestine operational support to military forces executing this plan.

5. ( ) Provides technical and human intelligence (HUMINT) support for the Army force (ARFOR) as required.

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6. ( ) Provides all nonunit cargo to all headquarters except Navy and Marine forces afloat.

(1) ( ) DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE (DAF)

1. ( ) Provides logistic support to Air Force units.

2. ( ) Coordinates and provides for interface with joint, DISA, and other service signal systems as required.

3. ( ) Provides personnel replacements and administrative support as required.

4. ( ) Provides US Air Force (USAF) personnel augmentation as required.

5. ( ) Provides Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) support.

6. ( ) Provides USAF personnel to augment HQ JTFSO as required.

(m) ( ) Commander in Chief, US SOUTHERN COMMAND (USCINCSO)

1. ( ) Designates COMJTFSO.

2. ( ) Designates Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR).

3. ( ) Designates Commander, Army Forces (COMARFOR)

4. ( ) Designates Commander, Special Operations Command SOUTH (COMSOC SO) as Commander. Joint Special Operations Task Force (COMJSOTF).

5. ( ) Provides a deployable joint task force (DJTF) to augment HQ JTFSO.

(n) ( ) Commander, US ARMY FORCES COMMAND (COMFORSCOM)

1. ( ) Provides US Army forces as directed by the JCS.

2. ( ) Provides US Army personnel for HQ JTFSO as required.

3. ( ) Provides communications support as required.

(o) ( ) Commander in Chief, US ATLANTIC COMMAND (CINCUSACOM)

1. ( ) Provides air combat forces for air operations in coordination with COMJTFSO and USCINCSO as required.

2. ( ) Provides maritime patrol aircraft and submarine support to USCINCSO as required.

3. ( ) Provides logistic and administrative support to assigned Navy forces as required.

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4. ( ) Provides liaison personnel and equipment to USCINCSO and COMJTF SO as required.

5. ( ) Plans for the redeployment of committed forces as required.

(p) ( ) Commander in Chief, US PACIFIC COMMAND (USCINCPAC)

1. ( ) Designates Commander, Naval Forces (COMNAVFOR).

2. ( ) Designates Commander, Marine Forces (COMMARFOR).

3. ( ) Provides Navy and Marine forces to COMNAVFOR and COMMARFOR as required.

4. ( ) Provides augmentation and supporting forces OPCON to CINCUSACOM as directed by the JCS.

5. ( ) Provides logistic and administrative support to deployed US Pacific Command (USPACOM) naval and Marine forces as required.

(q) ( ) Commander in Chief, US TRANSPORTATION COMMAND (USCINCTRANS)

1. ( ) Provides strategic and tactical airlift and strategic sealift with supporting elements as directed.

2. ( ) Provides tanker airlift control elements (TALCEs) as required.

3. ( ) Provides aeromedical evacuation support as required.

4. ( ) Provides weather support as required.

5. ( ) Designates Commander, Airlift Forces (COMALF), OPCON to COMAFFOR.

6. ( ) Provides C-130s with the All-Weather Air Delivery System (AWADS).

7. ( ) Provides or arranges for surface transportation and terminal services for movement of forces and nonunit cargo within the continental United States (CONUS) from designated origins to ports of embarkation (POEs). Coordinates terminal services throughput for designated ports of debarkation (PODs).

8. ( ) Serves as the JCS coordinating authority for deployment planning and execution. Acts as focal point for maintenance of the current database in the Joint Deployment System (JDS). During execution, monitors, analyzes, and advises the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) on matters involving deployments using common-user lift and monitors forces deploying by organic lift.

(r) ( ) Commander in Chief, STRATEGIC COMMAND (CINCSTRAT). At JCS direction, provides strategic reconnaissance aircraft as required.

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(s) ( ) Commander in Chief, US SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (CINCSOC)

1. ( ) Designates Army component special operations commander OPCON to COMJSOTF.

2. ( ) Designates Air Force component special operations commander OPCON to COMJSOTF.

3. ( ) Designates Commander, Naval Special Warfare Task Group (CNSWTG) as required.

4. ( ) Provides support to COMJSOTF as required.

5. ( ) Provides command element, Army special operations forces (ARSOF), and Air Force special operations forces (AFSOF) to support selective operations as required. Designates Commander, Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (COMJPOTF), and commander, PSYOP forces, as required.

6. ( ) Provides Air Force search and rescue (SAR) forces and Air Force special operations forces (SOF), to include liaison and task force staff support as required.

7. ( ) Provides liaison to COMJTFSO, to include personnel and equipment to coordinate PSYOP air support.

(t) ( ) Commander in Chief, US SPACE COMMAND (USCINCSpace)

1. ( ) Provides space-based support to USCINCSO and COMJTFSO as required.

2. ( ) Re-positions space-based systems as required to support operations consistent with US national interests and priorities.

(u) ( ) DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY (DLA)

1. ( ) Provides common-user supplies to all forces.

2. ( ) Coordinates for and provides logistic support as required.

(3) ( ) Planning Factors

(a) ( ) The host nation will assist with rear area security; however, not all rear area security requirements will be completely satisfied by the host country.

(b) ( ) The GOA and its supporters will conduct an extensive anti-US disinformation and propaganda campaign.

(c) ( ) If a global conflict commences while a regional conflict is in progress, US global war priorities will prevail over commitment to the regional conflict.

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f. ( ) Legal Considerations

(1) ( ) In the absence of a declaration of war, the War Powers Resolution requires a detailed report to Congress within 48 hours following the introduction of combat forces into foreign territory. Should this report be triggered by the commitment of unconventional warfare or other advance forces during preconflict operations, operational security could be compromised prior to deployment of the main body.

(2) ( ) The War Powers Resolution requires that, unless the Congress declares war or enacts specific legislation authorizing continued use of US forces, the President must remove all US forces within 60 to 90 days of their introduction. The resolution also provides for termination of military operations in less than 60 days if so directed by Congress. Deployment, completion of all military actions, accomplishment of all objectives, and redeployment may, therefore, be required in 90 days or less.

(3) ( ) Although military operations conducted according to this plan may occur in the absence of a declaration of war, it is the declared policy of the United States that all captured enemy personnel, whether members of the regular or irregular forces, will be accorded the status, treatment, and protection of prisoner-of-war (PW) status as defined in the Geneva Convention of 1949. It is also the declared policy of the United States to demand that US military personnel captured by the enemy be accorded the status of PWs as defined in the Geneva Convention.

(4) ( ) Rules of Engagement. Annex C, Appendix 8.

2. ( ) Mission. When directed, COMJTF SO will deploy forces into the joint operations area (JOA) to help the GOH deter Atlantican aggression and, if deterrence fails, conduct a joint and combined defense of Honduran territory. After building up sufficient forces, COMJTF SO will undertake offensive operations to destroy the Atlantican armored offensive capability, defeat Atlantican forces operating in HONDURAS, and restore peacetime conditions to the region.

3. ( ) Execution

a. ( ) Concept of Operations. Annex C. I intend to deter Atlantican aggression against the Honduran, Contra, and Miskito people by rapidly deploying forces into HONDURAS. If the GOA ignores this warning and attack, we will immediately transition to a joint and combined defense along phase line (PL) PIKE. The purpose of our initial defense will be to deny the Atlantics advantageous terrain in the southwest and to protect the Contra and Miskito people in the northeast. During the defensive phase, we will deploy additional defensive and offensive forces into HONDURAS. When adequate logistic and combat forces are available, we will launch a joint and combined counteroffensive operation to destroy Atlantican armored forces and defeat their light counterinsurgency forces. Atlantican forces in the CHOLUTECA region will pose the greatest risk to the Honduran Government and must be defeated first. I envision that our counteroffensive operations will be sequential-attacking first the armored forces in the CHOLUTECA region; then the light forces in the DANLI region; and, finally, the forces that threaten the Miskito people in the northern region. When operations are completed, the Atlantican forces will be ejected from HONDURAS and unable to conduct further offensive operations against the Contra, Honduras and Miskito people. We will have forces arrayed along the HONDURAN-ATLANTICAN border to help the Honduran Government return to peaceful conditions and to assist in postconflict operations.

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(1) ( ) General. Annex C. COMJTFSO intends to increase the deterrent effort against Atlantican hostility by rapidly deploying JTFSO forces into the theater to establish a credible defense and establish the basis for future combat operations should they be required. Should deterrence fail and the Atlantican forces attack. COMJTFSO will conduct joint and combined defensive operations to deny the

Atlanticans their military and political objectives in HONDURAS and to protect the Honduran, Contra, and Miskito peoples. During the defense, COMJTFSO will deploy additional forces to sustain the defense and future offensive operations and, when established, will conduct counteroffensive operations to destroy the Atlantican armored offensive capability, defeat Atlantican forces operating into HONDURAS. and reestablish preconflict borders in the region.

(2) ( ) Operation Order (OPORD) Structure. This operation will be conducted in six phases. Times showm are listed to facilitate planning. Phases may run concurrently.

(3) ( ) Employment

(a) ( ) Phase I (Show of Force/Establish Defense) (C-day through C+7). COMJTFSO will execute a JCS-directed EDRE into HONDURAS with the minimum force required to establish a credible defense against possible Atlantican attack. HQ JTFSO, to include necessary C2 systems, will be established to prepare for future combat operations. Deploying Army ground combat forces will be prepared to establish forward defensive positions in conjunction with Honduran forces in the CHOLUTECA region to block Atlantican armored attacks. Additional SOF will be deployed to support in-place SOF and establish liaison with Honduran military forces. Deploying air forces will establish operating bases, conduct show-of-force flights along the ATLANTICAN-HONDURAN border, establish the JFACC structure and communications, and prepare to conduct combat operations. Naval forces supporting USCINCSO will conduct show-of-force operations along the Atlantican littoral, with emphasis on the coastal areas adjacent to MANAGUA.

(b) ( ) Phase II (Deployment/Defensive Operations) (D-day through D+25). This phase will commence if deterrence fails and the Atlantican forces attack into Honduran territory. D-day and H-hour will be established when the NCA directs deployment of additional forces to HONDURAS. During this phase, JTFSO and Honduran forces will block the movement of Atlantican forces into HONDURAS along PL PIKE. Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) SWORD will be activated under the control of JTFSO. The Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF), and Commander, Task Force (CTF) 45, will pass operational control (OPCON) to JTFSO and will land 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) (Forward) (Fwd) on GREEN BEACH. Once established ashore, 1st MEB (Fwd) will be OPCON to Task Force (TF) BROWN. Deployment will be a service responsibility under the supervision of the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).

(c) ( ) Phase III (Offensive Air Operations)(D+15 through D+25). During this phase, JTFSO will coordinate attack directed against military targets on Atlantican territory through the JFACC. The objective of this phase is to cause the GoA to withdraw its forces from Honduran territory and cease hostile action against the Contra movement. Offensive air operations will secure air supremacy for the counteroffensive phase.

(d) ( ) Phase IV (Counteroffensive Operatlons)(D+26 through D+75). During this phase, JTFSO and Honduran forces will conduct counteroffensive operations to defeat the Atlantican forces, destroy their remaining offensive capabilities, and reestablish the HONDURAN-ATLANTICAN border. During this phase, we will increase the intensity and duration of air attacks against military facilities in ATLANTICA. The lack of

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logistics and transportation infrastructures in HONDURAS will constrain operations.

(e) ( ) Phase V (Postconflict Operations)(D+76 through D+105). During this phase of operations, JTFSO will restore peacetime conditions in Honduran territory. These operations will be directed by the Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF) and executed by combat and support forces remaining in Honduran territory. All forces must be prepared to rapidly transition to postconflict operations at any point in this campaign JCMOTF will cooperate with and optimize the use of host nation and Organization of American States (OAS) forces and materiel to support this operation. Return redeployment airlift and sealift will be used to deliver humanitarian assistance and aid material into HONDURAS. When directed, JTF BRAVO will assume responsibilities for postconflict operations.

(f) ( ) Phase VI (Redeployment Operations)(D+75 Until Complete). Redeployment will be a service component responsibility executed through USTRANSCOM and service force commanders in country. COMJTFSO will release forces to service force commanders for redeployment consistent with mission requirements in the JOA.

(4) ( ) Deployment. Appendix 1 to Annex A.

b. ( ) Task:

(1) ( ) COMJTFSO (Commander, 21ST AIRBORNE (ABN) CORPS)

(a) ( ) Establishes and deploys JTFSO staff and HQ.

(b) ( ) Receives deployable joint task force (DJTF) augmentation team from USCINCSO.

(c) ( ) Establishes HQ JTFSO at SOTO CANO Airbase (AB) to coordinate and synchronize JTFSO operations.

(d) ( ) Receives JCSE augmentation from JCS as needed to support operations.

(e) ( ) Assumes OPCON of all forces operating in the JTFSO JOA.

(f) ( ) Establishes and operates combined command, control, communications, and intelligence center (C3IC) adjacent to JTFSO Joint Operations Center (JOC) at SOTO CANO AB.

(g) ( ) Retains joint force land component command (JFLCC) at JTFSO.

(h) ( ) Provides liaison and communications to American Embassy (AMEMB) TEGUCIGALPA. Cooperates fully with the goals and guidance of the US Ambassador to the GOH.

(i) ( ) Establishes joint boards and committees as required.

(2) ( ) Commander, 21ST ABN CORPS

(a) ( ) Establishes and provides commander for TF BROWN.

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(b) ( ) Conducts predeployment **planning** and pre-positioning of selected elements at aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs) as required to support COMJTFSO operations.

(c) ( ) Establishes HQ Army Forces (ARFOR) at SOTO CANO AB to coordinate and synchronize combat operations of service forces supporting COMJTFSO.

(d) ( ) Nominates and provides joint rear area commander (JRAC) to conduct joint logistic, security, and support operations in AO DRAGON.

(e) ( ) Establishes communication and liaison with COMJTFSO and other components

(f) ( ) Plans for and conducts precombat operations in accordance with (IAW) the concept of operations.

(3) ( ) COMAFFOR (Commander, 9TH AIR FORCE)

(a) ( ) Plans for and conducts air operations in support of operation TIERRA CALIENTE.

(b) ( ) Nominates and provides JFACC, airspace coordination authority (ACA), and area air defense commander (AADC) for the JOA for the duration of the operation.

(c) ( ) Establishes HQ Air Force Forces (AFFOR) at SOTO CANO AB to coordinate and synchronize combat operations of supporting COMJTFSO.

(d) ( ) Provides logistic, security, and support forces operating in AO DRAGON OPCON to JRAC.

(e) ( ) Establishes and operates the JTFSO Joint Rescue Coordination Center (JRCC) at SOTO CANO AB.

(f) ( ) Gains and maintains defensive air superiority over Honduran territory not later than (NLT) C+4.

(g) ( ) Plans for and, when directed, conducts Phase III combat operations.

(h) ( ) Coordinates, regulates, and controls joint military air operations (except in the AOA), to include the development of air tasking orders in the JOA.

(i) ( ) Plans for and coordinates theater airlift, employment of air support, refueling, aerial port/air control team support, to include communications support for the above.

(j) ( ) Provides meteorological services support as required.

(k) ( ) Provides HQ JTFSO alternate command post facility during all phases of the operation.

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(4) ( ) COMMARFOR (Commander, 1ST MEB (FWD))

- (a) ( ) Conducts planning and rehearsal of amphibious operations during Phase II.
- (b) ( ) Nominates and provides Commander, TF WHITE, NLT C+4. TF WHITE OPCON to TF BROWN when established ashore.
- (c) ( ) Provides available Marine component air resources to the JFACC to support joint air operations.
- (d) ( ) Coordinates with the COMAFFOR and JRAC for airfield and logistic support for the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) air-based in HONDURAS.
- (e) ( ) Provides liaison and coordination team to HQ JTF SO NLT C+2.
- (f) ( ) Coordinates with COMAFFOR for airfield support for expeditionary aviation resources when projected ashore.

(5) ( ) Commander, JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE (COMJSOFT) (Commander, SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND SOUTH (COMSOCSO))

- (a) ( ) Provides Commander, TF RED, NLT C-1.
- (b) ( ) Provides SOF to support operations. as required. throughout the JTF SO JOA.
- (c) ( ) Provides special operations support to the JCMOTF as required by COMJTF SO.
- (d) ( ) Provides language-qualified liaison teams to Honduran forces, Contras, and Miskitos during all phases. Provide language-qualified liaison teams to TF RED during Phase IV(C) only.
- (e) ( ) Coordinates with and assists Honduran and Contra forces in AO CASTLE during Phase I in establishing defenses against counterinsurgency forces operating out of ATLANTICA.
- (f) ( ) Coordinates for and provides humanitarian assistance during Phase I to Contras operating in the DANLI region.
- (g) ( ) Receives JCSE augmentation from JCS as needed to support operations

(6) ( ) COMNAVFOR

- (a) ( ) With the exception of amphibious operations during Phase II, naval forces will operate in support of the joint task force (JTF) from the US Atlantic Command (USACOM) AOR. CTF 45 will provide a liaison element at the JTF SO HQ at SOTO CANO AB to assist in unity of effort.
- (b) ( ) Phase II (Amphibious Operations), Commander, TF 45.

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1. ( ) Plans for and conducts amphibious landing of TF WHITE over GREEN BEACH.

2. ( ) Provides for the security of TF WHITE until established ashore.

3. ( ) Coordinates naval air requirements and control in the AOA and JOA with COMJTFSO and JFACC as required.

(c) ( ) Be prepared to assume responsibility for AO MOAT in the event that the GULF OF FONSECA is threatened by Atlantic forces.

(7) ( ) Commander, JOINT TASK FORCE BRAVO (COMFTFB)

(a) ( ) Be prepared to provide forces OPCON to JRAC.

(b) ( ) Provides assistance with language-qualified personnel to JTFSO as required

(c) ( ) Be prepared to assume responsibilities as JCMOTF.

(8) ( ) Commander, JCMOTF (COMJCMOTF) (Commander, 301ST CIVIL AFFAIRS (CA) BRIGADE (BDE))

(a) ( ) Assists COMJTFSO in developing plans for transitioning the region to peaceful conditions.

(b) ( ) Assists JRAC with the use of host nation facilities and personnel in AO DRAGON.

(c) ( ) Provides plans and assistance for humanitarian relief to the Honduran population displaced by hostile action.

(d) ( ) Provides plans and assistance for humanitarian relief to Contra and Miskito population displaced by hostile action.

(e) ( ) provides interface to nongovernment organizations (NGOs) providing relief in the region.

(9) ( ) JRAC

(a) ( ) Plans for the improvement of intertheater and intratheater airfields and ports to accommodate force buildup and enhance throughput to support the concept of operations.

(b) ( ) Receives OPCON of support and security forces from all service components operating in AO DRAGON.

(c) ( ) Establishes HQ, joint rear area, at SOTO CANO AB (PALMEROLA) to coordinate and synchronize service and support operations.

(d) ( ) Supervises and provides for the security and defense of forces operating in AO DRAGON.

(e) ( ) Receives OPCON of JTF BRAVO forces in AO DRAGON.

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(f) ( ) Conducts joint logistics. Annex D.

(10) ( ) Commander, TF BROWN.

(a) ( ) Phase I

1. ( ) Establishes plans for a coordinated combined defense with Honduran forces operating in AO SHIELD NLT C+7. IAW direction from the GOH, initial border security in the CHOLUTECA region is the responsibility of those Honduran forces OPCON to TF BROWN.

2. ( ) Forward deploys US ground forces into AO SHIELD only after Atlantican forces have crossed the HONDURAN border.

3. ( ) Conducts liaison and coordination with TF WHITE NLT C+3.

4. ( ) Deploys and establishes TF HQ elements.

(b) ( ) Phases II and III

1. ( ) Conducts coordinated combined defense of AO SHIELD along PL PIKE in conjunction with Honduran forces. Denies Atlantican forces PL PIKE and crossing sites over the CHOLUTECA.

2. ( ) Receives OPCON of TF WHITE when established ashore.

3. ( ) Integrates arriving forces into the defensive plan as they become available.

(c) ( ) Phase IV(A)

1. ( ) Plans and conducts joint and combined operations to cut off and destroy the armored capability of the Atlantican Army in the CHOLUTECA region, defeat Atlantican forces, restore the preconflict border between ATLANTICA and HONDURAS, and transition to peace.

2. ( ) On completion of Phase IV(A), provides required forces to JTF SO for future operations.

(d) ( ) Phase IV(B) through Phase V

1. ( ) Plans and conducts joint and combined peacekeeping operations to transition AO SHIELD to peaceful conditions.

2. ( ) Rapidly transitions from US and Honduran coalition operations to unilateral Honduran operations in the region.

3. ( ) Be prepared to respond to additional Atlantican aggression that may spill over from concurrent JTF SO operations in AOs CASTLE and LANCE.

4. ( ) Be prepared to return Marine forces to CTF 45 control for embarkation.

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(11) ( ) Commander, TF BLACK

(a) ( ) Phase I: Cdr, Brigada 110 (Honduran)

1. ( ) Coordinates with and helps Contra forces establish defenses against counterinsurgency forces operating out of ATLANTICA.

2. ( ) Ensures that JAMISTRAN airfield is retained for future operations

(b) ( ) Phases II through IV(A): Cdr, 102d Abn Div (-)

1. ( ) Conducts coordinated combined defense of Contra base camps in AO CASTLE and defends along PL PIKE in conjunction with Honduran forces.

2. ( ) Denies Atlantican forces PL PIKE and crossing sites over the GUAYAMBRE and PATUCA Rivers.

a. ( ) Integrates arriving forces into the defensive plan as they become available.

(c) ( ) Phase IV(B)

1. ( ) Assumes command and control of forces operating in AO CASTLE and augmenting forces for the duration of this subphase.

2. ( ) Plans and conducts joint and combined operations to cut off and defeat Atlantican counterinsurgency forces operating against Honduran and Contra forces in AO CASTLE, Restores the preconflict border between ATLANTICA and HONDURAS and assists in the transition to peace.

3. ( ) On completion of Phase IV(B), provides required forces to JTF SO for future operations.

(d) ( ) Phase IV(B) through Phase V

1. ( ) Plans and conducts joint and combined peacekeeping operations to transition AO CASTLE to peaceful conditions.

2. ( ) Rapidly transitions from US and Honduran coalition operations to unilateral Honduran operations in the region.

3. ( ) Is prepared to respond to additional Atlantican aggression that may spill over from concurrent JTF SO operations in AOs SHIELD and LANCE.

4. ( ) Is prepared to provide humanitarian assistance to displaced persons and Contras affected by military operations in the region.

(12) ( ) Commander, TF RED

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(a) ( ) Phase I through Phase IV(C)

1. ( ) Coordinates with and assists Honduran and Miskito forces in establishing defenses against counterinsurgency forces operating out of ATLANTICA.

2. ( ) Coordinates for and provides humanitarian assistance to Miskitos operating in the MONTANAS DEL PATUCA region.

3. ( ) Integrates arriving forces into the defensive plan as they become available,

(b) ( ) Phase IV(C)

1. ( ) Assumes command and control of forces operating in AO LANCE and of augmenting forces for the duration of this subphase.

2. ( ) Plans and conducts joint and combined operations to cut off and defeat Atlantican counterinsurgency forces operating against Honduran and Contra forces in AO LANCE. Restores the preconflict border between ATLANTICA and HONDURAS and assists in the transition to peace.

(c) ( ) Phase V and Phase VI

1. ( ) Plans and conducts joint and combined peacekeeping operations to transition AO LANCE to peaceful conditions.

2. ( ) Rapidly transitions from US and Honduran coalition operations to unilateral Honduran operations in the region.

3. ( ) Be prepared to respond to additional Atlantican aggression that may spill over from concurrent JTF SO operations in AOs SHIELD and CASTLE.

4. ( ) Be prepared to provide humanitarian assistance to displaced persons and Miskitos affected by military operations in the region.

(13) ( ) Commander, TF WHITE

(a) ( ) Plans for and, when directed, conducts amphibious landings on GREEN BEACH to support operations in AO SHIELD.

(b) ( ) Activates and provides C2 for forces operating within AOA SWORD.

(c) ( ) Coordinates actions of other air and naval forces operating in support of amphibious operations within the AOA.

(d) ( ) On completion of amphibious operations, releases Marine forces OPCON to TF BROWN.

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(e) ( ) Provides continuing logistic sustainment to Marine forces ashore until relieved of responsibilities by COMJTFSO.

(14) ( ) Commander, TF BLUE (ON ORDER)

(a) ( ) TF BLUE is a contingency naval TF that will be activated at USCINCSO's direction to respond to Atlantican actions in the GULF OF FONSECA.

(b) ( ) If required, TF BLUE will assume responsibility for operations in and security of AO MOAT OPCON to COMJTFSO.

(15) ( ) Commander, JOINT PSYOP TF (COMJPOTF) (Commander, 7TH PSYOP GROUP (7th POG))

(a) ( ) Provides psychological and deception support to achieve COMJTFSO objectives in the region.

(b) ( ) Conducts PSYOP to support tactical operations in theater.

(c) ( ) Coordinates directly with and assists the JCMOTF in providing humanitarian assistance to people affected by military operations in the area.

[d] ( ) Be prepared to assist in the transition to peaceful conditions in the region.

c. ( ) Coordinating Instructions

(1) ( ) Service components will establish and maintain communications and liaison with COMJTFSO and other service components.

(2) ( ) Service components will conduct predeployment planning and pre-positioning of selected elements at APOEs as required to support COMJTFSO operations.

(3) ( ) Components and JRAC will position combat aviation forces, fuel, ammunition, and supplies to support this operation IAW the concept of operations.

(4) ( ) JRAC is responsible for the management and allocation of resources and terrain in AO DRAGON. All components will coordinate their operations in AO DRAGON with the JRAC.

(5) ( ) JTF SO J3 will chair the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCCB). All subordinates will nominate targets and forward them through standard fire support channels to the JTCCB for approval and allocation.

(6) ( ) Direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH) all concerned (ALCON). Keep the JTF staff informed by record message traffic. Include COMJTFSO as an information addressee on all message traffic.

(7) ( ) Definitions

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(a) ( ) N-day is the day a unit is notified for deployment or redeployment.

(b) ( ) C-day is the day on which deployment commences.

(c) ( ) D-day is the day combat operations commence.

(d) ( ) For planning purposes only, C-day equals D-7.

(8) ( ) All reports will be in Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems (JINTACCS) format and all reporting and planning will be in Zulu time.

(9) ( ) This OPORD is effective for planning immediately and for execution on order of the NCA.

(10) ( ) Use of not control agents (RCAs) may be planned but will not be executed without COMJTFSO approval. With the exception of RCA, no prescribed chemical load is authorized.

(11) ( ) All operations will be conducted to minimize collateral damage to nonmilitary personnel and facilities.

(12) ( ) Priority intelligence requirements (PIR). (Annex B).

4. ( ) Administration and Logistics

a. ( ) Concept of Support. Logistic support is the responsibility of the service component commands. USCINCSO exercises directive authority for logistics through COMJTFSO. COMARFOR will provide common servicing for classes I, III (bulk), and common V. Marine force (MARFOR) sustainment will be provided through service forces offshore. Prior to ARFOR arrival in, and following ARFOR departure from, the JOA COMJTFB will provide combat service support (CSS) as required. The joint rear area command will be established to facilitate common-user logistics and mutual security operations in AO DRAGON. JRAC has coordination authority and OPCON of designated tactical combat forces (TCFs).

b. ( ) Logistics. Annex D.

c. ( ) Personnel. Annex E.

d. ( ) Public Affairs. Annex F (not used).

e. ( ) Civil Affairs. Annex G (not used).

f. ( ) Environmental Services. Annex H (not used).

g. ( ) Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy. Annex M (not used).

h. ( ) Medical Services. Annex Q.

5. ( ) Command and Control

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a. ( ) Command

(1) ( ) Command Relationships. Annex J. USCINCSO; CINCUSACOM; CINCSOC; USCINCTRANS; Commander in Chief, US Army Forces Command (CINCFORSCOM); CINCSTRAT; Commander, Joint Special Operations Command (COMJSOC); and supporting agencies will participate in planning and executing this operation. USCINCSO has designated Commander, 21st Abn Corps, as COMJTFSO. On order, COMJTFSO (Commander, 21st Abn Corps) will deploy to HONDURAS and assume OPCON of all in-place and augmentation forces. COMJTFSO components are—

(a) ( ) COMARFOR. Commander, 21st Abn Corps, is designated COMARFOR for this operation.

(b) ( ) COMAFFOR. Commander, 9th Air Force (Commander, US Southern Command Air Force (COMUSSOUTHAF)), is designated COMAFFOR for this operation.

(c) ( ) COMNAVFOR. Commander, Task Force 21 (CTF 21 ), is designated as COMNAVFOR for USCINCSO for this operation. CINCUSACOM has further designated CTF 45 as the COMNAVFOR for COMJTFSO for amphibious operations during Phase II. CINCUSACOM and CTF21 will place appropriate naval forces under OPCON of CTF 45 to conduct operations. On execution, OPCON of augmenting forces from USCINCPAC will pass to CINCUSACOM when these forces enter the CINCUSACOM AOR. CINCUSACOM will also conduct such operations as maritime patrol and aerial surveillance. as required, in support of USCINCSO and COMJTFSO.

(d) ( ) COMMARFOR Commander, 1st MEF (Fwd), is designated as COMMARFOR for this operation. COMMARFOR is OPCON to COMJTFSO when established ashore during Phase II.

(e) ( ) COMJSOTF. Commander, Special Operations Command South (COMSOCSO), is designated COMJSOTF for this operation.

(2) ( ) Command Posts

(a) ( ) Phase I. HQ JTFSO main command post (CP) will be located initially at 21st Abn Corps HQ, FORT BRAGG, NC; on order, it will collocate with forward CP. HQ JTFSO forward CP will be located at SOTO CANO AB. COMAFFOR will provide alternate CP facility.

(b) ( ) Phases II through VI. HQ JTFSO main CP will be located at SOTO CANO AB. HQ JTFSO forward CP will relocate as required to support JTFSO operations. COMAFFOR will provide alternate CP facility.

(3) ( ) Succession to Command. NA

b. ( ) Command, Control, and Communications Systems. Annex K (omitted).

(1) ( ) Command and Control Concept. Effective C<sup>2</sup> of this operation rests with two factors: communications and execution. The US SOUTHCOM DJTF and the HQ JTFSO advanced operational element will deploy to HONDURAS early in Phase I to support JTFSO operations. The JCSE joint airborne

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communications center/command post (JACC/CP) will be employed for en route communications and to establish an initial CP in country. Simultaneously, liaison teams will be exchanged between HQ JTFSO and the warfighting components. If liaison officers (LOs) to CONUS locations are deployed, they will deploy with single-channel tactical satellite (TACSAT) radios. The primary communications link between CONUS components and HQ JTFSO and HQ USSOUTHCOM, however, will be the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) using a Defense Communications System (DCS) gateway. Communications elements that are to support HQ JTFSO will deploy incrementally with the deployment of HQ JTFSO. Once an effective command, control, communications, and intelligence (C<sup>3</sup>I) infrastructure is established in HONDURAS. COMJTFSO will deploy forward. Effective use of liaison teams and WWMCCS will ensure that initial combat operations are synchronized among all components of JTFSO.

(2) ( ) The joint signal operating instructions (JSOI) are in effect.

/t  
LTG  
Commander

ANNEXES:

A—Task Organization  
B—Intelligence  
C—Operations  
D—Logistics  
E—Personnel  
J—Command Relationships  
Q—Medical Services

OFFICIAL:

/s/  
Director, J3

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HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH  
FORT BRAGG, NC 28307  
7 December 199.

ANNEX A TO JTF SOUTH OPORD 9-5  
TASK ORGANIZATION ( )

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)-Directed Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise (EDRE)

Phase I

TASK FORCE (TF) BROWN (Army Forces (ARFOR))

- 21st Airborne (Abn) Corps Assault (Aslt) Command Post (CP)
- 1 light (lt) infantry (inf) brigade (bde) task force (TF)
- 2 aslt helicopter (hel) battalions (bns)
- 1 attack (atk) hel bn
- Regimento de Caballeria Blindada (armored cavalry regiment (ACR) (Honduran))  
operational control (OPCON))
- Corps combat service support (CSS) package

TF BLACK

- Brigada 110 (Honduran)(OPCON)

JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) RED (Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF))

- 1 Special Forces group (SFG)

9th Air Force (AF) (Air Force Forces (AFFOR))

- 912th Fighter Squadron (FS) (24 F-15Es)
- Air Force CSS package

Phases II through IV(A)

TF BROWN (ARFOR)

- 21st Abn Corps
- 17th Inf Division (Div) (Lt)
- 1st Bale, 102d Abn Div (OPCON to TF RED Phase IV(C))
- 1-506 Inf (Abn)
- 2-506 Inf (Abn)
- 3-506 Inf (Abn)
- 1-57 Field Artillery (FA) (105, towed (T)) (Abn)
- A/1 -442 Air Defense Artillery (ADA) (Avenger/Stinger (A/S)) (Abn)
- 102d Engineer (Engr) Bn (Abn)
- 1/102d Military Police (MP) Company (Co) (Abn)
- 1st Forward Area Support Team (FAST)
- 3-73 Armor (Abn)(M551)
- Regimento de Caballeria Blindada (ACR (Honduran))(OPCON)

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21st Aviation (Avn) Bde (Corps)  
21st Corps Artillery (Arty)  
Corps Troops

21st ADA Bde  
51st Engr Bde  
21st Military Intelligence (MI) Bde (Abn)  
21st MP Bde (Abn)  
21st Signal (Sig) Bde  
Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE)  
21st Corps Support Command (COSCOM)  
TF WHITE

Phases II through IV(B)

TF BLACK

102d Abn Div (-)  
Brigada 110 (Honduran) (OPCON) (OPCON to JTF RED Phase IV(C))

Phases II through IV(C)

JTF RED (JSOTF)

13th SFG (Abn)  
Detachment (Det) B/96th Civil Affairs (CA) Bn  
7th Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Co (Abn): direct support (DS) Joint Task Force SOUTH (JTFSO)  
617th Special Operations Aviation Detachment (SOAD) (five MH-60s)  
Sea-Air-Land Team (SEAL) 3 (-) (five platoons (plts))  
Special Boat Unit 12 (-) (two patrol boats (PBs). four Seafoxes)  
1st Special Operations Wing (SOW)  
8th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) (-) (two MC-130Es)  
20th SOS (five MH-53s)  
55th SOS (eight UH-60s)  
Special Operations Combat Control Team (SOCCT)  
Special Operations Weather Team (SOWT)  
952d Special Operations Group (SOG)(-) (two EC-130s) (VOLANT SOLO): general support (GS)

Phases II through IV

9th AF (AFFOR)

Honduran AF (10 F-5s) (OPCON)  
Honduran AF (12 A-37s) (OPCON)  
Honduran AF (12 Mirages) (OPCON)

TF 45 (Navy Forces (NAVFOR))

TF 45 (1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) (Forward) (Fwd) embarked)

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US Ship (USS) SAIPAN  
USS NASSAU  
USS IWO JIMA  
USS SHREVEPORT  
USS CHARLESTON  
USS WHIDBEY ISLAND  
USS PORTLAND  
USS SUMPTER  
USS SAGINAW

Marine Forces (MARFOR) (once designated)

1st MEF (Fwd) (TF WHITE is OPCON to TF BROWN in Phases II through IV(A))

Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF): DS JTF SO

7th Psychological Operations Group (POG) (Abn) (-)

17th PSYOP Bn (Abn) (Tactical (Tat)): DS 21st Abn Corps

28th PSYOP Bn (Abn) (Strategic (Strat) Dissemination): GS

409th PSYOP Bn (Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW)): GS Joint Interrogation Facility (JIF)

Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF)

301st CA Bde

96th CA Bn

99th CA Bn

JTF BRAVO (OPCON to joint rear area commander (JRAC) in Phases II through IV)

32d MI Bn (Aerial Exploitation (AE) (Lt))

63d MP Co

JTF BRAVO Logistics (Log) Support (Spt) Element (Elm) JTF BRAVO Hospital

19th Sig Bn (-)

28th PSYOP Det (Abn) (Strat); on order (OO) OPCON JPOTF

A Co, 12th Engr Bn (Construction (Const))

t /  
LTG  
Commander

Appendixes:

1—Time-Phased Force and Deployment List, C Date Sequence

6—JTF SO Troop List

OFFICIAL:

s/

t/

Colonel

Director, J3

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

97FEB/ANNEX-A



## UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

HEADQUARTERS, 21ST AIRBORNE CORPS  
FORT BRAGG, NC 28307-0000APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A TO JTF SOUTH OPORD 9 -5

## TIME-PHASED FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT LIST, C DATE SEQUENCE

LATEST REFINEMENT DATE: 1 DEC 9X

FRN/UTC/	FORCE DESCRIPTION	PAW	ORIGIN/	LAD/	APOE/SPOE/POD
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ARMY COMPONENT:

## 21ST AIRBORNE CORPS HEADQUARTERS

CA1AB	Corps Assault (Aslt) Command Post (CP)	40	BRAGG	C+1	POPE/CHAS/SC
CAAAB	Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) ,21st Airborne (Abn) Corps	198	BRAGG	C+8	POPE/CHAS/SC
CA2AB	Corps Tactical (Tat) CP	48	BRAGG	C+8	POPE/CHAS/SC

## 17TH INFANTRY DIVISION LIGHT

C52L5	1st Brigade (Bde)	1791	LEWIS	C+1	MCCOR/SEATL/SC
FW2LP	2-45 Field Artillery (FA) (105, Towed (T))	412	LEWIS	C+1	MCCOR/SEATL/SC
FG2LT	A/2-439 Air Defense Artillery (ADA) (Avenger/Stinger (A/S))	119	LEWIS	C+1	MCCOR/SEATL/SC
AW2LA	121st Aslt Helicopter (Hel) Battalion (Bn)	363	LEWIS	C+2	MCCOR/SEATL/SC
AW2L2	17th Attack (Atk) Hel Bn	236	LEWIS	C+2	MCCOR/SEATL/SC
CZ2LT	Foward Support Battalion (FSB)	649	LEWIS	C+2	MCCOR/SEATL/SC
CA3LI	HHC, 17th Infantry (Inf) Division (Div) Light (Lt)	233	LEWIS	C+8	MCCOR/SEATL/LM
C52L5	2d Bde	1791	LEWIS	C+8	MCCOR/SEATL/LM
CA2L3	Headquarters and Headquarters Battery (HHB), 17th Division Artillery (DIVARTY)	117	LEWIS	C+8	MCCOR/SEATL/LM
OP2L0	17th Inf Div Band	41	LEWIS	C+8	MCCOR/SEATL/LM
FW2LQ	A/2-48 FA (155, T)	140	LEWIS	C+8	MCCOR/SEATL/LM
FW2LP	2-46 FA ( 105, T)	412	LEWIS	C+9	MCCOR/SEATL/LM
ES2LL	17th Signal (Sig) Bn	498	LEWIS	C+9	MCCOR/SEATL/LM
CA2LB	17th Division Support Command (DISCOM) HHC/Materiel Management Center (MMC)	89	LEWIS	C+9	MCCOR/SEATL/LM

ABBREVIATIONS: FRN (force requirement number); UTC (unit type code); PAX (passengers); POD: NA (not applicable); LM (LA MESA); SC (SOTO CANO); PC (PUERTO CORTES); TN (TONCONTIN); GL (GOLOSON).

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EW2LL	17th Military Intelligence (MI) Bn	338	LEWIS	C+10	MCCOR/SEATL/LM
CZ2LM	Main Support Battalion (MSB)	481	LEWIS	C+10	MCCOR/SEATL/LM
CZ2LT	FSB (X2)	1298	LEWIS	C+10	MCCOR/SEATL/LM
CA2L1	HHC, 17th Aviation (Avn) Bde	176	LEWIS	C+11	MCCOR/SEATL/LM
AW2LG	175th Air Cavalry (Cav) Squadron (Sqdn)	265	LEWIS	C+11	MCCOR/SEATL/LM
EP2L1	17th Military Police (MP) Company (Co)	81	LEWIS	C+11	MCCOR/SEATL/LM
C52L5	3d Bde	1791	LEWIS	C+12	MCCOR/SEATL/LM
FW2LP	2-47 FA (105, T)	412	LEWIS	C+12	MCCOR/SEATL/LM
CA2L7	HHB, 2-439 ADA (A/S)	77	LEWIS	C+12	MCCOR/SEATL/LM
FG2LT	B/2-439 ADA (A/S)	119	LEWIS	C+12	MCCOR/SEATL/LM
FG2LT	C/2-439 ADA (A/S)	119	LEWIS	C+12	MCCOFUSEATL/LM
CZ2LA	Transportation Aircraft Maintenance Company (TAMC)	151	LEWIS	C+13	MCCOR/SEATL/LM
EB2L4	17th Engineer (Engr) Bn	294	LEWIS	C+14	MCCOR/SEATL/LM

## 102D AIRBORNE DIVISION

CAWAB	HHC, 102d Avn Bde (Abn)	180	BRAGG	C+19	POPE/CHAS/PC
AW4AB	196th Aslt Hel Co (Abn)	146	BRAGG	C+19	POPE/CHAS/PC
AW4AB	197th Aslt Hel Co (Abn)	146	BRAGG	C+19	POPE/CHAS/PC
AWEAB	1st Sqdn (Air Cav) 28th Cav (Abn)	385	BRAGG	C+19	POPE/CHAS/PC
AWFAB	102d Atk Hel Bn (Abn)	254	BRAGG	C+19	POPE/CHAS/PC
CASAB	HHC, 102d Abn Div	258	BRAGG	C+17	POPE/CHAS
21BAB	1st Bde	2123	BRAGG	C+17	POPE/CHAS
CAFAB	HHB, 102d DIVARTY (Abn)	126	BRAGG	C+17	POPE/CHAS
FW6AB	1-57th FA (105, T) (Abn)	441	BRAGG	C+17	POPE/CHAS
FCAAB	HHB, 1-442 ADA (A/S) (Abn)	72	BRAGG	C+17	POPE/CHAS
FGTAB	A/1-442 ADA (A/S) (Abn)	180	BRAGG	C+17	POPE/CHAS
ERZAB	102d MI Bn (Abn)	426	BRAGG	C+17	POPE/CHAS
EU3AB	102d Sig Bn (Abn)	496	BRAGG	C+17	POPE/CHAS
TAWAB	TAMC (Abn)	221	BRAGG	C+18	POPE/CHAS
CMAAB	Medical (Med) Bn (Abn)	347	BRAGG	C+18	POPE/CHAS
CTYAB	Supply and Transport (S&T) Bn (Abn)	741	BRAGG	C+18	POPE/CHAS
CSTAB	102d Maintenance (Maint) Bn (Abn)	533	BRAGG	C+18	POPE/CHAS
CAMAB	HHC/MMC (Abn)	216	BRAGG	C+18	POPE/CHAS
2IBAB	2d Bde	2123	BRAGG	C+18	POPE/CHAS
FW6AB	1-58th FA (105, T) (Abn)	441	BRAGG	C+18	POPE/CHAS
FGTAB	B/1-442 ADA (A/S) (Abn)	180	BRAGG	C+18	POPE/CHAS
TYBAB	3-73 Armor (Abn)(M551)	476	BRAGG	C+19	POPE/CHAS
EV3AB	102d Engr Bn (Abn)	419	BRAGG	C+19	POPE/CHAS
EPBAB	102d MP Co (Abn)	119	BRAGG	C+19	POPE/CHAS
2IBAB	3d Bde	2123	BRAGG	C+20	POPE/CHAS
FW6AB	1-59 FA (105, T) (Abn)	441	BRAGG	C+20	POPE/CHAS
FGTAB	C/1-442 ADA (A/S) (Abn)	180	BRAGG	C+20	POPE/CHAS

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OP6AB	102d Div Band	42	BRAGG	C+20	POPE/CHAS
EREAB	102d Chemical (Cml) Co (Abn)	128	BRAGG	C+20	POPE/CHAS

## 21ST CORPS AVIATION BRIGADE

AERCC	116th Aslt Hel Bn (UH-60)	240	BRAGG	C+2	POPE/CHAS/SC
CASSC	HHC, 21st Avn Bde (Corps)	151	BRAGG	C+9	POPE/CHAS/SC
CA23C	160th Air Traffic Control (ATC) Bn	130	BRAGG	C+9	POPE/CHAS/SC
CASBB	104th Avn Group (Gp)	72	BRAGG	C+10	POPE/CHAS/SC
AW3CC	121st Atk Hel Bn (AH-64)	226	BRAGG	C+10	POPE/CHAS/SC
CTAAC	701st TAMC (Aviation Intermediate Maintenance (AVIM))	257	BRAGG	C+10	POPE/CHAS/SC
AWCAC	103d Atk Hel Gp	76	BRAGG	C+10	POPE/CHAS/SC
ACACC	725th Command (Cmd) Avn Bn	325	BRAGG	C+13	POPE/CHAS/SC
AE4EC	121st Medium (Mdm) Lift Hel Bn (CH-47)	505	BRAGG	C+22	POPE/CHAS/PC
AW3CC	120th Atk Hel Bn (AH-64)	226	BRAGG	C+22	POPE/CHAS/PC
AERCC	117th Aslt Hel Bn (UH-60)	240	BRAGG	C+25	POPE/CHAS/PC

## 21ST CORPS ARTILLERY

FC3AC	HHC, 21st Artillery (Arty) Bde	200	BRAGG	C+11	POPE/CHAS/SC
FH18C	3-651 FA (155, T) (Abn)	521	BRAGG	C+12	POPE/CHAS/SC
FHJ8C	1-651 FA (155, T)	485	BRAGG	C+14	POPE/CHAS/SC
FHJ8C	2-651 FA (155, T)	485	BRAGG	C+14	POPE/CHAS/PC
FG6WC	2-661 FA (Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS))	508	BRAGG	C+14	POPE/CHAS/PC

## 21ST CORPS TROOPS

CB4UC	771st Cmd Sig Operations (Ops) Bn (Abn)	144	BRAGG	C+1	POPE/CHAS/SC
AS45A	HHC, 13th Special Forces Group (SFG) (Abn)	88	BRAGG	C+6	POPE/CHAS/SC
AS72L	1-13 Special Forces (SF)	261	BRAGG	C+6	POPE/CHAS/SC
AS72L	2-13 SF	261	BRAGG	C+6	POPE/CHAS/SC
AS72L	3-13 SF	261	BRAGG	C+6	POPE/CHAS/SC
ALK24	Support (pt) Co, 13th SFG	226	BRAGG	C+6	POPE/CHAS/SC
AP955	7th Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Co (Abn) (Direct Support (DS))	130	BRAGG	C+6	POPE/CHAS/SC
FAYAC	1-461 ADA (Hawk)	553	BRAGG	C+8	POPE/CHAS/SC
CBNAC	HHC, 21st MI Bde	91	BRAGG	C+8	POPE/CHAS/SC
C5ZAC	210th MI Bn (Tat Exploitation (Xplt))	190	BRAGG	C+8	POPE/CHAS/SC
C5XTC	220th MI Bn (Aerial Xplt)	288	BRAGG	C+8	POPE/CHAS/SC
C5QVC	221st MI Bn (Ops) (Abn)	271	BRAGG	C+8	POPE/CHAS/SC

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C26LC	250th Long-Range Surveillance Company (LRSC)	62	BRAGG	C+8	POPE/CHAS/SC
TZMU8	617th Special (Sp) Ops Avn Detachment (Det) (MH-60)	175	CAMPB	C+8	CAMPB/CHAS/GL
CAASC	HHC, 21st Sig Bde	78	BRAGG	C+9	POPE/CHAS/SC
CBU3C	712th Sig Radio (Rdo) Bn	254	BRAGG	C+9	POPE/CHAS/SC
CB88C	770th Sig Bn Area Spt (Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE))	216	BRAGG	C+9	POPE/CHAS/SC
CBB0C	705th Sig Spt Bn (Abn)	137	BRAGG	C+9	POPE/CHAS/SC
FAC1C	HHC, 21st ADA Bde	82	BLISS	C+11	KIRTL/GALVE/SC
CPA1C	HHC, 21st MP Bde	98	BRAGG	C+11	POPE/CHAS/SC
CPDFC	230th MP Bn (Abn)	464	BRAGG	C+11	POPE/CHAS/SC
AS231	Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE)	14	BRAGG	C+11	POPE/CHAS/SC
AKA33	HHC, 301st CA Bde	49	BRAGG	C+11	POPE/CHAS/SC
AKKK4	HHC, 96th CA Bn	40	BRAGG	C+11	POPE/CHAS/SC
AKK03	Civil Affairs (CA) Det (General Support (GS))	55	BRAGG	C+11	POPE/CHAS/SC
AKK08	CA Det (DS)	48	BRAGG	C+11	POPE/CHAS/SC
AKKL4	HHC, 99th CA Bn	40	BRAGG	C+11	POPE/CHAS/SC
AKL03	CA Det (GS)	34	BRAGG	C+11	POPE/CHAS/SC
AKL08	CA Det (DS)	40	BRAGG	C+11	POPE/CHAS/SC
TYARX	Commander in Chief (CINC) Ops Spt Team (Tin) (A)	15	MCDILL	C+11	MCDIL/TAMP/SC
AP9TY	8th PSYOP Gp (Abn) (-)	46	BRAGG	C+11	POPE/CHAS/SC
AP9OA	17th PSYOP Bn (Abn) (Tac)	312	BRAGG	C+11	POPE/CHAS/SC
AP92A	28th PSYOP Bn (Strategic (Strat)/Dissemination)	113	BRAGG	C+11	POPE/CHAS/SC
AP93A	409th PSYOP Bn (Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW))	112	BRAGG	C+11	POPE/CHAS/SC
V6NM2	4019th Engr Port Construction (Const) Co	188	BELVO	C+12	LANGL/NORF/PC
CRAVC	Engr Det. Well Drill (Abn)	25	BRAGG	C+12	POPE/CHAS/PC
FTYAC	1-430 ADA (Chaparral (Chap))	448	BLISS	C+14	KIRTL/GALVE/PC
CPDFC	272d MP Bn	464	BRAGG	C+15	POPE/CHAS/PC
C4YAC	HHC, 51st Engr Bde	170	BRAGG	C+15	POPE/CHAS/PC
CRY2C	538th Combat (Cbt) Engr Bn (Corps) (Abn)	377	BRAGG	C+15	POPE/CHAS/PC
CTY3C	500th Cbt Engr Bn (corps)	792	BRAGG	C+15	POPE/CHAS/PC
CTY3C	502d Cbt Engr Bn (Corps)	792	BRAGG	C+15	POPE/CHAS/PC
CNF9C	5045th Engr Aslt Floatbridge (Fltbrg) Co (Ribbon)	220	BRAGG	C+15	POPE/CHAS/PC
CNF9C	5046th Engr Aslt Fltbrg Co (Ribbon)	220	BRAGG	C+15	POPE/CHAS/PC
CNF9C	5047th Engr Aslt Fltbrg Co (Ribbon)	220	BRAGG	C+15	POPE/CHAS/PC

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CNF9C	5048th Engr Aslt Fltbrg Co (Ribbon)	220	BRAGG	C+15	POPE/CHAS/PC
V7N90	4505th Engr Det (Diving)	16	BELVO	C+15	LANGL/NORF/PC
V7L20	4815th Engr Pipeline Const Co	213	BELVO	C+15	LANGL/NORF/PC

## 21ST CORPS SUPPORT COMMAND (COSCOM)

CT77C	797th Movement Control Team (MCT) (Air Terminal (Trnl)) (LF)	48	BRAGG	C+1	POPE/CHAS/SC
CT77C	798th MCT (Air Tml) (LF)	48	BRAGG	C+1	POPE/CHAS/SC
TYPAB	Contract Spt Tm	12	BRAGG	C+1	POPE/CHAS/SC
TOP17	Procurement Law Tm (Judge Advocate (JA))	14	MCDILL	C+1	MCDIL/TAMP/SC
CT87C	701st Transportation (Trans) Co (Lt Truck (Trk), 5-Ton (T))	178	BRAGG	C+1	POPE/CHAS/SC
CVR6C	201st Quartermaster (QM) Supply (Sup) Co (DS)	244	BRAGG	C+1	POPE/CHAS/SC
BX324	8002d Med Det, Veterinary (Vet) Svc (JA)	17	BRAGG	C+3	POPE/CHAS/SC
BW442	8011th Preventive (Prev) Med Det (Entomology)	40	SAMHOU	C+3	KELLY/GALV/SC
CECAC	HHC, 21st Corps Support Group (CSG)	119	BRAGG	C+3	POPE/CHAS/SC
CEJAC	HHC, 90th Corps Support Battalion (CSB)	67	BRAGG	C+3	POPE/CHAS/SC
CMD8C	9011th Maint Co (DS)	287	BRAGG	C+3	POPE/CHAS/SC
CR17C	257th Petroleum (Petri) Sup Co	183	EUSTIS	C+3	LANGL/NORF/SC
CT9DC	HHC, 719th Trans Bn	76	BRAGG	C+3	POPE/CHAS/SC
CT87C	702d Trans Co (Lt Trk, 5-T)	178	BRAGG	C+3	POPE/CHAS/SC
BLAAC	HHC, 82d Med Bde	103	BRAGG	C+3	POPE/CHAS/SC
CAQAC	HHC, 21st COSCOM	311	BRAGG	C+3	POPE/CHAS/SC
CTAIC	4104th Movement Control Center (MCC)	124	BRAGG	C+3	POPE/CHAS/SC
CT58C	753d Trans Tml Transfer (Trf) Co	86	BRAGG	C+3	POPE/CHAS/SC
BK575	HHC, 800th Med Bn	135	BRAGG	C+4	POPE/CHAS/SC
BJ009	890th Area Support Medical Company (ASMC)	93	BRAGG	C+4	POPE/CHAS/SC
BTAAY	8121st Med Det (Air Ambulance (Amb)) (RG)	147	CAMPB	C+4	CAMPB/CHAS/SC
CV22C	QM Clothing Exchange and Bath (CEB) Augmentation (Aug) Tm	15	BRAGG	C+4	POPE/CHAS/SC
CM92C	2001st Materiel Management Center (MMC) (Forward (Fwd))	116	BRAGG	C+8	POPE/CHAS/SC
CT8AC	HHC, 70th Trans Bde	135	BRAGG	C+8	POPE/CHASLM
CEJAC	HHC, 91st CSB	67	BRAGG	C+8	POPE/CHAS/LM
CCC4C	26th Airdrop Sup and Equipment (Equip) Co	189	BRAGG	C+8	POPE/CHAS/LM

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BAB22	888th Med Det (Surgical) (Abn)	18	BRAGG	C+9	POPE/CHAS/SC
CBRTZ	950th Missile (Msl) Maint Tm (TOW/Dragon)	11	CAMPB	C+9	CAMPB/CHAS/SC
CEABC	HHC, 92d CSB	69	HOOD	C+9	KELLY/GALV/SC
CJOCC	5099th Water Purification (Purif) Tm	19	LEE	C+9	RICHM/NORF/SC
COPBV	2199th Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC)	78	BRAGG	C+9	POPE/CHAS/SC
CAYUM	523d Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Det	19	BRAGG	C+9	POPE/CHAS/LM
CT81C	7058th MCT (LB)	7	BRAGG	C+9	POPE/CHAS/LM
CT88C	7071st MCT (Highway (Hwy) Regulating (Reg)) (LH)	4	BRAGG	C+9	POPE/CHAS/LM
CT88C	7072d MCT (Hwy Reg) (LH)	4	BRAGG	C+9	POPE/CHAS/LM
CT88C	7073d MCT (Hwy Reg) (LH)	4	BRAGG	C+9	POPE/CHAS/LM
CE10C	131st Finance (Fin) Spt Unit	89	BRAGG	C+9	POPE/CHAS/SC
CAVB7	210th Replacement Reg Platoon (Pit)	34	BRAGG	C+9	POPE/CHAS/SC
CW56T	209th Press Camp Det	19	BRAGG	C+9	POPE/CHAS/SC
CT9BC	HHC, 771st Transportation Motor Transport (TMT) Bn	77	BRAGG	C+9	POPE/CHAS/SC
CT42C	723d Trans Mdm Trk Co (Petroleum, Oils. and Lubricants (POL))	178	CAMPB	C+9	CAMPB/CHAS/SC
CT9BC	HHC, 714th Trans Tml Bn	68	EUSTIS	C+9	LANGL/NORF/LM
CT99C	7010th Trans Mdm Trk Co (Container Cargo (CC))	178	BRAGG	C+10	POPE/CHAS/SC
CTU6C	7099th Tml Service (Svc) Co Breakbulk) (BB))	298	STORY	C+11	LANGL/NORF/GL
BN459	84th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH)	146	BRAGG	C+11	POPE/CHAS/SC
BKDN5	880th Med Det, Dental Svc	70	BRAGG	C+11	POPE/CHAS/SC
BT988	855th Med Amb Co	119	BRAGG	C+11	POPE/CHAS/SC
CVC9C	500th Ordnance (Oral) Co (Conventional (Convl) Ammunition (Ammo)) (DS)	230	BRAGG	C+11	POPE/SUNYP/SC
CTU4C	7100th Tml Svc Co (CC)	315	BAYONNE	C+11	NEWAR/BAYON/SC
CQVRR	155th Postal Co (DS)	115	BRAGG	C+12	POPE/CHAS/SC
CAZP5	211th Personnel Service Company (PSC) (Type E)	237	BRAGG	C+12	POPE/CHAS/SC
BTAAB	8120th Med Det (Air Amb) (RG)	147	CAMPB	C+12	CAMPB/CHAS/SC
CMD8C	9012th Maint Co (DS)	287	CAMPB	C+12	CAMPB/CHAS/SC
CVR6C	203d QM Sup Co (DS)	244	CAMPB	C+12	CAMPB/CHAS/SC
CR5EC	POL Wharf Plt	25	BAYONNE	C+12	NEWYO/BAYON/LM
CRU2C	615th POL Pipeline Tml Ops Co	110	LEE	C+12	LANGL/NORF/SC
CV78C	400th Repair (Rep) Parts Sup Co	277	HOOD	C+13	KELLY/GALV/SC
CVT79	7110th Trans Mdm Boat Co	188	EUSTIS	C+13	LANGL/NORF/PC
CVT82	7116th Trans Heavy (Hv) Boat Co	212	EUSTIS	C+13	LANGL/NORF/PC
CMT90	7022d Marine Intermediate				

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	Maint Co	128	STORY	C+13	LANGL/NORF/LM
CF599	8012th Graves Registration (GRREG) Co	64	LEE	C+13	RICHM/NORF/SC
BZ458	809th Combat Support Hospital (CSH)	609	SAMHOU	C+21	KELLY/GALV/PC

USAF COMPONENT

3FSGB	913 Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS) (F-4GWW)	520	GEORGE	C+9	GEORG/---/GL
3FKL2	912 TFS (F-15E)	430	SEYM-J	C+9	SEYM-/---/GL
3SAPF	950 Special Operations Squadron (SOS) (AC-130)	243	HURLBU	C+9	HURLB/---/GL
3S564	955 Air Rescue Squadron (ARS) (60G)(Search and Rescue (SAR))	83	EGLIN	C+9	EGLIN/---/TN
3EFAB	920 Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (TRS) (RF-4C)	326	GEORGE	C+10	GEORG/---/GL
3AGJA	951 Airborne Command and Control Squadron (ACCS) (Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC)) (EC-130)	349	KEESLE	C+10	KEESL/---/GL
3SAXH	952 Special Operations Group (SOG) (VOLANT SOLO) (EC-130)	92	HARRIS	C+10	HARRI/---/SC
3FVAB	933 TFS (A-10)	332	MRYTLE	C+10	MRYTL/---/SC
3AGHR	915 Tactical Air Support Squadron (TASS) (OA-37)	218	PATRIC	C+10	PATRI/---/LM

## 970TH TACTICAL AIR CONTROL WING

7E1CD	970 Tac Air Control (Con) Sqdn	25	SHAW	C+8	SHAW/---/GL
6KMF9	972 Electronic Security (ELSEC) Sqdn	24	KELLY	C+8	KELLY/---/GL
7FVQB	973 Air Support Operations Center (ASOC)	101	LITTLE	C+8	LITTL/---/SC
7FUAC	971 Air Con and Warning Sqdn (Control and Reporting Center (CRC))	40	MCGUIR	C+8	MCGUI/---/GL

## 990TH TACTICAL AIRLIFT GP

7E1A3	991 Tac Airlift Sqdn	142	HOWARD	NA	HOWAR/---/SC
7E1A3	992 Tac Airlift Sqdn	142	HOWARD	NA	HOWAR/---/LM
7E1CC	981 Deployed Tanker Airlift Coordination Center (DTACC)	25	HOWARD	C+1	HOWAR/---/SC
7E1AB	982 Tanker Airlift Control Element (TALCE)	12	HOWARD	C+8	HOWAR/---/GL

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7E1AB 983 TALCE	12	HOWARD	C+8	HOWAR/---/LM
4MB18 Aerial Exploitation (AE) Con Center	15	SCOTT	C+8	SCOTT/---/SC
4ER1A Med Blood Transship Center	6	SCOTT	C+9	SCOTT/---/SC

NONUNIT SUSTAINMENT—EQUIPMENT:

CODE DESCRIPTION	EACH	C-141	LAD	APOE/POD
TYP09 Kitchen-Dining Complex (1,000 pax)	2	2	C+3	PHILA/SC
TYQ44 Shower-Latrine Const System (Sys) (TT)	1	1	C+3	PHILA/SC
TZY81 Loader, Tac 25K	12	3	C+3	SCOTT/SC-LM
TZY97 Harvest Eagle Base Population (Pop) 1,100	1	17	C+3	SCOTT/SC
TG118 Base Power Production Sys	1	8	C+3	NORTON/SC
TZY72 Floodlight Set, Air Base (NF2)	2	2	C+5	SCOTT/SC-LM
T4511 Fuel Bladder (50 K-Gallon (Gal))	2	1	C+10	RICHMOND/SC-LM
TYP22 Reefer Unit (1.200 Cubic Feet (F3))	2	4	C+11	PHILA/LM
TZY50 Base Fire Protection (Prot) Sys	2	3	C+11	SCOTT/SC-LM

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HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH  
FORT BRAGG, NC 28307  
7 December 199\_

APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX A TO JTF SOUTH OPORD 9 -5 ( )

JTFSO TROOP LIST ( )

Army Forces (ARFOR)

21st Airborne (Abn) Corps

17th Infantry (Inf) Division (Div) (Light (Lt))

Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 17th Inf Div (Lt)

1st Brigade (Bale), 17th Inf Div (Lt)

2d Bde, 17th Inf Div (Lt)

3d Bde, 17th Inf Div (Lt)

2-66 Inf (Lt)

2-67 Inf (Lt)

2-68 Inf (Lt)

2-69 Inf (Lt)

2-70 Inf (Lt)

2-71 Inf (Lt)

2-72 Inf (Lt)

2-73 Inf (Lt)

2-74 Inf (Lt)

17th Aviation (Avn) Bde

HHC, 17th Avn Bde

17th Attack (AA) Helicopter (Hel) Battalion (Bn)

121st Assault (Aslt) Hel Bn (UH-60)

175th Air Cavalry (Cav) Squadron (Sqdn)

17th Inf Division Artillery (DIVARTY)

Headquarters and Headquarters Battery (HHB), 21st Inf DIVARTY

2-45 Field Artillery (FA)(105, Towed (T))

2-46 FA ( 105,T)

2-47 FA ( 105,T)

A/2-48 FA (155,T)

2-439 Air Defense Artillery (ADA) (Avenger/Stinger (NS))

HHB, 2-439 ADA (A/S)

A/2-439 ADA (A/S)

B/2-439 ADA (A/S)

C/2-439 ADA (A/S)

17th Engineer (Engr) Bn

17th Military Intelligence (MI) Bn

17th Military Police (MP) Company (Co)

17th Inf Div Band

17th Signal (Sig) Bn

17th Division Support Command (DISCOM)

HHC/Materiel Management Center (MMC)

17th Aircraft Maintenance Company (AMC)

Main Support Battalion (MSB)

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1st Forward Support Battalion (FSB)  
2d FSB  
3d FSB  
102d Abn Div  
HHC, 102d Abn Div  
1st Bde, 102d Abn Div  
2d Bde, 102d Abn Div  
3d Bde, 102d Abn Div  
1-506 Inf (Abn)  
2-506 Inf (Abn)  
3-506 Inf (Abn)  
1-365 Inf (Abn)  
2-365 Inf (Abn)  
3-365 Inf (Abn)  
1-507 Inf (Abn)  
2-507 Inf (Abn)  
3-507 Inf (Abn)  
3-73 Armor (Abn) (M551 )  
102d Avn Bde (Abn)  
HHC, 102d Avn Bde (Abn)  
102d Atk Hel Bn (Abn)  
196th Aslt Hel Co (Abn)  
197th Aslt Hel Co (Abn)  
1-28 Cav (Abn)  
102d DIVARTY (Abn)  
HHB, 102d DIVARTY (Abn)  
1-57 FA (105,T) (Abn)  
1-58 FA (105,T) (Abn)  
1-59 FA (105,T) (Abn)  
1-442 ADA (A/S) (Abn)  
HHB, 1-442 ADA (A/S) (Abn)  
A/1 -442 ADA (A/S) (Abn)  
B/1 -442 ADA (A/S) (Abn)  
C/1 -442 ADA (A/S) (Abn)  
102d Chemical (Cml) Co (Abn)  
102d Engr Bn (Abn)  
102d MI Bn (Abn)  
102d MP Co (Abn)  
102d Div Band (Abn)  
102d Sig Bn (Abn)  
102d Abn DISCOM  
HHC/MMC  
102d Maintenance (Maint) Bn (Abn)  
102d AMC  
102d Medical (Meal) Bn (Abn)  
102d Supply and Transport (S&T) Bn (Abn)  
21st Avn Bde (Corps)  
HHC, 21st Avn Bde (Corps)

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- 104th Avn Group (Gp) HQ (Operational Control (OPCON)  
to Task Force (TF) RED Phase IV(C))
  - 116th Aslt Hel Bn (UH-60) (OPCON to TF RED Phase IV(C))
  - 117th Aslt Hel Bn (UH-60) (OPCON to TF RED Phase IV(C))
  - 121st Medium (Mdm) Lift Hel Bn (CH-47D)
  - 725th Command (Cmd) Avn Bn
- 103d Atk Hel Gp
  - 120th Atk Hel Bn (AH-64)
  - 121st Atk Hel Bn (AH-64)
- 160th Air Traffic Control (ATC) Bn
- 21st Corps Artillery
  - 21st FA Bde
    - HQB, 21st FA Bde
    - 21st Corps Target (Tgt) Acquisition (Acq) Detachment (Det)
    - 1-651 FA (155,T)
    - 2-651 FA (155,T)
    - 3-651 FA (155,T) (Abn)
    - 2-661 FA (Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS))
- 21st Corps Troops
  - 21st ADA Bde
    - HQB, 21st ADA Bde
    - 1-430 ADA (Chaparral (Chap))
    - 1-461 ADA (Hawk)
  - 51st Engr Bde
    - HQB, 51st Engr Bde
    - 538th Combat (Cbt) Engr Bn (Corps) (Abn)
    - 500th Cbt Engr Bn (Corps)
    - 502d Cbt Engr Bn (Corps)
    - 5045th Engr Aslt Floatbridge (Fltbrg) Co (Ribbon)
    - 5046th Engr Aslt Fltbrg Co (Ribbon)
    - 5047th Engr Aslt Fltbrg Co (Ribbon)
    - 5048th Engr Aslt Fltbrg Co (Ribbon)
    - Engr Det, Well Drill (Abn)
    - 4019th Engr Port Construction (Const) Co
    - 4505th Engr Det (Diving)
    - 4815th Engr Pipeline Const Co
  - 21st MI Bde (Abn)
    - HQB, 21st MI Bde (Abn)
    - 210th MI Bn (Tactical Exploitation (TE))
    - 220th MI Bn (Aerial Exploitation (AE))
    - 221st MI Bn (Operations (Ops)) (Abn)
    - 250th Long-Range Surveillance Company (LRSC)
  - 21st MP Bde (Abn)
    - HQB, 21st MP Bde
    - 230th MP Bn (Abn)
    - 272d MP Bn (with enemy prisoner of war (EPW) augmentation)
  - 21st Sig Bde
    - HQB, 21st Sig Bde

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705th Sig Support (Spt) Bn (Abn)  
712th Sig Radio (Rdo) Bn (Abn)  
770th Sig Bn Area Spt (Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE))  
771st Cmd Sig Ops Bn (Abn)  
Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE)  
21st Corps Support Command (COSCOM)  
HHC, 21st COSCOM  
2199th Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC)  
209th Press Camp HQ  
131st Finance (Fin) Spt Det  
2001st MMC (Forward (Fwd))  
523d Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Det  
4104th Movement Control Center (MCC) (Fwd)  
797th Movement Control Team (MCT) (Air Terminal (Tml)) (LF)  
798th MCT (Air Tml) (LF)  
7058th MCT (LB)  
7071st Movement Regulating Team (MRT) (Highway (Hwy) Regulating (Reg)) (LH)  
7072d MRT (Hwy Reg) (LH)  
7073d MRT (Hwy Reg) (LH)  
155th Postal Co (Direct Support (DS))  
211th Personnel Service (Svc) Bn  
70th Transportation (Trans) Gp  
HHC, 70th Trans Gp  
771st Transportation Motor Transport (TMT) Bn  
7710th Trans Mdm Truck (Trk) Co (Container Cargo (CC))  
723d Trans Mdm Trk Co (POL)  
753d Trans Cargo (Cgo) Transfer (Trf) Co  
714th Trans Tml Bn  
7099th Trans Tml Svc Co (Breakbulk (BB))  
7100th Trans Tml Svc Co (CC)  
719th Trans Bn  
701st Trans Co (Lt/5-ton (T))  
702d Trans Co (Lt/5-T)  
703d Trans Co (Lt/Mdm)  
701st Aircraft (Acft) Maint Co (Aviation Intermediate Maintenance (AVIM))  
82d Med Bde  
84th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH)  
809th Combat Support Hospital (CSH)  
888th Med Det (Surgical (Surg)) (Abn)  
800th Med Bn  
8011th Preventive Medicine (PM) Det (Entomolog)  
880th Med Det, Dental Svc  
890th Area Support Medical Company (ASMC)  
886th Med Det (Logistics Spt)  
8002d Med Det, Veterinary (Vet) Svc (JA)  
803d Med Bn (Evacuation (Evac))  
8120th Med Det (Air Ambulance (Amb)) (UH-60)  
8121st Med Det (Air Amb) (UH-60)

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- 855th Med Amb Co
- 21st Corps Support Group (CSG)
  - 90th Corps Support Battalion (CSB)
    - HHC, 90th CSB
    - 500th Ordnance (Oral) Co (Conventional (Conv))
    - Ammunition (Ammo)) (DS)
    - 9011th Maint Co (DS)
    - 201st Quartermaster (QM) Supply (Sup) Co (DS)
    - 950th Missile (Msl) Maint Team (Tin) (Dragon/Tube-Launched Optically Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW))
  - 91st CSB
    - HHC, 91st CSB
    - 26th Airdrop Sup and Equipment (Equip) Repair (Rep) Co
    - 9012th Maint Co (DS)
    - QM Clothing Exchange and Bath (CEB) Augmentation (Aug) Tm
    - 203d QM Sup Co (DS)
    - 257th Petroleum (Petri) Sup Co
  - 92d CSB
    - HHC, 92d CSB
    - 8012th Collection Co (MA)
    - 5099th Water Purification (Purif) Tm (12,000 gallons per hour (GPH))
    - 400th Rep Parts Sup Co
    - POL Wharf Platoon (Pit)
    - 615th POL Pipeline Tml Ops Co

Air Force Forces (AFFOR)

- 920th Reconnaissance Squadron (RS) (8 RF-4Cs, Reconnaissance (Recon))
- 913th Fighter Squadron (FS) (6 F-4Gs, Wild Weasel)
- 912th FS (24 F-15Es)
- 950th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) (4 AC-130s, Gunship)
- 951st Airborne Command and Control Squadron (ACCS) (4 EC-130s, Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC))
- 952d Special Operations Group (SOG) (4 EC-130s, VOLANT SOLO Psychological Operations (PSYOP))
- 933d FS (24 A-10s)
- 955th Air Rescue Squadron (ARS) (4 MH-60Gs Search and Rescue (SAR) Hel)
- 970th Air Ops Gp
  - 970th Air Control (Con) Sqdn (Air Operations Center (AOC))
  - 971st Air Con Warning Sqdn (Control and Reporting Center (CRC))
  - 972d Electronic Security (ELSEC) Sqdn
  - 973d Air Support Operations Center (ASOC)
- 990th Provisional Airlift Wing (HOWARD AFB, PANAMA (PA))
  - 991st Airlift Sqdn
  - 992d Airlift Sqdn
  - 981st Deployed Tanker Airlift Coordination Center (DTACC)
  - 982d Tanker Airlift Control Element (TALCE)
  - 983d TALCE
  - Aeromedical Evacuation (AME) Con Center (Cen)

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Med Blood Transship Cen  
Navy Forces (NAVFOR)  
Task Force (TF) 45 (1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) (Fwd) embarked)  
US Ship (USS) SAIPAN  
USS NASSAU  
USS IWO JIMA  
USS SHREVEPORT  
USS CHARLESTON  
USS WHIDBEY ISLAND  
USS PORTLAND  
USS SUMPTER  
USS SAGINAW

Marine Forces (MARFOR) (Once designated)  
1st MEF (Fwd)  
Command Element (CE) 1st MEF (Fwd)  
Ground Command Element (GCE) Regimental Landing Team (RLT) 5  
HQ Co, 5th Marines  
1st Bn, 5th Marines (Inf Bn)  
2d Bn, 5th Marines (Inf Bn)  
3d Bn, 5th Marines (Inf Bn)  
1st Light Armored Infantry (LAI) Bn (-) (36 Lt Armored (Armd) Vehicles)  
Co A, 1st Tank Bn (17 M1A1s)  
Co A, 1st Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) Bn (47 AAVs)  
Co A, 1st Cbt Engr Bn  
Trk Co, HQ Bn, 1st Marine Div  
1st Bn, 12th Marines (DS) (24 Howitzers (Hews), T)  
2d Bn, 12th Marines (General Support (GS)) (6 155-mm Hows  
(Self-Propelled (SP)) and 6 8-Inch Hows (SP))  
Bridge Co, Engr Spt Bn, Fleet Force Semite Support Group (FSSG)  
Air Combat Element (ACE) Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 50  
Marine Attack Squadron (VMA) 211 (20 AV-8B Atk Acft)  
Marine Helicopter Squadron (Medium) (HMM) 261 (12 CH-46 Transports)  
HMM-265 (12 CH-46 Transports)  
HMM-362 (12 CH-46 Transports)  
HMM-364 (12 CH-46 Transports)  
Helicopter. Light Marine Aviation (HLMA) 169(12 UH-1s and 12 AH-1s)  
Marine Helicopter Squadron (Heavy) (HMH) 464 (8 CH-53Es)  
Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS) 36  
Marine Air Control Squadron (MACS) 1  
Marine Wing Control Squadron (MWCS) 38  
Marine Aviation Tactical Control Squadron (MATCS) 38  
Det, Marine Air Support Squadron (MASS) 1  
A Battery (Btry), 1st Low-Altitude Air Defense (LADD) Bn  
A Btry, 2d Hawk Msl Bn  
Marine Wing Support Squadron (MWSS) 374  
Combat Semite Support Element (CSSE) Brigade Service Support Group (BSSG) 50  
Air Contingent

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Marine Fighter/Attack Squadron (VMFA) 212 (12 F-18Cs)  
VMFA-323 (12 F-18CSs)  
VMFA-210 (12 F-18Ds)  
Det, Marine Electronic Warfare Squadron (VMAQ) 2 (4 EA-6Bs)  
Det, Marine Aerial Refueling Squadron (VMGR) 352 (6 KC-130s)  
Det, Marine Observation Squadron (VMO) 2 (6 OV-10s)

Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF)

13th Special Forces Group (SFG) (Abn)  
Det/B/96th Civil Affairs (CA) Bn  
7th PSYOP Co (Abn): direct support (DS) Joint Task Force SOUTH (JTFSO)  
617th Special Operations Aviation Detachment (SOAD) (5 MH-60s)  
Sea-Air-Land Team (SEAL) 3 (-)(5 pits)  
Special Boat Unit 12 (-)(2 patrol boats (PBs), 4 Seafoxes)  
1st Special Operations Wing (SOW)  
8th SOS (-) (2 MC-130Es)  
20th SOS (5 MH-53s)  
55th SOS (8 UH-60s)  
Special Operations Combat Control Team (SOCCT)  
Special Operations Weather Team (SOWT)  
952d SOG (-) (2 EC-130s) (VOLANT SOLO)

Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF)

301st CA Bde  
96th CA Bn  
99th CA Bn

Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF)

7th Psychological Operations Group (POG) (Abn) (-)  
17th PSYOP Bn (Abn) (Tactical (Tac))  
28th PSYOP Bn (Abn) (Strategic (Strat) Dissemination)  
409th PSYOP Bn (EPW)

Joint Task Force (JTF) BRAVO

32d MI Bn (AE (Lt))  
63d MP Co  
JTF BRAVO Logistics (Log) Spt Element (Elm)  
JTF BRAVO Hospital  
19th Sig Bn (-)  
28th PSYOP Det (Abn) (Strat)  
A Co, 12th Engr Bn (Const)

Honduran Armed Forces

Honduran Air Force (AF) ( 10 F-5s)  
Honduran AF ( 15 A-37s)  
Honduran AF ( 12 Mirages)  
Regirmento de Caballeria Blindada (armored cavalry regiment (ACR)) (Honduran)  
Brigada 110 (Honduran)

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HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH  
FORT BRAGG, NC 28307  
7 December 199.

ANNEX B TO JTF SOUTH OPORD 9 -5 ( )  
INTELLIGENCE ( )

- ( ) REFERENCES:
- a. ( ) Basic OPORD.
  - b. ( ) USCINCSO Intelligence Plan, 15 March 1989.
  - c. ( ) USCINCSO Joint Targeting List, 15 March 1989.
  - d. ( ) USCINCSO Intelligence Estimate, 15 March 1989.
  - e. ( ) Maps:
    - ( ) Series USACGSC 50-355, HONDURAS, sheet 1 (SAN LORENZO), edition 1982, 1:50,000.
    - ( ) Series USACGSC 50-356, HONDURAS, sheet 1 (CHOLUTECA—EL TRIUNFO), 1:50,000.
    - ( ) Series USACGSC 50-357, HONDURAS, sheet 1 (SAN MARCOS DE COLON), 1:50,000.
    - ( ) Series USACGSC 50-358, HONDURAS, sheet 1 (SOTO CANO—TEGUCIGALPA). 1:50,000.
    - ( ) Series TPC, BELIZE—EL SALVADOR—GUATEMALA—HONDURAS—MEXICO, sheet K-25A, edition 3, 1:500,000.
    - ( ) Series TPC, EL SALVADOR—HONDURAS—NICARAGUA, sheet K-25B, edition 5, 1:500,000.
    - ( ) Series TPC, COSTA RICA—NICARAGUA—PANAMA, sheet K-25C, edition 3, 1:500,000.

1. ( ) Situation

- a . ( ) Characteristics of the Area. Appendix 11.
- b . ( ) Hydrographic, Amphibious, Topographic, and Weather. Appendix 11.
- c. ( ) Estimate of Enemy Capabilities

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(1) ( ) Atlantican force capabilities are limited to a two-axis attack to CHOLUTECA by two motorized infantry regiments and four infantry battalions supported by artillery, armed helicopters, and fighters. The Atlantican Armed Forces are not capable of supporting a penetration beyond CHOLUTECA without pausing for 30 days. Seizing the southern border area of HONDURAS would provide the government of ATLANTICA (GOA) with a bargaining chip for negotiations with the government of HONDURAS (GOH) in the GOA's effort to end the Honduran-supported insurgency directed against the GOA.

(2) ( ) Additional reports indicate that ATLANTICA has positioned approximately two motorized infantry regiments supported by an additional motorized infantry regiment along the Pan-American Highway southeast of CHOLUTECA near the HONDURAN border. Battalion-sized Atlantican forces are located in the vicinity of the town of SOMOTO. Road movement from major population centers indicates supply and sustainment activities for these forces are in full swing.

(3) ( ) Intentions of Atlantican forces are unknown at this time, but it appears that an attack into HONDURAS toward CHOLUTECA with a significant motorized infantry force may be imminent. Another attack with up to three infantry battalions could support this effort along the highway between SOMOTO and CHOLUTECA to the north.

(4) ( ) The enemy can conduct limited reconnaissance and surveillance operations in the Joint Task Force SOUTH (JTFSO) joint operations area (JOA).

(a) ( ) Urban and rural leftist groups and revolutionary organizations inside HONDURAS can provide Atlantican forces with human intelligence (HUMINT) to the disposition and possible intentions of Honduran and joint task force (JTF) military forces. While specific identification and classification of these groups are currently difficult, the HUMINT threat appears to lie with the "Lorenzo Zelaya" Popular Revolutionary Forces (*Fuerzas Populares Revolucionarias (FPR)*), the Morazan Front for the Liberation of Honduras (*Frente Morazanista para la Liberación de Honduras (FMLH)*), and the "Cinchonero" Popular Liberation Movement (*Movimiento Popular de Liberación (MPL)*). The National Directorate of Unity (*Dirección Nacional de Unidad (DNU)*) and a follow-on structure, the People's Democratic Movement (*Movimiento Democráticas del Pueblo (MDdeP)*), coordinate the activities of these leftist organizations; as such, they will likely focus the reconnaissance and surveillance effort among the three groups during periods of heightened military tension. The greatest leftist activity resides in the CHOLUTECA and EL PARAISO regions of southwestern HONDURAS.

(b) ( ) Refugees provide an additional HUMINT threat. Their camps along the border with ATLANTICA may interfere with Honduran and JTFSO operations along the border.

(c) ( ) Military Region I has ground reconnaissance assets organic to the motorized infantry division, supported by artillery acquisition systems and by limited rotary-wing (MI-2, MI-24) and fixed-wing (MiG-19 and MiG-23) platforms of unknown sortie potential.

(d) ( ) Military Region II has ground reconnaissance assets organic to the infantry division; these assets are supported by artillery acquisition systems and by limited rotary-wing (MI-2, MI-24) and fixed-wing (MiG-19 and MiG-23) platforms of unknown sortie potential.

## 2. ( ) Mission and Concept of Intelligence Operations

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a. ( ) Mission. Provide accurate, timely, all-source intelligence and counterintelligence to JTFSO and components, direct intelligence activities of components, and satisfy the intelligence requirements of higher headquarters and authorities.

b. ( ) Concept of Intelligence Operations. JTFSO Intelligence Directorate (Joint) (J2) will direct intelligence operations and coordinate the taskings of national, theater, and tactical assets. The J2 will exercise overall direction of signals intelligence (SIGINT) operations; collection management: tactical, operational, and strategic imagery operations; and HUMINT operations. The component commands will, to the maximum extent possible, provide their own intelligence support.

3. ( ) Intelligence Activities

a. ( ) Direction. JTFSO J2 will direct the intelligence effort while incorporating component requirements. As such, the J2 will monitor the status of established requirements and will submit new requirements as necessary.

(1) ( ) Essential Elements of Information

(a) ( ) Will the Atlantican forces continue an offensive into HONDURAS? If so, when, where, with what forces, in what strength, and with what objective?

(b) ( ) What HUMINT, logistic, and terrorist support is the *MDdep* providing to Atlantican forces? What other groups are providing the support, what support is being provided, and from what locations is the support originating?

(c) ( ) What external support is being given to ATLANTICA (for example, the Morazan Front for the Liberation of Atlantica (*Frente Morazanista para la Liberation de Atlantica (FMLNA)*); EL SALVADOR; CUBA; and/or other Communist affiliates? Who is providing the support, what is the extent of the support, and along what lines of communication is the support flowing?

(d) ( ) To what extent can the Atlantican Air Force and Navy support the ground offensive into HONDURAS?

(e) ( ) Where are rally points; logistic centers; cache points; and command, control, and communications (C3) nodes to support Atlantican forces after JTFSO intervention?

(f) ( ) How could refugees disrupt JTFSO operations in the border areas?

(g) ( ) Will the Atlantican forces employ chemical weapons? If so, when, where, and what type?

(2) ( ) New Requirements. Not applicable (NA).

b. ( ) Collection

(1) ( ) SIGINT. JTFSO J2 will exercise tasking authority over supporting tactical SIGINT assets. Components retain tasking authority over organic and attached SIGINT assets.

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(2) ( ) Imagery intelligence (IMINT). JTFSO J2 will exercise collection management authority over designated theater imagery assets oriented to ATLANTICA and/or HONDURAS. The J2 will receive, validate, and submit all imagery requirements.

(3) ( ) HUMINT. JTFSO J2 will direct all theater-based, ATLANTICA-oriented, military HUMINT operations.

(4) ( ) Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT). NA.

(5) ( ) Other Collection Activities. NA.

c. ( ) Processing

(1) ( ) HUMINT. JTFSO components are responsible for the interrogation and debriefing of enemy prisoners, civilian internees and/or detainees, and any other inhabitants in their areas of operation (AOAs). JTFSO components may coordinate laterally to identify interrogation and debriefing assistance that they can provide to each other. Only those prisoners, internees, detainees, or other inhabitants possessing political, strategic, or operational importance to the JTFSO will be transported to the JTFSO interrogation facility for further processing.

(2) ( ) Documents and Material. JTFSO components will establish guidelines for the initial exploitation of documents and material captured or recovered in their AOs and subsequent evacuation of identified significant items to JTFSO, which will perform follow-up processing and exploitation.

(3) ( ) SIGINT. Appendix 2 (omitted).

(4) ( ) IMINT. Appendix 7 (omitted).

d. ( ) Analyses and Reporting. Intelligence reports will be submitted directly to the JTFSO J2 with an Information copy to affected JTFSO component commanders.

(1) ( ) Indications and warning (I&W) intelligence information will be reported at the highest precedence to JTFSO.

(2) ( ) Guidance regarding critical intelligence reports, national- and/or theater-level intelligence support teams, and crisis response units will be published separately.

(3) ( ) JTFSO collection assets will be employed to locate and to track committed and reinforcing Atlantican ground units, command and control headquarters (HQ), aviation and naval assets, insurgent activity within HONDURAS, and external threat lines of communication.

(4) ( ) JTFSO collection management and intelligence production functions will be performed at the JTFSO main command post (CP). All requests for intelligence information (RIIs) and collection requirements will be forwarded to the Collection Management Office, JTFSO J2.

(5) ( ) Major subordinate commands (MSCs) will collect, produce, and disseminate battlefield information and intelligence in response to identified JTFSO priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and information requirements (IRs).

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e. ( ) Production

(1) ( ) Targeting

(a) ( ) Procedures. Appendix 4 (omitted).

(b) ( ) Concept. Appendix 4 (omitted).

(2) ( ) Counterintelligence targets. JTFSO will maintain the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) lists (white, gray, and black). Components will report counterintelligence target information to the JTFSO J2.

f. ( ) Dissemination. Components will ensure that lateral and higher headquarters that have identified an immediate need for specific intelligence (PIRs and IRs) are included in the initial reporting of that intelligence or information.

(1) ( ) No unit subject to this operation order (OPORD) will disseminate raw intelligence reports outside of the JOA. Raw intelligence reports include interrogation reports; size, activity, location. unit, time, and equipment (SALUTE) reports; spot reports, and so forth. Exceptions are SIGINT reports and controlled-source HUMINT reports, which will be handled in accordance with (IAW) instructions to be published separately. Raw intelligence reports may be disseminated laterally and must be forwarded to higher HQ within the JOA but not higher than JTFSO command. Summary intelligence reports will be disseminated outside the JOA only by the JTFSO J2; however, MSCs may forward summary reports to their parent HQ only.

(2) ( ) Intelligence Activity Reports

(a) ( ) Intelligence Report (INTREP). Intelligence information having significant value to ongoing or planned operations will be transmitted to the JTFSO J2 in INTREP (Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems (JINTACCS)) format. If the information is of a significant or highly perishable nature, it will be passed to the JTFSO J2 by the fastest means available; that is, the telephone or the sensitive information tactical satellite (TACSAT) net. JTFSO J2 will use the same format to disseminate time-sensitive intelligence to components.

(b) ( ) Intelligence Summaries (INTSUMs). JTFSO components will submit INTSUMs in JINTACCS format. Reports will cover 12-hour periods ending at 1400 and 0200, and they will reach the JTFSO J2 not later than (NLT) 4 hours following the closing time of the report.

(c) ( ) Daily INTSUM. JTFSO J2 will provide a summary of significant all-source intelligence to the MSCs and Commander in Chief, US Southern Command (USCINCSO), twice daily: an INTSUM at 0800 and another at 2000.

4. ( ) Assignment of Intelligence Tasks

a. ( ) Orders to Subordinate and Attached Units

(1) ( ) Joint Intelligence Task Force (JINTF)

(a) ( ) Army Forces (ARFOR) provides commander and staff for the JINTF.

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(b) ( ) Establishes a joint interrogation facility (JIF) vicinity the JTFSO enemy-prisoner-of-war (EPW) facility during Phase 111 and conducts tactical-level interrogation in support of the components and detailed operational- and strategic-level interrogation in support of JTFSO.

(c) ( ) Establishes a joint document and materiel exploitation center (JDMEC) during Phase III.

(d) ( ) Conducts HUMINT and counterintelligence (CI) in support of JTFSO.

(e) ( ) On order (00), coordinates strategic photo collection requirements.

(f) ( ) Provides imagery exploitation support to operational Phases II, III, and IV.

(g) ( ) provides general SIGINT support to JTFSO.

(h) ( ) Establishes a technical control and analysis element (TCAE) to support JTF SIGINT management. Performs mission management of JINTF SIGINT assets and provides technical data support to JTFSO components and to electronic warfare (EW) operations.

(i) ( ) Establishes a Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) capable of providing all-source analysis.

(j) ( ) Coordinates the conduct of target exploitation with the JTFSO Operations Directorate (J3).

(k) ( ) Provides EPW and/or CI direct support (DS) teams to component commands prior to Phase III; continues EPW and CI DS during hostilities,

(2) ( ) ARFOR, Phases II, III, and IV.

(a) ( ) OO, provides augmentation forces and equipment as required by the JINTF.

(b) ( ) OO, deploys forces to provide intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) support to JTFSO.

(c) ( ) OO, assumes operational control (OPCON) of echelons above corps (EAC) assets supporting intheater requirements.

b. ( ) Requests to Higher, Adjacent, and Cooperating Units. Request USSOUTHCOM—

(1) ( ) Authorize direct liaison with Honduran military forces and with the civilian populace to exchange Atlantican threat information.

(2) ( ) Provide DS of JTFSO through intheater intelligence collection assets, to include US Air Force (USAF) and US Navy (USN) resources.

(3) ( ) Provide immediate dissemination of SIGINT gained through strategic and operational USAF collection platforms.

c. ( ) Coordinating Instructions

(1) ( ) Coordination between intelligence staffs is authorized and encouraged at all levels while keeping

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the JTF SO J2 advised.

(2) ( ) JINTF will conduct target exploitation of SIGINT and cryptologic-associated material.

(3) ( ) Disclosure of intelligence information to foreign governments will be directed by USSOUTHCOM.

5. ( ) Command, Control, Communications, Annex K (omitted).

6. ( ) Miscellaneous Instruction. NA.

7. ( ) Consolidated Listing and Impact Assessment of Shortfalls and Limiting Factor. NA.

t/  
LTG  
Commander

Appendixes:

11 —Analysis of Area of Operations

OFFICIAL:

s/

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Colonel  
Director, J2



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HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH  
FORT BRAGG, NC 28307  
7 December 199\_

APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX B TO JTF SOUTH OPORD 9 -5 ( )  
ANALYSIS OF AREA OF OPERATIONS ( )

( ) REFERENCES:

( ) Maps:

- ( ) Series USACGSC 50-355, HONDURAS, sheet 1 (SAN LORENZO), edition 1982, 1:50,000.
- ( ) Series USACGSC 50-356, HONDURAS, sheet 1 (CHOLUTECA—EL TRIUNFO), 1:50,000.
- ( ) Series USACGSC 50-357, HONDURAS, sheet 1 (SAN MARCOS DE COLON), 1:50,000.
- ( ) Series USACGSC 50-358, HONDURAS, sheet 1 (SOTO CANO—TEGUCIGALPA), 1:50,000.
- ( ) Series TPC, BELIZE—EL SALVADOR—GUATEMALA—HONDURAS—MEXICO, sheet K-25A, edition 3, 1:500,000.
- ( ) Series TPC, EL SALVADOR—HONDURAS—NICARAGUA, sheet K-25B, edition 5, 1:500,000.
- ( ) Series TPC, COSTA RICA—NICARAGUA—PANAMA, sheet K-25C, edition 3, 1:500,000.

1. ( ) Purpose and Limiting Considerations

a. ( ) Purpose. This appendix analyzes and evaluates the HONDURAN-ATLANTICAN border region from the LAS VEGAS salient (FL5580) to the CHOLUTECA Gap/PACIFIC coast (DK8547) and the zones of entry.

b. ( ) Mission. Basic operation plan (OPLAN).

2. ( ) General Description of the Area

a. ( ) Climate or Weather Conditions

(1) ( ) Wet Season Summary

(a) ( ) General. The weather in the joint operations area (JOA) during the wet season (May to October) is characterized by mostly cloudy skies, hot temperatures, high dewpoints, frequent rain showers, and thunderstorms. Precipitation amounts are usually moderate in the interior. Precipitation occurs 5 to 26 days per month. Mean cloudiness varies from 50 to 85 percent. Mean minimum temperatures range from the upper 60

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to the upper 70 degrees Fahrenheit (°F), depending on elevation. Maximum temperatures range from the upper 80s to the lower 90s. Areas that are sheltered from the wind are particularly hot. Thunderstorm occur 4 to 24 days per month, with coastal stations usually recording greater frequency. Surface winds are usually north to northeast at 6 to 10 knots. Coastal areas are occasionally subjected to the effects of tropical storms or hurricanes. Clouds associated with those storms obscure mountaintops in the interior sections and bring copious rainfall and strong winds to the entire JOA.

(b) ( ) Flying Weather. Flying weather is usually good except in the immediate vicinity of thunderstorms and in the higher elevations. Ceiling/visibility less than 5,000 feet and/or 6 miles occurs 25 to 45 percent of the time; less than 1,500 feet, 3 miles, 5 to 10 percent of the time; and less than 500 feet, 1 mile, 1 to 6 percent of the time. Icing and turbulence are usually not a problem except near rain showers and thunderstorms. Early morning fog can be a problem at some mountain locations, when peaks are generally obscured, and in low-lying areas.

(c) ( ) Reconnaissance Weather. Reconnaissance weather is usually poor due to extensive cloud cover. The mean occurrence in days per month of cloud cover of one-fourth or less and visibility of 3 miles or more ranges from 1 to 9 during the night and from 0 to 5 during midafternoon.

(d) ( ) Exposure Weather. The weather is warm, humid, and mostly cloudy in the mountains. Rain occurs about 1 day in 2, usually as early evening showers or thunderstorms. The lowlands are cloudy with frequent heavy rainfall, oppressive temperatures, and humidity.

Temperature (°F)	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct
Absolute maximum	104	96	93	94	94	92
Average maximum	90	87	86	87	87	87
Average minimum	68	69	67	67	68	67
Absolute minimum	39	52	53	56	59	54
<b>Average precipitation (inches)</b>	5.7	14.1	9.4	6.1	7.6	6.7

## Average number of days

Precipitation	11	19	20	20	18	17
Thunderstorms	5	19	11	12	10	6

(e) ( ) Air Assault. Weather is usually suitable for air assault; however, the early afternoon or evening hours may be unfavorable 30 to 60 percent of the time due to rainfall or winds in excess of 13 knots.

## (2) ( ) Dry Season Summary

(a) ( ) General. The weather for the JOA during the dry season (November to April) is characterized by partly cloudy skies, warm to hot temperatures, and infrequent rainfall. Exceptions are in the eastern part of the country along the coast where the rainy season does not let up until December and the northern coast where stations receive their maximum rainfall at this time of the year. Rain generally occurs less than 5 days per month. Mean temperature is about 55 to 75°F, while maximum temperatures range from 70 to 85°F. Thunderstorms occur 2 to 6 days per month in November and December but become infrequent after that. Surface winds are generally north to northeast at 8 to 15 knots.

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(b) ( ) Flying Weather. Flying weather is usually good. Ceiling/visibility less than 5,000 feet and/or 6 miles occurs 15 to 45 percent of the time; less than 1,500 feet, 3 miles, 1 to 5 percent of the time; and less than 500 feet, 1 mile, rarely. Aircraft icing can occur above the freezing level in the stratified cloudiness that occasionally forms along the northern coast.

(c) ( ) Reconnaissance Weather. Reconnaissance weather is generally poor along the eastern coast and fair elsewhere. Isolated locations in the mountains may have poor conditions. However, 2 to 10 days per month with favorable conditions are usual. West coast locations may have 10 to 20 percent favorable days per month.

(d) ( ) Exposure Weather. Warm days, cool nights, and partly cloudy skies are the rule. Rainfall is infrequent.

Temperature (°F)	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr
Absolute maximum	90	90	97	97	99	103
Average maximum	84	83	83	85	89	90
Average minimum	62	62	60	62	64	66
Absolute minimum	50	46	39	48	49	54
<b>Average precipitation (inches)</b>	3.1	2.3	1.7	0.9	0.6	1.1

**Average number of days**

Precipitation	12	8	10	6	5	6
Thunderstorms	2	1	0	0	1	2

(e) ( ) Air Assault Weather. Weather is usually suitable for an assault; however, the early afternoon may be unsuitable 30 to 45 percent of the time due to winds in excess of 13 knots.

b. ( ) Terrain

(1) ( ) General. HONDURAS is a rugged mountainous country with intermountain valleys and narrow coastal plains. It is slightly larger than TENNESSEE. More than 80 percent of HONDURAS has elevations ranging from 300 to 2,849 meters and mountain gradients averaging 40 percent. Vegetation vanes from coastal mangrove marsh to dense triple-canopy rain forest HONDURAS shares 573 miles of border with ATLANTIC A.

(2) ( ) Zones of Entry

(a) ( ) Ports. HONDURAS has four major ports on the CARIBBEAN coast: PUERTO CORTES (CN9941), TELA (DN4738), LA CEIBA (EN2037), and PUERTO CASTILLA (FN1070). Port facilities handle 98 percent of the country's exports and 93 percent of the imports. PUERTO CORTES is the country's most important port facility, followed by LA CEIBA. The major exports are agricultural products and lumber, Imports are manufactured goods and crude oil products. There are 20 minor ports for coastal shipping and fishing.

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1. ( ) PUERTO CORTES (CN9941). PUERTO CORTES is located on a peninsula approximately 57 kilometers (km) north of SAN PEDRO SULA (CN8815) and 303 kilometers north of TEGUCIGALPA (DL8050). It is the major port of HONDURAS, handling two-thirds of the national maritime traffic. It is a modern facility and the home port of the Honduran Navy. The port has six piers or whines capable of handling two vessels of 7,500 tons simultaneously at a single pier. Varying in length from 76 to 352 meters are one petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) finger pier, one molasses finger pier, and four marginal whines for general cargo (one timber wharf is not suitable for military use). Roll on/roll off (RO/RO) is available, but there are no flatbed or trailer ramps. Utilities, services, facilities, and storage are suitable for military operations. POL storage and a Texaco refinery are located at the port. Roads, railroads, and airfields service the port. Its vulnerabilities include the following:

a. ( ) The access from the port to the main supply route (MSR) is along congested city streets.

b. ( ) Destruction of the highway and railroad bridges connecting the peninsula to the mainland would cut access to the port.

c. ( ) The MSR (CARRETERA DEL NORTE (NORTHERN HIGHWAY)) is immediately vulnerable to ambush from enemy forces in the mountains and swamps.

d. ( ) LA MESA airfield is 72 kilometers south, requiring convoying along congested city streets in SAN PEDRO SULA.

2. ( ) SAN LORENZO (DK5085). The port of SAN LORENZO is located on the PACIFIC coast of HONDURAS. in the GULF OF FONSECA. The city is 5 kilometers west of the port. Tidal restrictions, fog, and lack of lighting restrict vessel entry until the daylight hours. One T-type pier exists, with three berths varying from 16 to 137 meters. Port facilities, storage, and equipment are available. Insufficient water depth limits type of vessel and cargo capacity. Roads and an airfield service the port. RO/RO is available. There are no POL facilities. Recent reports indicate the port facility has been upgraded to a container port. SAN LORENZO is 97 kilometers south-southwest of TEGUCIGALPA. Its vulnerability is that destruction of the road leading to the pier and blockage of the narrow channel would severely impede operations.

(b) ( ) Routes

1. ( ) NORTHERN Highway, Route 1, from PUERTO CORTES to TEGUCIGALPA (303 km) is a two-lane, undivided, bituminous road in good condition. Roadway width is 6.5 meters north of LAGO DE YOJOA (CM9050) and 10 to 14 meters from LAGO DE YOJOA to TEGUCIGALPA. A single-gauge railroad track parallels the highway into LA MESA Airport. Vulnerability points follow:

a. ( ) PUERTO CORTES bridge (DN0150).

b. ( ) CHOLOMA bridge (CN9827).

c. ( ) RIO ULUA/ambush (CM9688).

d. ( ) Ambush (DN0949 to CN9827).

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- e. ( ) Chokepoint (CM9634).
- f. ( ) TAULABE bridge (CM9625).
- g. ( ) Gradient/chokepoint (CM9824).
- h. ( ) Gradient/chokepoint (CM9922).
- i. ( ) Gradient/chokepoint (DM1905).
- j. ( ) Chokepoint (DL4077 to DL6075).
- k. ( ) Gradient/chokepoint (DL7060 to DL7560).

2. ( ) EAST Highway, Route 4, from TEGUCIGALPA to JAMAISTRAN (EL6550) is a bituminous mountain road 5.5 meters wide from the capital to EL ZAMORANO (DL9950); 10.5 meters wide to DANLI (EL4850); and loose surface 5.5 meters wide to JAMAISTRAN. Vulnerabilities follow:

- a. ( ) Ambush (DL8755).
- b. ( ) Chokepoint (DL8555 to DL9850).
- c. ( ) Bridge/SANTA CLARA (EL0249).
- d. ( ) Bridge (EL1253).
- e. ( ) Bridge (EL1654).
- f. ( ) Bridge/LOS LIMONES (EL1856).
- g. ( ) Ambush (EL0852).
- h. ( ) Ambush (EL3452).
- i. ( ) Ambush (EL5254 to EL5954).

3. ( ) SOUTH Highway from SAN LORENZO to TEGUCIGALPA (Route 1) is a mountainous, bituminous, all-weather road, 8 to 12 meters wide, in poor to fair condition. Vulnerabilities follow:

- a. ( ) Chokepoint/ambush (DL6010 to DL7027).
- b. ( ) Ambush (DL7744).

(c) ( ) Airfields. Tab A. There are 262 airfields, of which 197 are known to be in usable condition. Most airfields are small, secondary, sodded, or graded airfields that support agricultural communities. There are six airfields capable of supporting light to heavy lift and C-130s: GOLOSON (EN 1740), LA MESA (DN0109), SOTO CANO (PALMEROLA) (DL3389), TONCONTIN (DL7949), JAMAISTRAN (EL6450), AND SAN

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LORENZO (DK5180).

1. ( ) LA MESA (SAN PEDRO SULA) is a major international airport. The runway is 2,930 by 45 meters. Air Florida and the Honduran national airlines, TAN and SAHSA, provide daily flights. This airfield is capable of supporting C-130s and C-5s.

2. ( ) SAN LORENZO is graded earth and limited to light- to medium-lift aircraft. The runway is 1,494 by 46 meters.

3. ( ) SOTO CANO (PALMEROLA) is a military hard-surface airfield 8 kilometers south-southeast of COMAYAGUA (DL3099). The runway is 2,440 by 45 meters. The airfield is capable of supporting C-130s and C-5s and lies just off the NORTH Highway (Route 1 ) in the COMAYAGUA Valley. The valley is 43 kilometers north to south and 15 kilometers east to west. It is level and supports agricultural activities.

4. ( ) JAMAISTRAN (EL6450) is located 16 kilometers east of DANLI (EL5550). The airfield is graded earth, 1,000 by 60 meters, and capable of supporting C-130s or light- to medium-lift aircraft.

5. ( ) TONCONTIN (TEGUCIGALPA) is a joint civil-military airfield with the Honduran Air Force headquarters. The airfield is 3 kilometers south of the capital and is capable of supporting C-130s. The runway is 1,869 by 45 meters.

6. ( ) GOLOSON is a joint civil-military airfield. The airfield is 4 kilometers southwest of LA CEIBA. The runway is 2,840 by 45 meters and is capable of supporting C-130s and C-5s.

(3) ( ) Relief and Drainage

(a) ( ) Relief

1. ( ) The border between HONDURAS and ATLANTICA runs from narrow coastal plains to rugged interior mountains. The majority of the area has elevations varying from 2,000 feet in the valleys to summits over 6,000 feet. A narrow coastal plain runs from SAN LORENZO to CHOLUTECA (DK8071) to the border where the plain expands into ATLANTICA. The width of the plain varies from 1 kilometer near SAN LORENZO to 30 kilometers near CHOLUTECA and narrows to 5 kilometers near SAN BERNARDO (DK8348) and through the CHOLUTECA Gap. It then expands near the border to more than 50 kilometers into ATLANTICA. Isolated hills are scattered through the plains. The mountains are steep with slopes averaging more than 40 percent. The eastern portion of HONDURAS is mountainous terrain with elevations ranging from 300 to 7,511 feet. Major valleys are the MOROCELI Valley (EL6010), RIO CHOLUTECA Valley (EL2525), ZAMORANO Valley (EL0046), and EL PARAISO-DANLI Valley (EL4840).

2. ( ) The western portion of HONDURAS is rugged and mountainous. The JAMAISTRAN Valley is the major valley (EL7055).

3. ( ) Across the border, the significant feature is the OCOTAL (EL5508) to LAS TROJES (FL0857) Valley, which provides easy ground and air access along the border. The DE LAS NUBES Mountains run along most of the western half of the JOA from OCOTAL (EL5706) to LAS TROJES (FL0857). Much of the terrain is an equal mix of hills, mountains, and gentle valleys.

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(b) ( ) Drainage

1. ( ) There is a fairly dense drainage network throughout the area. The rivers flowing into the PACIFIC Ocean are generally short. The majority of the rivers flow northeast into the CARIBBEAN Sea. The major river along the west coast is the RIO CHOLUTECA. The RIO GUAYAMBRE, RIO GUAYAPE, and the RIO PATUCA flow to the east. Rivers dividing the two countries are the RIO COCO and the RIO GUASAULE.

2. ( ) The RIO PATUCA and RIO COCO are major rivers in the east. The drainage system is in high-water season from May through October, peaking in June and July. During high water, rivers are in flood stage, reaching maximum width and velocity. The coastal plains and intermountain valleys become flooded. Bridges and roads can be washed away, and fords become impossible to use. There is no potable water in HONDURAS. Untreated sewage and chemicals are dumped into the rivers. During the rainy season, extremely high amounts of silt are in the rivers. Ample ground and surface water is available, but it is contaminated. Valleys have high water tables.

3. ( ) The CENTRAL HIGHLANDS form the beginning of most watersheds. The streams are narrow (less than 18 meters) and deeply cut, with steep banks and rapidly flowing water over a rocky bottom. Rivers are typically 1 to 1.8 meters deep during high water and up to 1 meter deep during the dry season, with velocities at 2 to 3 meters per second. River depths change rapidly before and after thunderstorms. The RIO GRANDE and RIO CHOLUTECA (18 to 142 meters wide) are in the center of the JOA. The RIO CHOLUTECA runs through the MOROCELI Valley (EL1554).

4. ( ) The RIO GUAYAMBRE (EL7055 to FL0898) and the RIO PATUCA (FL0898 to FL6187) in the northeast form an inverted V-shaped obstacle forcing mobilized traffic toward JAMASTRAN.

5. ( ) The cross-border (HONDURAS-ATLANTICA) major river is the RIO COCO, flowing from SOMOTO (EK4590) through OCOTAL to PANALI (FK1095), where the RIO EL JICARO converges with it (FK0894) (100 to 142 meters wide); the RIO COCO then continues northerly where it forms the border (FL3430).

(4) ( ) Vegetation

(a) ( ) Vegetation varies greatly from the RIO CHOLUTECA to the east. The CHOLUTECA region is characterized by a combination of grass, agriculture, and bush with scattered small trees. Cacti and thorn brush are typical in the dry valleys and rock hillsides. Vegetation typically gets thicker with increasing elevation and along streams. Coniferous trees dominate elevations above 1,000 meters in the cooler tropical mountain climate. The mountains north of CHOLUTECA (DK8070), along the RIO CHOLUTECA to the border (EL2515), and northeast from YUSCARAN (EL1541) to DANLI are grass and brush, with the higher and steeper slopes covered with small, open oak and pine forests. Evergreen trees dominate the streams and higher elevations in the vicinity of SAN MARCOS DE COLON (EK2085), with a canopy closure of 30 to 75 percent. The local population around the major urban areas has cut or burned a considerable portion of the Honduran forest. Trees lose most of their leaves by the end of the dry season (March and April). The small farms grow corn, beans, and coffee. The larger farms raise cattle, tobacco, cotton, and corn.

(b) ( ) Vegetation varies from shrubs, small trees, thorn bushes, and grass along the border through the DANLI Valley to open pine and oak forests in the higher elevations toward TEGUCIGALPA where canopy

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closure is 25 to 50 percent and trees are 5 to 20 meters high. Shrubs are 0.5 to 3 meters high. and grasses are 0.3 to 6 meters tall. East of Route 17 (DANLI—EL PARAISO-OCOTAL), the vegetation becomes thicker, with a canopy closure of 50 to 75 percent. Underbrush density varies throughout the JOA.

(c) ( ) Vegetation varies from cultivated fields in the EL PARAISO Valley to dense continuous triple-canopy rain forest north and west of LAS TROJES in the LAS VEGAS salient along the RIO COCO. The JAMAISTRAN Valley to LAS TROJES consists of brush and grass. A thick overgrowth of bamboo and palm grows on the tropical rain forest floor.

(d) ( ) Atlantican vegetation varies from brush, crops, and grasses in the coastal plain to a mixture of lowland grasses and coniferous hills. North and west of OCOTAL, the mountain vegetation has a canopy closure of 50 to 100 percent that gradually transitions into triple-canopy forest.

(5) ( ) Surface Materials. The soils vary between a time of silt and clay. Clay dominates the region. The soil depths vary from 4 to 20 feet in the mountains. The southern mountains typically have shallow and rocky soils. The soils for much of the JOA remain moist throughout the year. Soil moisture can vary from dry and extremely dusty to wet, sticky, slippery, and soft, depending on the season and location. Soils are wet after heavy rains and during most of the rainy season. Soils may support one or two passes of heavy vehicles. but the soil will quickly weaken and not support follow-on vehicles.

(6) ( ) Manmade Features

(a) ( ) The most populated areas are the CHOLUTECA, TEGUCIGALPA, and DANLI areas. The major features are SAN LORENZO port, Route 1 (PAN AMERICAN Highway), and the capital of HONDURAS, TEGUCIGALPA. TEGUCIGALPA and its twin city COMAYAGUELA are the largest urban areas in HONDURAS, with 500,000 inhabitants total. TEGUCIGALPA is a vital transportation and industrial center. A four-lane highway bypass to the south of the capital connects the airport, Route 4, and the MSR. Seven major bridges connect the twin cities. The capital is 303 kilometers south of the CARIBBEAN port of PUERTO CORTES and 85 kilometers north of SAN LORENZO and the PAN-AMERICAN Highway. There are limited refined POL products (800 tons) and medical supplies in the capital.

(b) ( ) The major road through the JOA is the east-west LAS TROJES-DANLI-TEGUCIGALPA road, The only north-south road crossing the border is Route 17, which runs from OCOTAL to EL PARAISO to DANLI. The major Atlantican roads are the PAN-AMERICAN Highway. Route 24 into the CHOLUTECA Gap. and Route 29 from OCOTAL to LAS TROJES. There are numerous secondary roads, cart trails, and footpaths. Many of the secondary roads are deeply rutted. Most all-weather roads are 6 to 9 meters wide, while natural earth roads are 3 to 6 meters wide. Driving is difficult and dangerous because of the mountainous roads and locals walking in the middle of the roads with carts and livestock. especially during the early mornings and late evenings. Secondary roads usually have masonry arch and timber bridges. These older bridges have a low carrying capacity of 5 tons. The newer bridges are concrete beam. slab, or steel through truss construction with a capacity of 20 tons. Many of the secondary roads turn into cart trails and footpaths as they move away from the valleys. There are numerous secondary (primarily agriculture) airfields in the JOA. The major airfields in the immediate area are TONCONTIN, SAN LORENZO, and JAMAISTRAN in HONDURAS and the ESTELI (EK6545) in ATLANTICA. The major roads, airfields, and ports in ATLANTICA are located south of CHINANDEGA (DJ8597). Numerous lumber and sawmills are scattered throughout the interior mountain ranges. Large farms are located in the valleys; the majority of the small farms (less than 10 acres) are located on the steeper mountain slopes.

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(c) ( ) The DANLI-EL PARAISO Valley is densely cultivated (sugar and tobacco). Urban dwellings are made of adobe, concrete, and wood. Most structures are one story, and few have more than two stories. Streets are mostly unpaved and arranged in a block pattern. Rural and residential dwellings are made of adobe or wood or are wooden frames filled with mud or thatch. Most of the country does not have electrical power. Diesel powerplants provide electricity to DANLI and EL PARAISO. The Department of EL PARAISO has YUSCARAN as the government city and DANLI as the military headquarters.

c. Sociology. ( ) Most of the Hondurans and Atlantics are Mestizo (Indian and Spanish) and are Roman Catholics. " The population of FRANCISCO MORAZAN is 657,000 and of EL PARAISO, 190,000. Population density varies from 22 inhabitants per kilometer in EL PARAISO to 66 in FRANCISCO MORAZAN. The family is the basic social unit, and the families are large. HONDURAS and ATLANTICA are poor countries. Agriculture supports the countries. Seventy percent of the residents live in rural areas with 65 percent of the farms consisting of subsistent plots of less than 10 acres on typically poor locations and soils. HONDURAS is densely populated when compared to arable land. There is a vast difference between the rich and poor. There is no middle class. Land was distributed in the form of individual plots for families (*campesino*). but this attempt to ease tension resulted in forming a strong antigovernment organization. Social and environmental stresses in HONDURAS are becoming critical and will eventually result in social change and political instability. Added to this are immigration problems. Many of the immigrants from ATLANTICA are located in the mountains between CHOLUTECA and TEGUCIGALPA.

d. ( ) Economics. HONDURAS and ATLANTICA are poor countries-the annual incomes of most rural families is less than \$100 a year.

### 3. Military Aspects of the Area

#### a. ( ) Tactical Aspects

(1) ( ) Observation and Fire. Line of sight varies locally, daily, and in relationship to the intensity of rain showers. Typically, afternoons and evenings are the worst. Observation generally decreases as weather conditions worsen.

(a) ( ) Weather Conditions. Thunderstorms reduce visibility to less than 200 meters. Clouds and fog settle on the mountaintops and high elevations. Continuous cloud ceilings restrict aircraft operations and target acquisition. Reconnaissance operations may be severely limited. Heavy rain showers and thunderstorms reduce radar range and attenuate the signals for single-channel radios (AM/FM); short-range, wide-band radios; and line-of-sight communications. They also block troposcatter transmission. Heavy rainfall and high humidity limit infrared (short-wave) and laser rangefinders. The typically overcast skies limit air assault and transport operations to the early morning hours. Gusty winds and lightning reduce the effectiveness of radars.

(b) ( ) Relief The sharp, deeply dissected mountainous terrain provides poor observation and fire from both the ground and air. Long-range observation and fire are limited to selected vantage points along the major road systems following the valleys. The intermountain valleys have fair to good observation: that is, COMAYAGUA Valley (DL3090), MOROCELI (EL1060), and DANLI-EL PARAISO (EL5050). Observation is fair to excellent along the PACIFIC lowlands. The relief degrades radio communications.

(c) ( ) Vegetation. The vegetation varies significantly from the PACIFIC lowlands to the interior

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mountains. Observation and fire are generally good along the PACIFIC lowlands, the southern mountain slopes around CHOLUTECA, and the agricultural interior mountains. Observation and fire decrease in the direction of BOCA Y (FL9982). Observation and fire are poor along the streams and rivers and the high elevations, especially along the HONDURAN-ATLANTIC border. Because of the dry season, most of the vegetation in the PACIFIC lowlands and on the rocky southern slopes is leafless until July. Most of the vegetation in the higher elevations and along the rivers is evergreen and restricts aerial observation. Thick triple-canopy forests are located north and east of the LAS VEGAS salient (EL4932). The thick vegetation, cloud cover, and high humidity decrease the effectiveness of night-vision goggles. Tall grasses in the dry slopes and valleys limit ground observation. In the dry season, grass and forest fires are common.

(d) ( ) Manmade Features. Manmade features have very little effect on observation and fire within the area, except in the larger cities of TEGUCIGALPA and CHOLUTECA. Most buildings are single story. Rural buildings do not provide protection from small-arms fire.

(2) ( ) Cover and Concealment

(a) ( ) Weather. Low clouds and reduced visibility provide excellent concealment in the afternoon and evening hours, especially in the higher elevations. The north and east sides of the mountains provide the best concealment.

(b) ( ) Relief. The sharp, highly dissected terrain and steep slopes provide excellent cover and concealment for most of the interior mountains. Numerous streams, draws, and rugged microrelief provide excellent cover from direct-fire weapons and require pinpoint accuracy by indirect fire. Brush, grass, and crops provide fair concealment in the valleys. Most streams provide good cover and concealment.

(c) ( ) Vegetation. Overall, vegetation provides excellent to fair cover and concealment. The forest provides limited protection from direct-fire weapons. Concealment and cover are excellent along streams and at high elevations, especially on the northern and eastern slopes. The tropical rain forests provide excellent cover and concealment from aerial observation and direct-fire weapons. Most trees are evergreen in the higher elevations and along the streams and provide good year-round aerial concealment. During the dry season, the PACIFIC coast and southern slopes provide good aerial observation during March and April. Most of the RIO CHOLUTECA Valley from the PACIFIC coast to the mountains is relatively dry and provides fair aerial observation. Changing vegetation requires the use of several different camouflage patterns.

(d) ( ) Surface Material. The rocky soils and deep clay soils hinder construction of individual fighting positions and engineer construction. Heavy rainfalls quickly fill fighting positions, which retain the water.

(e) ( ) Manmade Features. Rural dwellings and most urban buildings provide little, if any, cover. Widely scattered villages provide good concealment. The village network provides cultural concealment, as the enemy can mix with the local population. The capital TEGUCIGALPA provides excellent cover and concealment for urban combat operations.

(3) ( ) Obstacles

(a) ( ) Weather Conditions. The rainy season is May to October, with June being one of the wettest months. Afternoon thunderstorms typically dump 1 to 2 inches of rain nearly every day. The intensity and

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location of the thunderstorms determine the effect on trafficability and road and bridge damage. For several hours, rivers flood and fords are impossible to use; roads wash away, and bridges are carried downstream. Occasionally, mud slides destroy villages and trails and block major roads. Rain severely reduces trafficability. The low cloud ceilings and visibility restrict air operations to valleys. The weather reduces the effectiveness of night-vision goggles and target acquisition systems.

(b) ( ) Relief and Drainage. The steep slopes and rugged microrelief in mountainous terrain restrict nearly all vehicle movement to major roads and valleys. The road restrictions (gradient, curvature, width, fords) reduce road march speeds to 15 to 25 kilometers per hour (kmph) on the main roads and 5 to 10 kmph on secondary roads. Foot cross-country movement varies from 0.3 to 0.5 kmph during daylight and 1.5 kmph during daylight on trails. High terrain and low temperatures reduce helicopter lift capabilities. Rivers and streams are nearly impossible to cross during, and for several hours after, the thundershowers. The PACIFIC lowlands provide the best opportunity for the rapid movement of mechanized forces. Steep terrain limits use of air movement and airborne operations.

(c) ( ) Vegetation. Vegetation is an obstacle to both vehicle and foot troops. Thick vegetation is along the rivers and streams. The dry slopes contain spring vegetation. Dense undergrowth is scattered through the JOA, especially in the rain forest and at the forest's edge.

(d) ( ) Surface Materials. Rocky soils and thick clay make engineer construction difficult. The valleys and many of the slopes are covered with clay and silt, making trafficability difficult. Tropical clays are weak, and it takes very little rainfall to reduce soil strength. Most wheeled vehicles, tanks, and towed vehicles are restricted to improved roads. Unimproved roads erode, rut, and quickly become impassable.

(e) ( ) Manmade Features. Secondary roads and trails are built to support carts and light trucks. Heavy military vehicles eventually destroy the roads. Most secondary roads are too narrow for military vehicles. Route restrictions include width, gradient, creature, and seasonal restrictions due to flooding. Bridges are generally too weak to support tanks. Secondary airfields are of improved earth and do not support heavy- and medium-lift C-130s. Rear air support sites are restricted due to the poor soils, limited roads, and steep slopes. Maps of mountainous and jungle terrain may not be accurate. Navigation will be difficult because of a lack of distinctive features in the jungles and additional distance-time (climb-ascent) factors in the mountains.

(4) ( ) Key Terrain.

(a) ( ) TEGUCIGALPA (DL8050). Capital: controls northern highways.

(b) ( ) SOTO CANO (PALMEROLO) airfield (DL3389). All-weather airfield capable of supporting C-5s and C-130s and used for corps port of debarkation (POD).

(c) ( ) JAMASTRAN (EL6450). C-130 airfield used for corps forward support.

(d) ( ) PAN-AMERICAN Highway (DK9878). Major east-west route between ATLANTICA and HONDURAS.

(e) ( ) Highway 17 (EL4825). Major route from ATLANTICA toward the capital.

(f) ( ) CHOLUTECA Gap (DK8547). Chokepoint along the major mechanized divisional avenue

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of approach.

- (g) ( ) SAN LORENZO DK5180. Container port and C- 130 airfield.
- (h) ( ) Route 4 (DL1853). Major route from BAULI to capital.
- (i) ( ) LAS TROJES chokepoint (EL9955). Controls routes of advance into JAMASTRAN and capital.
- (j) ( ) NACAOME (DK4796). Controls PAN-AMERICAN Highway and Highway 1.
- (k) ( ) CHOLUTECA (DK8071). Department capital and major transportation center.
- (l) ( ) RIOCHOLUTECA (EL2513). Border crossing.
- (m) ( ) JALAPA Valley (Route 24) (EL6510 to FL0153). Across border; major east-west valley in south.
- (n) ( ) ATLANTICA (EK4592). Major line of communication (LOC) intersection of PAN-AMERICAN Highway and Route 1.

(5) ( ) Avenues of Approach

(a) ( ) Avenue of Approach A. The CHOLUTECA approach follows the PACIFIC lowlands from SOMOTILLO (EK1041) through CHOLUTECA (DK8071) to NACAOME (DK4595) in the west or north at NACAOME on Highway 1 to TEGUCIGALPA. This is a division-sized avenue of approach. The major obstacles are clearing the chokepoint near SAN BERNARDO (DK8350) and several rivers (CHOLUTECA, AQUA CALLENTE, and GRANDE). Cross-country movement in the dry season is 20 to 30 kmph. Wet season reduces movement to 5 to 10 kmph and occasionally restricts movement to the road network.

(b) ( ) Avenue of Approach B. Avenue of approach B follows the PAN-AMERICAN Highway from SOMOTO (EK4590) to CHOLUTECA where it joins avenue of approach A. This is a regiment- to division-sized avenue of approach, though 7 kilometers of the avenue are choked and basically restricted to the road. Light infantry can support the main avenue by controlling high ground, bridges, and chokepoints. On-road movement varies from 10 to 20 kmph in the mountains to 30 to 40 kmph in the valleys. Off-road movement is subject to the same restrictions.

(c) ( ) Avenue of Approach C. Avenue of approach C runs from OCOTAL (EL5510) to DANLI (EL5550) along Route 17 and then turns west on Route 4 to the capital. This is a major avenue of approach into and through the zone. It supports a regiment. The route is restricted to on-road battalions and columns from 10 kilometers north of OCOTAL to EL PARAISO (EL4831). The terrain opens to support a deployed regiment to DANLI. From DANLI to the capital, the avenue of approach is restricted to the road network and occasionally supports one deployed battalion. The rainy season restricts tanks and wheeled vehicles to the road. There are few parallel secondary roads supporting the avenue of approach. On-road (Routes 17 and 4) movement rate through the mountains is 10 to 20 kmph and in the valleys is 30 to 40 kmph. Supporting light infantry avenues can be used to secure chokepoints, bridges, and high ground.



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(d) ( ) Avenue of Approach D. Avenue of approach D runs along the JALAPA Valley to LAS TROJES (FL0857), where it follows a secondary road into the JAMASTRAN airfield. This is a battalion (minus) avenue of approach that is restricted to the road network. The rainy season restricts or completely eliminates this route due to the number of river crossings, as it parallels a small river for most of the approach.

(e) ( ) Supporting Avenues

1. ( ) A company-sized avenue of approach moving through the sector goes from the boundary to Route 15 and then runs north toward the MSR. This avenue will not support heavy vehicles and is restricted to the mountainous road along the last 15 kilometers. This is a fair-weather avenue.

2. ( ) A company-sized avenue of approach crosses the border at EL2513 and then moves along the RIO CHOLUTeca Valley. The avenue splits, with one avenue moving toward EL ZAMORANO (DL9849) Valley along mountainous roads and the other moving around the RIO CHOLUTeca. This avenue does not support heavy vehicles and is a fair-weather avenue.

(f) ( ) Air Avenues of Approach. Air avenues of approach through the eastern part (tropical jungle) are restricted to mountain valleys below 4,000 feet mean sea level (MSL). Over the tropical forest, helicopter avenues of approach will be well above the treetops to avoid widely scattered giant trees that extend above the canopy. These avenues follow major river valleys; that is, RIO GUAYAPE, RIO PATUCA, and RIO COCO. These approaches, from east to west, best support fast, high-flying aircraft. Throughout most of the JOA, the valley approach between 50 and 4,000 feet best suits helicopter operations. The major helicopter approaches are along Route 17 (EL PARAISO-DANLI); SOMOTO (EK4590) north to the border (EL2515), following RIO CHOLUTeca into the MOROCELI Valley; from the border vicinity EL2417 following the RIO CHOLUTeca Valley southwest into CHOLUTeca; following the PAN-AMERICAN Highway into the CHOLUTeca Gap; along the PACIFIC lowlands; and up the CHOLUTeca Valley. The DANLI, MOROCELI, and ZAMORANO Valleys provide the best landing and drop zones.

b. ( ) Combat Service Support Aspects

(1) ( ) Personnel. The majority of the civilian workers are unskilled, and many are illiterate. The hot, humid climate reduces personnel work capacity. Potable water is not readily available. Most of the rural population is extremely poor. Dangerous animals and harmful insects and plants are common throughout the area.

(2) ( ) Logistics. The limited all-weather road network reduces movement of supplies and personnel. Driving is difficult and dangerous. During the wet season, mules and donkeys may be used to move supplies forward. Mud slides, bridges that wash away, fords that become impossible to cross, and roads that deteriorate because of heavy military use limit resupply and require intensive engineer maintenance and/or construction. High elevations, mountainous roads, and high temperatures increase fuel consumption and maintenance. Secondary roads limit resupply to the major valleys and lower elevations. Secondary roads in the mountains are typically narrow with numerous route restrictions and weak bridges. Rugged terrain limits selection of rear area base camps. Helicopter landing zones and drop zones are limited in number and location, C-130 assault strips are generally not usable or limit the number of passes due to wet or weak soils. Few construction resources and limited engineer equipment, fuel, and medical supplies are available in the JOA. TEGUCIGALPA is the major source of incountry logistic support.

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4. ( ) Effects of Characteristics of the Area

a. ( ) Effect on Enemy Courses of Action

(1) ( ) Terrain. The terrain favors defensive operations. The rugged terrain provides the enemy excellent hasty and deliberate defensive positions. Limited mobility and poor weather restrict the use of combat vehicles and attack helicopters. The terrain allows the enemy to easily predict the avenues of approach and establish defensive positions, ambush sites, and escape routes. Extensive cloud cover, limited helicopter operations, and slow movement of troops and equipment aid concealment of and engagement by defensive positions.

(2) ( ) Effect of Enemy Attack

(a) ( ) The weather favors enemy attack by light infantry or unconventional warfare (UW) forces, especially from afternoon until late evening.

(b) ( ) Mountainous terrain favors enemy light infantry or UW forces attack or ambush.

(c) ( ) The best avenue of approach is along infiltration routes throughout the rugged highlands, using the cloud cover, forest, and slopes for concealment and base camps.

(d) ( ) A dense secondary trail network and potentially friendly villages greatly aid the speed, distance, escape routes, and resupply of the enemy. The best location is the mountainous area between TEGUCIGALPA and CHOLUTECA.

(e) ( ) The terrain and weather do not favor the enemy use of heavy tanks and trucks.

(f) ( ) Terrain and weather severely limit enemy resupply required in maintaining offensive operations. Mules and donkeys may be used to aid supply problems.

(g) ( ) Terrain restricts the location of artillery sites near the border. Terrain also severely restricts leapfrogging artillery forward with offensive operations.

(3) ( ) Effect on Enemy Air. Rugged terrain, vegetation, and weather limit the use of close air support (CAS). Limited landing zones and easily predictable air avenues restrict air operations. Enemy air is most likely during early mornings, as clouds, visibility, and winds are at a minimum. Potential surprise air avenues of approach for fixed-wing aircraft would be over the tropical forest, following the major river valleys into the corps rear area. The other main air avenues arc along the RIO CHOLUTECA Valley or along the EL PARAISO-DANLI Valley.

b. ( ) Effect on Own Courses of Action

(1) ( ) The weather and terrain favor light infantry operations, but severely reduce the high-tech advantage over the enemy. Night-vision goggles, CAS, artillery support, and weapon-sighting equipment are severely affected. The terrain and weather favor defensive operations and limit offensive operations because of the difficulty in moving supplies and support equipment forward. High humidity, hot temperatures, rains, and terrain limit foot mobility. Movement is difficult. Troops moving along trails and roads are easily ambushed,

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and enemy forces can easily detect large-scale troop movements through difficult terrain into the enemy's hiding positions. Protection of the rear area from UW forces is difficult.

(2) ( ) **Our** best avenue of approach is through the rugged highlands using company-sized raids into the enemy rear support base. The best avenue is through the mountains east of EL PARAISO.

(3) ( ) The best air avenue is along the LAS TROJES-OCOTAL Valley during the early morning hours to destroy rear area support.

(4) ( ) Enemy units need to be kept east of the RIO CHOLUTECA, away from the dense rural community in the mountains south of TEGUCIGALPA.

Tabs:

A—Airfield List

B—Distance Chart

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HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH  
 FORT BRAGG, NC 28307  
 7 December 199\_-

TAB A TO APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX B TO JTF SOUTH ORORD 9 -5 ( )  
 AIRFIELD LIST ( )

## ( ) MAJOR AIRFIELDS IN HONDURAS

( )	<b>Airfield</b>	<b>UTM*</b>	<b>Runway(M)</b>	<b>Surface</b>	<b>Condition</b>	<b>Aircraft</b>
( )	GOLOSON	EN1740	2,840 X 45	Asphalt	Good	C-5
( )	LA MESA	DN0109	2,930 X 45	Asphalt	Good	C-5
( )	SOTO CANO (2070)	DL3389	2,440 X 45	Asphalt	Good	C-5
( )	TONCONTIN	DL7949	1,869 X 45	Asphalt	Good	C-5
( )	SAN LORENZO	DK5180	1,494 X 46	Gravel	Fair	C-130
( )	JAMASTRAN	EL6450	1,000 X 60	Gravel	Fair	C-130
( )	SAN MARCOS DE COLON	EK2085	1,500 X 45	Gravel	Fair	C-130
( )	EL TRIUNFO	EK0049	1,500 x 45	Gravel	Fair	C-130
( )	VILLA SAN FRANCISCO	EL0561	940 X 21	Gravel	Fair	Light
( )	LOS LIMONES	EL1756	853 X 70	Gravel	Fair	Light
( )	AGUA FRIA	EL4662	500 x 30	Grass	Fair	Light
( )	GUINOPE	EL0736	496 X 12	Gravel	Poor	Light

\* Universal transverse mercator

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HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH  
FORT BRAGG, NC 28307  
7 December 199\_

TAB B TO APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX B TO JTF SOUTH ORORD 9 -5  
DISTANCE CHART ( )

DISTANCE BETWEEN KEY POINTS  
(in kilometers)

PUERTO CORTES												
PUERTO CORTES	- LA MESA											
LA MESA	72	-	SOTO CANO									
SOTO CANO	235	163	-	TEGUCIGALPA								
TEGUCIGALPA	303	231	68	-	DANLI							
DANLI	399	327	164	96	-	JAMASTRAN						
JAMASTRAN	418	34	183	115	19	-	LAS TROJES					
LAS TROJES	465	394	231	134	67	48	-	JALAPA				
JALAPA	49	424	261	193	97	78	30	-	OCOTAL			
OCOTAL	454	382	219	151	55	74	85	58	-	SOMOTILLO		
SOMOTILLO	502	430	267	199	259	314	362	307	189	-	SAN LORENZO	
SAN LORENZO	411	339	176	108	204	223	271	233	175	91	-	CHOLUTECA
CHOLUTECA	444	372	209	141	237	256	304	200	142	58	33	-

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HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH  
FORT BRAGG, NC 28307  
7 December 199\_

ANNEX C TO COMITESO ORORD 9-5 ( )  
OPERATIONS ( )

( ) REFERENCES: a. ( ) Basic OPORD.

b. ( ) USCINCSO OPLAN 5500-9.

c. ( ) Maps:

( ) Series USACGSC, 50-355, HONDURAS, sheet 1 (SAN LORENZO),  
edition 1982, 1:50,000.

( ) Series USACGSC. 50-356, HONDURAS, sheet 1  
(CHOLUTECA—EL TRIUNFO), 1:50,000.

( ) Series USACGSC, 50-357, HONDURAS, sheet I (SAN  
MARCOS DE COLON), 1:50,000.

( ) Series USACGSC, 50-358, HONDURAS, sheet 1 (SOTO  
CANO—TEGUCIGALPA), 1:50,000.

( ) Series TPC, BELIZE-EL SALVADOR—GUATEMALA—HON-  
DURAS— MEXICO, sheet 25A, edition 3,1:500,000.

( ) Series TPC, EL SALVADOR—HONDURAS—NICARAGUA, sheet  
K-25B, edition 5, 1:500,000.

( ) Series TPC, COSTA RICA—NICARAGUA—PANAMA, sheet K-25C,  
edition 3,1:500.000.

1. ( ) General

a. ( ) Purpose. This annex provides guidance for the conduct of combat, combat support, and humanitarian assistance operations by US military forces. We will assist the armed forces of HONDURAS against external aggression from the nation of ATLANTICA or, in the event of an invasion of HONDURAS by Atlantican forces, apply force to destroy the Atlantican offensive capability and restore the HONDURAN-ATLANTICAN border.

b. ( ) Mission. When directed, Commander, Joint Task Force SOUTH (COMJTFSO), will deploy forces into the joint operations area (JOA) to assist the government of HONDURAS (GOH) deter Atlantican aggression and, if deterrence fails, to conduct a joint and combined defense of HONDURAN territory. After building up sufficient forces, COMJTFSO will undertake offensive operations to defeat Atlantican forces operating in HONDURAS and restore peacetime conditions to the region.

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c. ( ) Joint Operations Area. (Operation Overlay)

d. ( ) Operational Phases. As defined by reference a. the military phases of this operation are:

Phase I	Show of Force/Establish Defense
Phase II	Deployment/Defensive Operations
Phase III	Offensive Air Operations
Phase IV	Counteroffensive Operations
Phase V	Postconflict Operations
Phase VI	Redeployment Operations

2. ( ) Content of Operations

a. ( ) General. Commander in Chief, US Southern Command (USCINCSO), intends to increase the deterrent effort against Atlantican hostility by rapidly deploying Joint Task Force SOUTH (JTF SO) forces into the theater to establish a credible defense and establish the basis for future combat operations should they be required. Special operations forces (SOF) will conduct selected operations in HONDURAS and ATLANTICA to neutralize the Atlantican military support apparatus and will conduct unconventional warfare with the Contra and Miskito insurgents in support of our operational objectives. Should deterrence fail and the Atlantic an forces attack COMJTFSO will conduct joint and combined defensive operations to deny the Atlanticsans their military and political objectives in HONDURAS and to protect the Honduran, Contra, and Miskito peoples. During the defense. COMJTFSO will deploy additional forces to sustain the defense and future offensive operations and, when established, conduct counteroffensive operations to destroy the Atlantican armored offensive capability, defeat Atlantican forces operating in HONDURAS, and reestablish preconflict borders in the region. Naval forces operating in support of USCINCSO will conduct show-of-force operations along the Atlantican littoral, provide amphibious and Marine forces, secure sea lines of communications (SLOCs), and provide air combat forces to support JTF SO operations. This operation will be conducted in six phases. The nature of the conflict will influence the flow of deploying forces into HONDURAS. Times shown are listed to facilitate planning. Phases may run concurrently.

(1) ( ) Phase I (Show of Force/Establish Defense) (C-Day through C+7). During this phase, COMJTFSO will execute a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)-directed emergency deployment readiness exercise (EDRE) into HONDURAS with the minimum force required to establish a credible defense against possible Atlantican attack. Force reception facilities will be established to support deployment operations. Headquarters (HQ), JTF SO, and necessary command and control systems will be established to prepare for future combat operations. Deploying Army combat forces will establish forward defensive positions in conjunction with Honduran forces in the CHOLUTeca region to block Atlantican armored attacks. Additional special operations forces will be deployed to support in place SOF and establish liaison with Honduran military forces. HQ, Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), will be established to expand foreign internal defense (FID) operations in HONDURAS and begin to conduct unconventional warfare (UW) operations with Contra and Miskito insurgents and be prepared to conduct strategic reconnaissance (SR) against selected Atlantican targets. Deploying air forces will establish operating bases, conduct show-of-force flights along the ATLANTICAN-HONDURAN border, establish the joint force air component command (JFACC) structure and communications,

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and prepare to conduct combat operations. Deploying logistics forces will establish the logistics structure to maintain the EDRE force and prepare to expand logistics to support future operations, Naval forces operating in support of USCINCSO will conduct show-of-force operations along the Atlantican littoral with emphasis on the coastal areas adjacent to MANAGUA. Should this phase be extended, all forces will be prepared to conduct training exercises with their Honduran counterpart units. On completion of this phase, forces will be established in a defensive posture to defend against Atlantican attack.

(2) ( ) Phase II (Deployment/Defensive Operations) (D-Day through D+25). This phase will commence should deterrence fail and the Atlantican forces attack into Honduran territory. D-day and H-hour will be established when the National Command Authority (NCA) directs deployment of additional forces to HONDURAS. During this phase, JTFSO and Honduran forces will block the movement of Atlantican forces into HONDURAS forward of Phase Line (PL) PIKE along a line running from PATUCA (GN8865) south along the RIO PATUCA to the confluence of the RIOs PATUCA and GUAYAMBRE (EM1510), then south along RIO GUAYAMBRE to (EL1095) southwest to RIO CHOLUTECA (EL2005), then south along RIO CHOLUTECA to the mouth of the river (DK5050). Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) SWORD will be activated under the control of JTFSO. The Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF), and Commander, Task Force (CTF) 45, will pass operational control (OPCON) to JTFSO and will land 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) (Forward (Fwd)) on GREEN BEACH. When established ashore, 1st MEF (Fwd) (Task Force (TF) WHITE) will pass OPCON to TF BROWN. Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force (COMJSOTF), will continue current operations and commence direct action operations against selected enemy targets in HONDURAS and ATLANTICA. Deployment will be a service responsibility under the supervision of the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). Forces will pass OPCON to COMJTFSO upon reconstitution in theater. After adequate forces have been deployed to ensure the success of the defense, additional forces and logistics will be deployed to provide for counteroffensive operations.

(3) ( ) Phase III (Offensive Air Operations) (D+15 through D+25). During this phase, the JTFSO will coordinate attacks directed against military targets on Atlantic an territory through the JFACC. The objective of this phase is to cause the government of ATLANTICA (GOA) to withdraw its forces from Honduran territory and cease hostile action against the Contra movement. Offensive air operations will secure air supremacy for the counteroffensive phase, destroy military facilities in ATLANTICA, and destroy Atlantican armored and mechanized forces in HONDURAS. The Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) will support this phase by conducting direct action against selected targets and by providing target laser designation (TLD) missions as required. Targets for this phase will be approved by the JTFSO Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) prior to execution.

(4) ( ) Phase IV (Counteroffensive Operations)(D+26 through D+75). During this phase, JTFSO and Honduran forces will conduct counteroffensive operations to defeat the Atlantican forces. destroy their remaining offensive capability, and reestablish the HONDURAN-ATLANTICAN border. JSOTF will continue operations begun in previous phases and prepare for postconflict operations. During this phase, the intensity and duration of air attacks will be increased against military facilities in ATLANTICA. The lack of logistics and transportation infrastructure in HONDURAS will constrain operations. To concentrate overwhelming forces effectively, the counteroffensive operation will be conducted in three subphases.

(a) ( ) Phase IV (A) (AO SHIELD)(D+25 through D+30). During this phase, JTFSO will concentrate on isolating and destroying Atlantican forces in Area of Operations (AO) SHIELD. TF BROWN will attack with one light infantry division one airborne brigade (+) (augmented with airborne armored battalion), one Honduran armored cavalry regiment, and one Marine expeditionary force forward to defeat Atlantic an forces and destroy armored and mechanized forces in AO SHIELD. Forces in AOs CASTLE and LANCE will prepare

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for upcoming operations during this phase. On completion of the main objective, JTFSO will reestablish the HONDURAN-ATLANTICAN border and commence postconflict operations in AO SHIELD.

(b) ( ) Phase IV (B) (AO CASTLE) (D+35 through D+50). During this phase, JTFSO will conduct combined operations to defeat Atlantican forces operating in AO CASTLE. Before initiating operations in AO CASTLE, we will reorient our forces as required. JTFSO will orient our air and special operations against the Atlantican sustaining bases inside ATLANTICA. TF BLACK will attack with one airborne division and one Honduran brigade to defeat Atlantican forces and reestablish the ATLANTICAN-HONDURAN border. Forces in AO SHIELD will continue postconflict operations, and forces in AO LANCE will prepare for upcoming operations during this phase. On completion of combat operations, we will commence postconflict operations in AO CASTLE.

(c) ( ) Phase IV (C) (AO LANCED) (D+60 through D+75). During this phase, JTFSO will conduct combined operations to defeat Atlantican forces in AO LANCE. Before initiating operations in AO LANCE, JTFSO will reorient our forces as required. Once again, JTFSO will orient our air and special operations against the Atlantican sustaining bases inside ATLANTICA. TF RED will attack with one airborne brigade, one Honduran brigade, and one special forces battalion to defeat the Atlantican forces and reestablish the HONDURAN-ATLANTICAN border. Forces in AOs SHIELD and CASTLE will continue postconflict operations during this phase. On completion of combat operations in AO LANCE, we will transition to postconflict operations in the JOA.

(5) ( ) Phase V (Postconflict Operations) (D+76 through D+105). During this phase, JTFSO will restore peacetime conditions in Honduran territory. These operations will be directed by the Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF) and executed by combat and support forces remaining in Honduran territory. All forces must be prepared to rapidly transition to postconflict operations at any point in this campaign. JCMOTF will cooperate with and optimize the use of host nation and Organization of American States (OAS) forces and materiel to support this operation. Return redeployment airlift and sealift will be used to deliver humanitarian assistance and aid material into HONDURAS. When directed, Joint Task Force (JTF) BRAVO will assume responsibilities for postconflict operations.

(6) ( ) Phase VI (Redeployment Operations) (D+75 until complete). Redeployment will be a service component responsibility executed through USTRANSCOM and service force commanders in country, COMJTFSO will release forces to service force commanders for redeployment consistent with mission requirements in the JOA.

b. ( ) Tasks

(1) ( ) Commander, JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH (COMJTFSO) (Commander, 21ST AIRBORNE (ABN) CORPS)

(b) ( ) Establishes and deploys JTFSO staff and headquarters.

(c) ( ) Receives deployable joint task force augmentation team from USCINCSO.

(d) ( ) Establishes HQ JTFSO at SOTO CANO Airbase (AB) to coordinate and synchronize JTF operations.

(e) ( ) Nominates and provides the joint rear area commander (JRAC) to conduct joint logistic, security, and support operations in AO DRAGON.

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(f) ( ) Receives joint communications support element (JCSE) augmentation from JCS as needed to support operations.

(g) ( ) Assumes OPCON of all forces operating in the JTFSO JOA.

(h) ( ) Retains joint force land component command (JFLCC) at JTFSO.

(i) ( ) Establishes and operates combined command, control, communications, and intelligence center (C3IC) adjacent to JTFSO Joint Operations Center (JOC) at SOTO CANO AB.

(j) ( ) Provides liaison and communications to the US Embassy in TEGUCIGALPA and cooperates fully with the goals and guidance of the US Ambassador to the GOH.

(k) ( ) Establishes joint boards and committees as required.

(2) ( ) Commander, ARMY FORCE (COMARFOR) (Commander, 21ST ABN CORPS)

(a) ( ) Establishes and provides commander for TF BROWN by not later than (NLT) C-1.

(b) ( ) Conducts predeployment planning and pre-positioning of selected elements at aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs) as required to support COMJTFSO operations.

(c) ( ) Establishes HQ, Army Forces (ARFOR), at SOTO CANO AB to coordinate and synchronize combat operations of service forces supporting COMJTFSO.

(d) ( ) Establishes communications and liaison with COMJTFSO and other components.

(e) ( ) Plans for and conducts precombat operations in accordance with (IAW) the concept of operations.

(3) ( ) Commander, AIR FORCE FORCES (COMAFFOR) (Commander, 9TH AIR FORCE)

(a) ( ) Plans for and conducts air operations in support of Operation TIERRA CALIENTE.

(b) ( ) Nominates and provides the joint force air component commander (JFACC), airspace coordination authority (ACA), and area air defense commander (AADC) for the JOA for the duration of the operation

(c) ( ) Establishes HQ, Air Force Forces (AFFOR), at SOTO CANO AB to coordinate and synchronize combat operations of Air Force service forces supporting COMJTFSO.

(d) ( ) Provides logistic, security, and support forces operating in AO DRAGON OPCON to JRAC.

(e) ( ) Establishes and operates the JTFSO Joint Rescue Coordination Center (JRCC) at SOTO CANO AB.

(f) ( ) Gains and maintains defensive air superiority over Honduran territory NLT C+4.

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

(g) ( ) Plans for and, when directed, conducts Phase III combat operations.

(h) ( ) Coordinates, regulates, and controls joint military air operations (except in the AOA), to include the development of air tasking orders in the JOA.

(i) ( ) Plans for and coordinates theater airlift, employment of air support, refueling, and aerial port and air control team support, to include communications support for the above.

(j) ( ) Provides meteorological services support as required.

(k) ( ) Provides HQ JTF SO alternate command post (CP) facility during all phases of the operation.

(4) ( ) Commander, MARINE FORCES (COMMARFOR) (Commander, 1ST MEF (FWD))

(a) ( ) Conducts planning and rehearsals of amphibious operations during Phase II.

(b) ( ) Nominates and provides the Commander, TF WHITE, NLT C+4. When TF WHITE is established ashore, is prepared to pass OPCON to TF BROWN.

(c) ( ) Provides available Marine component air resources to the JFACC to support the joint air operation,

(d) ( ) Coordinates with the COMAFFOR and Commander, JRAC, for airfield and logistic support for the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) air based in HONDURAS.

(e) ( ) Provides liaison and coordination team to HQ JTF SO NLT C+2.

(f) ( ) Coordinates with COMAFFOR for airfield support for expeditionary aviation resources when projected ashore.

(5) ( ) Commander, JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE (COMJSOTF) (Commander, SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND SOUTH (COMSOCSO)

(a) ( ) Commands TF RED for Phases I through IV(B) and V through VI.

(b) ( ) Provides special operations forces to support operations as required throughout the JTF SO JOA.

(c) ( ) Provides special operations support to the JCMOTF as required by COMJTF SO.

(d) ( ) Provides language-qualified liaison teams to Honduran, Contra, and Miskito forces during all phases. Provides language-qualified liaison teams to TF RED during Phase IV (C) only.

(e) ( ) Receives JCSE augmentation from JCS as needed to support operations.

(6) ( ) Commander, NAVAL FORCES (COMNAVFOR)

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

(a) ( ) With the exception of amphibious operations during Phase II, naval forces will operate in support of the JTF from the US Atlantic Command (USACOM) area of responsibility (AOR). CTF 45 will provide a liaison element at HQ JTFSO at SOTO CANO AB to assist in unity of effort.

(b) ( ) Phase II (Amphibious Operations), CTF 45

1. ( ) Plan for and conduct amphibious landing of TF WHITE over GREEN BEACH.

2. ( ) Provide for the security of TF WHITE until established ashore.

3. ( ) Coordinate naval air requirements and control in AOA and JOA with COMJTFSO and JFACC as required.

(c) ( ) Be prepared to assume responsibility for AO MOAT in the event that the GULF OF FONSECA is threatened by Atlantican forces.

(7) ( ) Commander, JOINT TASK FORCE BRAVO (COMJTFB)

(a) ( ) Be prepared to provide forces OPCON to JRAC.

(b) ( ) Provides assistance with language-qualified personnel to JTFSO as required.

(c) ( ) Be prepared to assume responsibilities as Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF).

(8) ( ) Commander, JOINT CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS TASK FORCE (COMJCMOTF)  
(Commander, 301ST CIVIL AFFAIRS (CA) BRIGADE (BDE))

(a) ( ) Assists COMJTFSO in developing plans for transitioning the region to peaceful conditions.

(b) ( ) Assists joint rear area commander with the use of host nation facilities and personnel in AO DRAGON.

(c) ( ) Provides plans and assistance for humanitarian relief to the Honduran population displaced by hostile action.

(d) ( ) Provides plans and assistance for humanitarian relief to the Contra and Miskito population displaced by hostile action.

(e) ( ) Provides interface to nongovernment organizations (NGOs) providing relief in the region.

(9) ( ) Commander, JOINT REAR AREA (JRAC), Commander, TBD, ARFOR

(a) ( ) Plans for the improvement of intertheater and intratheater airfields and ports to accommodate force buildup and enhance throughput to support the concept of operations.

(b) ( ) Receives support and security forces OPCON from all service components operating in AO DRAGON.

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

(c) ( ) Establishes HQ JTF LOG at SOTO CANO AB to coordinate and synchronize service and support operations.

(d) ( ) Supervises and provides for the security and defense of forces operating in AO DRAGON.

(e) ( ) Receives JTF BRAVO forces in AO DRAGON OPCON.

(f) ( ) Conducts joint logistics (Annex D).

(10) ( ) Commander, TF BROWN

(a) ( ) Phase I

1. ( ) Establishes coordinated combined defense with Honduran forces operating in AO SHIELD NLT C+7.

2. ( ) Conducts liaison and coordinates with TF WHITE NLT C+3.

3. ( ) Deploys and establishes TF headquarters elements.

(b) ( ) Phases II and III

1. ( ) Conducts coordinated combined defense of AO SHIELD forward of PL PIKE in conjunction with Honduran forces. Denies Atlantican forces PL PIKE and crossing sites over the CHOLUTECA.

2. ( ) Receives TF WHITE OPCON when established ashore.

3. ( ) Integrates arriving forces into the defensive plan as they become available.

(c) ( ) Phase IV (A)

1. ( ) Plans and conducts joint and combined operations to cut off and destroy the armored capability of the Atlantican Army in CHOLUTECA, defeat Atlantican forces, restore the preconflict border between ATLANTICA and HONDURAS, and transition to peace.

2. ( ) On completion of Phase IV (A), provides required forces to JTF SO for future operations.

(d) ( ) Phase IV (B) through Phase V

1. ( ) Plans and conducts joint and combined peacekeeping operations to transition AO SHIELD to peaceful conditions.

2. ( ) Rapidly transitions from US and Honduran coalition operations to unilateral Honduran operations in the region.

3. ( ) Be prepared to respond to additional Atlantican aggression that may spill over from concurrent JTF SO operations in AOs CASTLE and LANCE.



UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

4. ( ) Be prepared to return Marine forces to TF 45 control for embarkation.

(11) ( ) Commander, TF BLACK

(a) ( ) Phase I

1. ( ) Coordinates with and assists Honduran and Contra forces in establishing defenses against counterinsurgency forces operating out of ATLANTICA.

2. ( ) Coordinates for and provides humanitarian assistance to Contras operating in the DANLI region.

3. ( ) Ensures that JAMISTRAN airfield is retained for future operations.

(b) ( ) Phases II through IV (A)

1. ( ) Conducts coordinated combined defense of Contra base camps in and defends AO CASTLE forward of PL PIKE in conjunction with Honduran forces.

2. ( ) Denies Atlantican forces PL PIKE and crossing sites over the GUAYAMBRE and PATUCA Rivers.

3. ( ) Integrates arriving forces into the defensive plan as they become available.

(c) ( ) Phase IV (B)

1. ( ) Assumes command and control of forces operating in AO CASTLE and augmenting forces for the duration of this subphase.

2. ( ) Plans and conducts joint and combined operations to cut off and defeat Atlantican counterinsurgency forces operating against Honduran and Contra forces in AO CASTLE. Restores the preconflict border between ATLANTICA and HONDURAS and assists in the transition to peace.

3. ( ) On completion of Phase IV (B), provides required forces to JTF SO for future operations.

(d) ( ) Phase IV (B) through Phase V

1. ( ) Plans and conducts joint and combined peacekeeping operations to transition AO CASTLE to peaceful conditions.

2. ( ) Rapidly transitions from US and Honduran coalition operations to unilateral Honduran operations in the region.

3. ( ) Be prepared to respond to additional Atlantican aggression which may spill over from concurrent JTF SO operations in AOs SHIELD and LANCE.

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

4. ( ) Be prepared to provide humanitarian assistance to displaced persons and Contras affected by military operations in the region.

(12) ( ) Commander, TF RED

(a) ( ) Phase I through Phase IV (C)

1. ( ) Coordinates with and assists Honduran and Miskito forces in establishing defenses against counterinsurgency forces operating out of ATLANTICA.

2. ( ) Coordinates for and provides humanitarian assistance to Miskitos operating in the MONTANAS DEL PATUCA region.

3. ( ) Integrates arriving forces into the defensive plan as they become available.

(b) ( ) Phase IV (C)

1. ( ) Assumes command and control of forces operating in AO LANCE and augmenting forces for the duration of this subphase.

2. ( ) Plans and conducts joint and combined operations to cut off and defeat Atlantican counterinsurgent forces operating against Honduran and Contra forces in AO LANCE. Restores the preconflict border between ATLANTICA and HONDURAS and assists in the transition to peace.

(c) ( ) Phase V through Phase VI

1. ( ) Plans and conducts joint and combined peacekeeping operations to transition AO LANCE to peaceful conditions.

2. ( ) Rapidly transitions from US and Honduran coalition operations to unilateral Honduran operations in the region.

3. ( ) Be prepared to respond to additional Atlantican aggression that may spill over from concurrent JTF SO operations in AOs SHIELD and CASTLE.

4. ( ) Be prepared to provide humanitarian assistance to displaced persons and Miskito forces affected by military operations in the region.

(13) ( ) Commander, TF WHITE

(a) ( ) Plans for and, when directed, conducts amphibious landings on GREEN BEACH to support operations in AO SHIELD.

(b) ( ) Activates and provides command and control for forces operating in AOA SWORD.

(c) ( ) Coordinates actions of other air and naval forces operating in support of amphibious operations in the AOA.

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(d) ( ) On completion of amphibious operations, on order, passes OPCON of Marine forces ashore to TF BROWN.

(e) ( ) Provides continuing logistic sustainment to Marine forces ashore until relieved of responsibilities by COMJTF SO.

(14) ( ) Commander, TF BLUE (ON ORDER TBD)

(a) ( ) TF BLUE is a contingency naval task force that will be activated at USCINCSO's direction to respond to Atlantan actions in the GULF OF FONSECA.

(b) ( ) TF BLUE will, if required, assume responsibility for operations in and security of AO MOAT under OPCON of COMJTF SO.

(15) ( ) Commander, JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE (COMJPOTF)  
(Commander, 7th PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS GROUP (POG))

(a) ( ) Provides psychological and deception support to achieve COMJTF SO objectives in the region.

(b) ( ) Conducts psychological operations to support tactical operations in theater.

(c) ( ) Coordinates directly with and assists the JCMOTF in providing humanitarian assistance to people affected by military operations in the area.

(d) ( ) Be prepared to assist in the transition to peaceful conditions in the region.

c. ( ) Coordinating Instructions

(1) ( ) Service components will establish and maintain communications and liaison with COMJTF SO and other service components.

(2) ( ) Service components will conduct predeployment planning and pre-positioning of selected elements at APOEs as required to support COMJTF SO operations.

(3) ( ) Components and JRAC will position combat aviation forces, fuel, ammunition, and supplies to support this operation IAW the concept of operations.

(4) ( ) JRAC is responsible for the management and allocation of resources and terrain in AO DRAGON. All components will coordinate their operations in AO DRAGON with the JRAC.

(5) ( ) COMJTF SO J3 will chair the Joint Targeting Coordination Board. All subordinates will nominate targets and forward them through standard fire support channels to the JTCB for approval and allocation.

(6) ( ) Direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH) all concerned (ALCON). Keep the JTF staff informed by record message traffic. Include COMJTF SO as an information addressee on all message traffic.

(7) ( ) Definitions

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(a) ( ) N-day is the day a unit is notified for deployment or redeployment.

(b) ( ) C-day is the day on which deployment commences.

(c) ( ) D-day is the day combat operations commence.

(d) ( ) For planning purposes only, C-day= D-7.

(8) ( ) All reports will be in joint reporting format and all reporting and planning will be in Zulu time.

(9) ( ) This operation order (OPORD) is effective for planning immediately and for execution on order of the National Command Authority NCA).

(10) ( ) Use of riot control agents (RCAs) may be planned but will not be executed without COMJTFSO approval. With the exception of RCA, no prescribed chemical load is authorized.

(11) ( ) All operations will be conducted to minimize collateral damage to nonmilitary personnel and facilities.

(12) ( ) Priority intelligence requirements (PIR). (Annex B).

3. ( ) Conduct of Operations

a. ( ) Readiness, Alert, and Marshaling

(1) ( ) Readiness. The services and/or supporting commanders are responsible for accomplishing notification and preparation for overseas movement (POM ) requirements.

(2) ( ) Alert. Warning time for Phase II operations maybe minimal. Consequently, a high state of force readiness, a responsive alert system and detailed supporting plans are essential. Services and/or supporting commanders are responsible for establishing and maintaining alerting systems.

(3) ( ) Marshaling. When directed by the NCA, reinforcing forces will be moved to specified marshaling areas and ports of embarkation (POEs) for movement into theater.

b ( ) Air Operations. Simplicity and consistency with joint doctrine in air and air defense operations are paramount in all cases.

(1) ( ) Coordinating Authority for Air (CAA). COMAFFOR in coordination with all deployed forces. Honduran forces, and international flight agencies, is responsible for coordinating, regulating, and controlling joint military air operations (except in the AOA), to include the development of air tasking orders (ATOs) in the JOA.

(2) ( ) Airspace Control Authority (ACA). COMAFFOR is delegated ACA responsibility with the aircraft earner battle group (CVBG) 200 nautical mile defense zone (bubble) and the AOA if activated. ACA for these areas shall remain with each CVBG and CATF or commander, landing force (CLF), as applicable.

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c. ( ) Air Defense Operations. COMAFFOR acts as the area air defense commander (AADC), except in the AOA when activated, in coordination with all deployed forces and host nation forces. Air defense planning will be IAW JCS Pub 8. COMAFFOR will coordinate with COMNAVFOR for naval air requirements and control within the JOA.

d. ( ) Naval Operations. Naval operations, to include security of SLOCs, antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations, countermine operations, and maritime intercept operations, will be the responsibility of the Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command (CINCUSACOM), operating in support of USCINCSO outside the COMJTF SO JOA.

e. ( ) Command, Control, and Communication Countermeasures (C3CM). Service components will establish the procedures necessary to ensure that C3CM operations against enemy command and control, weapon systems, and surveillance systems are properly coordinated. COMARFOR will exercise coordinating authority for C3CM within the JOA.

4. ( ) Operational Constraints. Factors that may impede accomplishment of the mission are as follows:

a. ( ) Tactical surprise. as a minimum, must be maintained for initial Phase IV operations if such operations are to be successful.

b. ( ) Weather in the JOA may significantly impede operations.

c. ( ) Limited theater ports of debarkation (PODS) throughput capability of both materiel and combat forces may significantly hinder the pace and timing of operations.

d. ( ) Limited intertheater lines of communications and transportation assets will impede the pace of counteroffensive operations.

e. ( ) The availability of intheater communications assets is limited. and JCS-directed communication support must be available for COMJTF SO to provide adequate command, control. and intelligence to the participating forces.

t/  
LTG  
Commander

Appendixes  
8—Rules of Engagement

/s/  
COL  
J3



APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX C TO JTF SOUTH OPORD 9 -5 ( )  
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ( )

( ) REFERENCES: a. ( ) Appendix 8 (ROE) to Annex C to USCINCSO OPLAN 5500-9\_. 23 October 1991.

b. ( ) DOD Dir 5100.77, DOD Law of War Program.

1. ( ) Situation

a. ( ) General. Joint Task Force SOUTH (JTFSO) implements a phased operation with rules of engagement (ROE) changing from peacetime ROE to combat ROE to stabilization ROE as the Atlantic an forces are defeated, the border is restored, and Honduran nation assistance is conducted.

b. ( ) Enemy. Annex B.

c. ( ) Friendly

(1) ( ) Air elements will conduct operations in accordance with (IAW) the joint force air component commander (JFACC) ROE.

(2) ( ) Maritime elements will conduct operations IAW the Task Force (TF) 123 ROE.

(3) ( ) Ground forces will conduct operations IAW ROE in paragraph 3 of this appendix.

d. ( ) Assumptions

(1) ( ) JTFSO forces will transition from Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) peacetime ROE to combat ROE on order from Commander in Chief, US Southern Command (USCINCSO), unless otherwise directed.

(2) ( ) ROE will change as the situation warrants.

2. ( ) Mission. On order, JTFSO conducts operations in the joint operations area (JOA) IAW the Department of Defense (DOD) Directive (Dir) 510077, DOD Law of War Program, and with appendix 8 to annex C to USCINCSO Operation Plan (OPLAN) 5500-9\_. 23 October 1991, to destroy Atlantic an units, restore the HONDURAN border, support Honduran combat operations, and permit restoration of Honduran facilities.

3. ( ) Execution

a. ( ) Concept of Operation

(1) ( ) General. The ROE outlined in this appendix will remain in effect until amended.

(a) ( ) Phase I. JTFSO forces will be governed by JCS peacetime ROE unless directed otherwise.

(b) ( ) Phases II, III, and IV. JTFSO forces will be governed by combat ROE as specified in paragraph 3c of this appendix.

(c) ( ) Phase V. JTFSO forces will be governed by stabilization ROE as specified in Tab A (omitted).

(2) ( ) US National Policies

(a) ( ) DOD Dir 5100.77, DOD Law of War Program, governs the conduct of all JTFSO combat operations. Commanders will ensure operations are conducted IAW the appropriate principles of the law of war. Legal review and guidance from servicing judge advocates (JAs) or legal assistants (LAs) will be obtained for all policies, OPLANS, operation orders (OPORDs), target lists, and procedures prior to the conduct of military operations and as the tactical situation permits.

(b) ( ) Operations will reflect the limited nature of US strategic interests in the area; that is, to assist HONDURAS in restoring its border and ejecting Atlantican forces.

b. ( ) Tasks. Subordinate commands will not further modify or interpret these ROE except to impose additional restrictions as warranted.

c. ( ) Coordinating Instructions

(1) ( ) These ROE will apply to all US combat operations under this OPORD unless covered by separate ROE or otherwise directed.

(2) ( ) All practical means will be employed to limit the risk to the lives and property of friendly forces and civilians and to avoid the violation of operational and national borders.

(3) ( ) Nothing in these ROE will infringe on the inherent right of a commander to exercise self-defense and take immediate action against an enemy direct attack with all lawful and appropriate means necessary to save US and Honduran lives and to protect US property.

(4) ( ) Honduran forces are allied. Atlantican forces are hostile (Annex B).

(5) ( ) Surface Weapons. This subparagraph applies to indirect-fire and direct-fire surface weapons and to naval gunfire.

(a) ( ) Every effort will be made to observe fires regardless of the target location. Unobserved fires will only be used when absolutely necessary for mission accomplishment and will meet the following criteria:

1. ( ) No unobserved fires will be directed against targets in populated areas unless the unit is in contact and in serious danger of being overrun or unless authorization is granted by the Commander, Joint Task Force SOUTH (COMJTF SO).

2. ( ) Unobserved fires maybe used against all clearly identified targets in uninhabited or sparsely populated areas if deemed essential by the tactical unit commander directing the fire.

(b) ( ) All fire missions directed against known or suspected targets in populated areas must preclude the unnecessary destruction of civilian persons and property. Any such fires will be coordinated through the Honduran liaison at JTFSO headquarters (HQ).



1. ( ) The decision to conduct indirect-fire missions in populated areas is retained by the division-level commanders and will not be further delegated.

2. ( ) Direct-tie weapons may be used in a direct-tie role in populated areas when necessary at the discretion of the tactical commander controlling the fire.

3. ( ) Before initiating fires in populated areas, if the tactical situation allows, use leaflets, loudspeakers, and so forth, to notify the civilians and permit their evacuation.

(6) ( ) Air Operations. This subparagraph defines operational restrictions and ROE for fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft in support of JTFSO ground forces. It applies to all close air support (CAS) and Army aviation missions but does not apply to air interdiction (AI) (see JFACC ROE).

(a) ( ) All pilots will receive an air or ground briefing to determine the disposition of friendly forces and civilians before initiating an air attack.

(b) ( ) CAS and helicopter gunship missions require attacking aircraft to be under the control of or in direct communications with a forward air controller (FAC) or forward observer (FO) who has visual contact with enemy forces and can define the target area and location of friendly forces and civilians when in Honduran airspace.

(c) ( ) Air attacks directed against known or suspected enemy targets in populated areas must preclude unnecessary danger to civilians and destruction of civilian property. Such attacks in HONDURAS will be coordinated with the Honduran liaison at JTFSO HQ. In addition—

1. ( ) The decision to conduct attacks in populated areas will be made by the division-level commander and not further delegated.

2. ( ) Prior to starting air attack against populated areas, if the tactical situation permits, use leaflets, loudspeakers, and so forth, to notify civilians and permit their evacuation.

(7) ( ) Chemical

(a) ( ) Lethal chemical weapons will not be used in this operation.

(b) ( ) Riot control agents (RCAs) will not be employed by US forces without express Presidential authorization and will be used only in defensive military modes to save lives, such as—

1. ( ) In riot control situations in areas under direct and distinct US military control, to include controlling enemy prisoners of war (EPWs).

2. ( ) In situations where civilians are used by the enemy to mask or screen attacks.

3. ( ) In rescue or recovery missions in remote or isolated areas to recover downed aircrews, escaping prisoners of war (PWs), or passengers.

4. ( ) In rear areas outside the immediate combat zone to protect convoys from civil disturbance, terrorism, and paramilitary forces.

(c) ( ) Herbicides will not be used by US forces except for the control of vegetation within US bases and installations or around the immediate defensive perimeters. Such use will be coordinated with the Honduran liaison at JTF SO.

(8) ( ) Incendiaries. Large-caliber incendiary weapons (white phosphorus (WP), for example) will be employed in populated areas only in extraordinary cases and only with the approval of COMJTF SO.

(9) ( ) Tactical Operations

(a) ( ) Honduran Land, Airspace, or Territorial Waters

1. ( ) Nominated targets in Honduran territory, waters, or airspace will be approved with the Honduran Military Command.

2. ( ) Mines and denial munitions maybe emplaced IAW the following:

a. ( ) AU minefield will be recorded on Department of the Army (DA) Form 1355 and DA Form 1355-1-R as appropriate.

b. ( ) Authority to emplace family of scatterable mines (FASCAM) or other scatterable munitions is held by division-level commanders for their area of operations (AO). It maybe further delegated to brigade-level commanders for those of long duration (more than 24 hours) or to battalion- or task force-level commanders for those of short duration (less than 24 hours).

(b) ( ) Cross-Border Operations

1. ( ) Nominated targets in the territorial waters, airspace, or land area of ATLANTICA will be reviewed by the appropriate component commander or designated representative to assess the impact of target engagement on the civilian population structures, and economy. The striking of these targets by any means will occur only after approval by JTF SO.

2. ( ) Atlantican rniliary targets found in the Honduran AO or on or over the high seas may be engaged subject to the restrictions in paragraph 3c(9)(a) and 3c(9)(b) 1. Atlantican targets found in neutral airspace, territorial waters, or land areas will not be engaged except in hot pursuit. See paragraph 3c(10) below for the definition of hot pursuit.

3. ( ) US land forces will not cross the ATLANTICAN border unless ordered by USCINCSO.

4. ( ) Counterbattery and air defense fires by US ground forces that are conducted within 1 kilometer of the ATLANTICAN border, or across the border. are permitted for the defense of US or Honduran forces in contact with the enemy or receiving the effects of the enemy fire. Such fires will be reported immediately to JTF SO. Fires that may cross neutral borders. airspace, or territorial waters are prohibited until authorized by USCINCSO.

5. ( ) Direct and indirect fires by ground weapon systems (other than counterbattery and air defense and to include naval gunfire in support of ground operations) that will engage targets within 1 kilometer of the border or across the ATLANTICAN border will be reported to JTF SO. At no time will US ground forces enter into Atlantican or into neutral territory without USCINCSO permission.

6. ( ) Search and rescue (SAR) elements, whether air, sea, or ground, may cross the ATLANTICAN border or enter Atlantican territorial waters on approval from JTFSO.

7. ( ) Division-level commanders may employ organic ground reconnaissance and surveillance assets necessary for unit self-defense in the region of the ATLANTICAN border if they will not conflict with JTFSO elements and if they have approval from JTFSO.

(10) ( ) Hot pursuit for air and naval forces means that enemy air or naval targets have engaged in hostile acts or have exhibited hostile intent against US or allied forces over Honduran airspace or in the AO of the naval blockade and US air or naval forces are conducting immediate efforts to exercise unit or individual self-defense. Hot pursuit will end as soon as the enemy has been successfully engaged or has moved outside a hostile threat area or US forces have broken the engagement. Supporting enemy ground, air, or naval units or weapons may be engaged during hot pursuit for the defense of the pursuing force and IAW these ROE. Hot pursuit for ground forces will not permit cross-border operations unless specifically granted by JTFSO in cases involving the ATLANTICAN border or by the USCINCSO for neutral borders.

4. ( ) Administration and Lotistics

a. ( ) Reports of alleged war crimes, violations of the law of war, and violations of these ROE will be forwarded immediately to JTFSO.

b. ( ) Investigative assets are available through JTFSO.

c. ( ) Prisoners of War, Civilian Detainees, and Refugees. Appendix 1 to Amex E (omitted).

5. ( ) Command, Control, and Communications. Annex K (omitted).



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HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH  
FORT BRAGG, NC 28307  
7 December 199\_

ANNEX D TO JTF SOUTH OPORD 9\_-5 ( )  
LOGISTICS ( )

- ( ) REFERENCES:
- a. ( ) Basic OPORD.
  - b. ( ) JCS Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*. December 1986.
  - c. ( ) JCS Pub 4, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*, September 1992.
  - d. ( ) DOD Manual, *Management of Bulk Petroleum Products, Storage, and Distribution Facilities*.
  - e. ( ) Joint Pub 5-03.2, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES): Volume II, Supplemental Planning Formats and Guidance*, March 1992.

1. ( ) Situation

a. ( ) Enemy. Annex B.

b. ( ) Friendly. Joint Task Force SOUTH (JTF SO) will be supported by national logistics assets from the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), Department of Defense (DOD) service component wholesale logistics agencies, and Commander in Chief, US Southern Command (USCINCSO), J4 as required.

c. ( ) Assumptions

- (1) ( ) All lines of communication (LOCs) will remain open throughout operations.
- (2) ( ) Sufficient tiding will be available as required.

d. ( ) Resource Availability

(1) ( ) Existing theater resources will be used to the maximum extent. This includes allied sources, USCINCSO, and pre-positioned DOD resources.

(2) ( ) Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command (USCINCTrans), will provide strategic lift assets up to available quantities and type. Worldwide demands will compete with JTF SO for strategic airlift assets.

(3) ( ) Host nation support (HNS) from the government of HONDURAS (GOH) and from third countries is limited.

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(4) ( ) Operational project stocks (OPROJ) will be available for contingencies within JTFSO joint operations area (JOA).

e. ( ) Planning Factors

(1) ( ) Each component command will identify specific planning factors within its respective supporting orders that deviate from the standard Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) logistics factor file (LFF) or unit consumption factors file (UCFF).

(2) ( ) JTFSO will provide consumption factors, if necessary, to compensate for local conditions.

2. ( ) Mission. On activation, JTFSO will provide or arrange for joint logistics support to all US and allied land forces in the JTFSO JOA in support of this operation order (OPORD).

3. ( ) Execution

a. ( ) Concept of Logistic Support

(1) ( ) USCINCSO will exercise directive logistics authority through Commander, Joint Task Force SOUTH (COMJTFSO), to preclude unnecessary duplication among supporting forces and to maximize economy of resources.

(2) ( ) Logistics support is the responsibility of the service component commands through service supply channels except where interservice support agreements (ISSAs) have been established or where joint board amendments have been made.

(3) ( ) Accompanying supplies (not to exceed 4 days) and pre-positioned resources will initially sustain deploying service components.

(4) ( ) Existing interservice responsibilities and support agreements will remain in effect for the support of all forces assigned as specified in this OPORD. Responsible joint support agencies will provide the forms, formats, and procedures necessary to receive support and conduct logistic operations.

b. ( ) Tasks

(1) ( ) Representatives from each JTFSO service component will establish joint boards to coordinate and execute common logistics support and services. Boards are to be determined (TBD).

(2) ( ) Joint Task Force BRAVO (JTFB) will provide any US support required by Honduran military forces.

(3) ( ) The Army force (ARFOR) is designated the JTFSO executive agency for interservice logistic support. Joint boards will be established to assist ARFOR in conducting this mission. Prior to ARFOR arrival in the JOA and after ARFOR departure from the JOA (basic OPORD Phases I and IV), JTFB will be responsible for providing logistics (within capabilities) to all JTFSO assigned and attached units. ARFOR will—

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(a) ( ) Coordinate and provide logistics as directed by this OPOD, interservice support agreements (ISSAs), or joint board decisions to all land forces assigned and attached to JTFSO (except Marine forces (MARFOR) as noted).

(b) ( ) provide classes I, III, common V, and X; mortuary affairs; and potable water support to all land forces in JOA (except MARFOR as noted).

(c) ( ) Act as the JTFSO executive agent for bulk fuels, terminal services, ground transportation, direct support (DS) ground support equipment maintenance, postal operations, and common-user logistics management.

(d) ( ) Be prepared to logistically support independently deployed units, provide for resupply of isolated units in coordination with US Air Force, South (USAFSO), and provide class III(b) to ground elements of MARFOR after their accompanying supplies are exhausted.

(e) ( ) Provide essential logistics support to civilian internees (CIs), displaced persons (DPs), and enemy prisoners of war (EPWs).

(f) ( ) Coordinate joint base defense plans for all JTFSO logistics bases in Area of Operations (AO) DRAGON up to and including level III threats through the establishment of joint procedures for a joint rear area commander (JRAC). ARFOR will designate JRAC.

(4) ( ) Air Force forces (AFFOR) will provide service-unique requirements, common logistics taskings from joint boards, and JOA whole blood management and intratheater airlift.

(5) ( ) MARFOR will support Marine force supply in conjunction with Navy forces (NAVFOR). Accompanying supplies will sustain MARFOR deployed ashore. ARFOR will be responsible for immediate or emergency resupply to ashore MARFOR as required. ARFOR will be responsible for resupply of class III (b) to MARFOR once accompanying supplies are exhausted.

(6) ( ) NAVFOR (Task Force (TF) 45) will support Navy and Marine forces from afloat assets. NAVFOR will provide offshore hospital facilities (Annex Q) as backup to JTFSO.

(7) ( ) All JTFSO assigned or attached units will coordinate logistics support through ARFOR or joint boards as required. Joint transportation requests that exceed organic unit capabilities will be coordinated through the Joint Movement Center (JMC).

4. ( ) Administration and Logistics

a. ( ) Logistics

(1) ( ) Supply and Distribution. Appendixes 1,3,5, and 6 (not used).

(a) ( ) Distribution and Allocation

1. ( ) Component commands tasked to provide mutual or common support will distribute map overlays, standing operating procedures (SOPS), and lists of supplies and services to supported units to identify locations and operating requirements.

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2. ( ) Primary supply and service points TBD.

3. ( ) Terminals and LOCs TBD.

4. ( ) Allocation of support in order of priority

a. ( ) US military forces engaged in combat operations.

b. ( ) US nationals and designated local and third-country nationals involved in JTFSO combat and support operations.

c. ( ) Civil-military operations.

5. ( ) Allocation of class III(b) will be through JTFSO Subarea Petroleum Office (SAPO).

6. ( ) Common classes of supply will be allocated by joint boards (where applicable). Each component command retains logistics suballocation responsibility for assigned and attached forces in accordance with (IAW) service procedures and existing ISSAs.

(b) ( ) Levels of Supply

1. ( ) Class I. Units will deploy with 3 days of supply (DofS) of combat rations. Rations will evolve into semiperishable and perishable rations as soon as the situation will allow. All local water sources will be considered nonpotable until approved by competent US medical authorities.

2. ( ) Classes II, IV, and VI. Units will deploy with service-established basic loads. Re-supply will be through normal service component supply channels. Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) will support as directed through DOD.

3. ( ) Class III

a. ( ) Packaged products will be provided by service component supply sources (up to 3 DofS). Common package products will be arranged through ARFOR.

b. ( ) An offshore petroleum discharge facility will be established in coordination with ARFOR plans.

c. ( ) Single fuel (JP-8) will be used throughout the operation (less NAVFOR and MARFOR aviation).

d. ( ) Deploying units will have all vehicles, equipment, and fuel cans filled IAW US Air Force (USAF) and Military Sealift Command (MSC) guidance.

4. ( ) Class V

a. ( ) Deploying units will maintain prescribed basic loads IAW service directives. Deployment configuration will be IAW USAF and MSC guidance.



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b. ( ) On receipt of this order, component commands will provide JTF SO J4 with an initial 30-day forecast of ammunition requirements.

c. ( ) Resupply will be IAW established service supply procedures.

d. ( ) Interservice support and centralized conventional ammunition management will be IAW Appendix 6 (not used).

e. ( ) Pre-positioned logistics ship (T-AKX) is scheduled on or about C+16 (CARIB-BEAN side) with estimated 60 DofS.

5. ( ) Class VIII. Medical supply, minus whole blood products, is a service responsibility. Economy of resources will be managed through joint boards. Units will maintain 3 DofS.

6. ( ) Class IX. Units will deploy with 15 DofS. Common repair parts for ground equipment will be coordinated through the ARFOR.

7. ( ) All classes of supply, except classes III(b) and V, will have a stockage objective of 10 DofS not later than (NLT) C+20 and 30 DofS NLT C+30. Classes III and V will be 15 DofS NLT C+14 and 30 DofS NLT C+30.

8. ( ) Service directives will govern policies and procedures for requisitioning and receiving supplies and equipment. ARFOR will establish terminal service receipt procedures for arriving and departing materiel.

9. ( ) Fast sealift ships (FSSs) breakbulk (BB) scheduled to arrive on or about C+30 with JTF SO buildup requirements (estimated 30 DofS) in all classes of supply (less III(b) and V) for Phase IV.

(c) ( ) Salvage. Salvage of supplies and equipment will be IAW service component directives, JOA salvage and collection yard TBD. US military and civil-military materiel will not be abandoned without prior approval of COMJTF SO. Reconditioning of damaged materiel will be accomplished in the JOA to the maximum extent possible.

(d) ( ) Captured Enemy Materiel. The capture of enemy materiel will be reported to the JTF SO J2 through service component operational channels prior to its use or disposal. Enemy class VIII will not be destroyed. "War trophies" are not authorized. Service component commanders will establish procedures to ensure that captured enemy materiel is not retained by individuals or transported outside the JOA until DOD guidance and approval are obtained.

(e) ( ) Local Acquisition of Supplies and Services. Local purchase of supplies and services will be coordinated through joint contracting personnel for bulk materiel and general support needs. Field ordering procedures and limitations of each service component will be reviewed and modified (if necessary) through the JTF SO J4. The USCINCSO Logistics Procurement Support Board will provide procedures for local contract services.

(f) ( ) POL. Appendix 1 (not used).

(g) ( ) Interservice Logistic Support. Omitted.

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(h) ( ) Mortuary Affairs. Concurrent return program is in effect. A centralized temporary morgue in AO DRAGON will be established and managed by ARFOR (location TBD). Service component commanders are responsible for the initial search, recovery, accountability of personal effects, and transportation to the centralized morgue. No temporary burials are authorized. Appendix 2 (not used).

(i) ( ) Nonnuclear Ammunition. Appendix 6 (not used).

(2) ( ) Maintenance and Modification. Basic guidance appears in references. ISSAs and joint maintenance facilities will be established to conserve manpower, equipment, and materiel. Units will maintain service-unique equipment IAW service component directives.

(3) ( ) Medical Service. Annex Q.

(4) ( ) Mobility and Transportation. Appendix 4.

(5) ( ) Civil Engineering Support Plan. Appendix 5 (not used).

(6) ( ) Sustainability Assessment. Appendix 3 (not used).

(7) ( ) Security Assistance. To be published (TBP).

(8) ( ) OPSEC Planning Guidance for Logistics. TBP.

(9) ( ) Use of Host Nation Labor. Appendix 7 (not used).

b. ( ) Administration. Formats for joint logistics operations will be IAW references and procedures established by JTFSO J4 and joint boards. Administrative control (ADCON) of two or more service component elements will be IAW references. Joint logistics automation systems and procedures TBP.

5. ( ) Command and Signal

a. ( ) Command Relationships. Annex J.

b. ( ) Command, Control, and Communications Systems. Annex K.

t/  
General  
Commander in Chief

Appendixes:

4—Mobility and Transportation

s/  
t/  
Colonel  
Director, J4

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH  
FORT BRAGG, NC 28307  
7 December 199\_-

AAPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX D TO JTF SOUTH OPORD 9 -5 ( )  
MOBILITY AND TRANSPORTATION ( )

( ) REFERENCE: Basic OPORD.

1. ( ) Concept of Mobility and Transporttion Operations

a. ( ) Transportation Policies. To be published (TBP).

b. ( ) Concept of Deployment. Service component commands wtill submit unit and nonunit supply lists in C-date sequence and in unit type code (UTC) format to Commander in Chief, US Southern Command (USCINCSO), J4 (Transportation) and the Joint Movement Center (JMC). Deconflictions and adjustments to final Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL) will be made by USCINCSO JMC. US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) component commands will provide common-user terminal and strategic transportation support to Joint Task Force SOUTH (JTFSO) forces from continental United States (CONUS) ports of embarkation (POEs). Intratheater ground and air transportation is provided through USCINCSO J4 (JMC).

c. ( ) Movement Support. TBP.

d. ( ) Ports. Annex B and supplemental information TBP.

e. ( ) Planning Factors. TBP.

2. ( ) Responsibilities of Supporting and Subordinate Commands

a. ( ) JTFSO logistics directorate J4 will establish a JMC to—

(1) ( ) Receive requests for and coordinate the usc of all JTFSO common-user transportation assets within the joint operations area (JOA).

(2) ( ) Coordinate strategic and intertheater airlift requirements with USCINCSO JMC and USTRANSCOM.

(3) ( ) Process all ground transportation requests, movement credits, and highway routing bids. The Army force (ARFOR) is the executive agency.

(4) ( ) Coordinate airdrop supply operations for all land forces in JOA.

b. ( ) JTFSO units will maximize use of organic haul capabilities prior to requesting external transportation support through the JMC.

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c. ( ) Component Responsibilities.

(1) ( ) Each service component will provide liaison teams to operate JTFSO JMC.

(2) ( ) ARFOR provides ground transportation assets to all land forces when tasked by the JMC. Movement regulation will be coordinated through the joint rear area commander (JRAC).

(3) ( ) The Air Force forces(AFFOR) provides intratheater airlift to all land forces when tasked by the JMC.

d. ( ) Transportation requirements. TBP.

3. ( ) Capabilities and Limiting Factors. TBP.

4. ( ) En Route Support Requirements. TBP.

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HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH  
FORT BRAGG, NC 28307  
7 December 199\_

ANNEX E TO JTF SOUTH OPORD 9 -5 ( )  
PERSONNEL ( )

( ) REFERENCE: See basic OPORD.

1. ( ) General

a. ( ) Purpose. This annex provides personnel, financial, legal, and postal guidance for support of Joint Task Force SOUTH (JTFSO) operations.

b. ( ) Concept of Personnel Support. The JTFSO J1 (Director for Manpower and Personnel) will provide guidance on personnel policies and procedures to each component command when such guidance is necessary. Component commands will provide personnel support to their service forces assigned or deployed in the execution of this operation order (OPORD). Operations security (OPSEC) guidance is to be published (TBP).

c. ( ) Assumptions. None.

d. ( ) Planning Factors. TBP.

2. ( ) Personnel Policies and Procedures

a. ( ) General Guidance

(1) ( ) Personnel policies and procedures of the respective services apply. Deployment of personnel, finance, and other records will be in accordance with (IAW) service regulations.

(2) ( ) Component commands will notify the JTFSO J1 of personnel problems that limit the operational capability of their forces. Reports will be narrative form, citing the problem area, action taken or being taken to correct deficiencies, and assistance required if applicable.

b. ( ) Specific Guidance

(1) ( ) Reporting Procedures

(a) ( ) Personnel strength, casualty, and critical shortage reports will be submitted to the JTFSO J1 on arrival of forces in the joint operations area (JOA). Subsequent reports are due not later than (NLT) 0900Z as of 0100Z daily. Formats are TBP.

(b) ( ) Casualty reports will be submitted as soon as possible to the JTFSO J1. No release of casualty information to the media or other third parties is authorized except as specified in Appendix 6 (omitted).

(2) ( ) Replacement Policies. Replacement policies will be LAW service regulations. Theater replacements will be kept to an absolute minimum consistent with critical mission requirements.

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- (3) ( ) Filler Policies. To be determined (TBD).
- (4) ( ) Personnel Readiness Center Operations. Not applicable (NA).
- (5) ( ) Rotation Policies. TBD.
- (6) ( ) Use of Personnel With Critical Skills, Female Personnel, and Specialists. TBD.
- (7) ( ) Noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) Policies, Including Requirements for Execution of Dependent Care and Reception Plans. NA
- (8) ( ) US Citizen Civilian Personnel. TBD
- (9) ( ) Non-US Citizen Labor. Maximum practical use will be made of local civilian labor in support of operations consistent with operational requirements and the *Joint Manual of Use and Administration of Foreign Labor During Hostilities*.
- (10) ( ) Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Other Detained Persons. Appendix 1 (omitted).
- (11) ( ) Formerly Captured, Missing, or Detained US Personnel. Appendix 2 (omitted).
- (12) ( ) Morale, Recreation, and Welfare. JTF SO commands will provide morale, recreation, and welfare services IAW appropriate service directives and current interservice support agreements.
- (13) ( ) Casualty Reporting. Appendix 6 (omitted).
- (14) ( ) Decorations and Awards
  - (a) ( ) Recommendations for decorations and awards shall be made IAW the policies and regulations of the individual services.
  - (b) ( ) Recommendations for joint awards will be forwarded to JTF SO J1.
- (15) ( ) Hostile Fire Pay. Hostile fire pay will be granted IAW Department of Defense (DOD) and appropriate service directives.
- (16) ( ) Travel Procedures. Not applicable (NA).
- (17) ( ) Military Law, Discipline, and Order. Component commanders are responsible for discipline, law, and order within their commands. Serious crimes and international incidents involving the host nation will be managed by JTF SO J1.
- (18) ( ) Medical Returnees to Duty. Annex Q.
- (19) ( ) Spot and Field Promotions. NA

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(20) ( ) Single or Dual M-Service Parents. NA.

(21) ( ) Leave Accumulation. NA.

(22) ( ) War Zone Benefits. TBD.

(23) ( ) Temporary Additional Duty (TAD)/Temporary Duty (TDY) Pay. NA.

3. ( ) Finance and Disbursing. Appendix 3 (omitted).

4. ( ) Legal. Appendix 4 (omitted).

5. ( ) Military Postal Services. Appendix 5 (omitted).

t/  
LTG  
Commander

OFFICIAL:

s/

t/

Colonel

Director, J1





UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH  
FORT BRAGG, NC 28307  
7 December 199\_-

ANNEX I TO JTF SOUTH OPORD 9 -5 ( )  
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS ( )

- ( ) REFERENCES:
- a. ( ) JCS Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (U).
  - b. ( ) JCS Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)* (U).
  - c. ( ) *USCINCLANT-USCINCSO MOA Regarding Coordination, Integrated Planning and Command Relationships of 29 Sep 82* (U).
  - d. ( ) Basic OPORD.
  - e. ( ) USCINCSO OPLAN 5500-9\_-

1. ( ) General

- a. ( ) Purpose. This annex establishes the relationships between—

(1) ( ) Commander, Joint Task Force SOUTH (COMJTFSO) components

- (a) ( ) Commander, Army Forces (COMARFOR).
- (b) ( ) Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR).
- (c) ( ) Commander, Naval Forces (COMNAVFOR).
- (d) ( ) Commander, Marine Forces (COMMARFOR).
- (e) ( ) Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force (COMJSOTF).

(2) ( ) Commander in Chief, US Southern Command (USCINCSO).

(3) ( ) Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command (CINCUSACOM); Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command (CINCSOC); Commander, US Army Forces Command (COMFORSCOM); Commander, Air Combat Command (COMACC); and other unified and specified commands.

(4) ( ) USCINCSO components

- (a) ( ) Commander, US Army South (COMUSARSO).
- (b) ( ) Commander, US Air Force South (COMUSAFSO).
- (c) ( ) Commander, US Navy South (COMUSNAVSO).

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(d) ( ) Commander, US Special Operations Command South (COMUSSOCSO).

(5) ( ) Joint Task Force BRAVO (JTFB).

(6) ( ) US Ambassador to Honduras.

(7) ( ) Honduran Military Forces.

b. ( ) Scope. This annex establishes the command relationships pertaining to military operations by COMJTFSO and supporting forces in accordance with (IAW) the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and USCINCSO direction in the theater of war and theater of operations.

(1) ( ) Per JCS direction, USCINCSO is the supported commander for operations outlined in this plan. CINCUSACOM; Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command (USCINCPAC); Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command (USCINCTrans); CINCSOC; Commander in Chief, US Strategic Command (USCINCSTRAT); COMFORSCOM; Commander in Chief, US Space Command (USCINCSpace); and the individual services and agencies support USCINCSO in the development and execution of plans to support operations outlined herein.

(2) ( ) Per USCINCSO direction, COMJTFSO is the supported commander for operations within the TIERRA CALIENTE joint operations area (JOA). COMARFOR; COMAFFOR; COMNAVFOR; COMMARFOR; COMFORSCOM; Commander, Air Combat Command (COMACC); CINCSOC; and the individual services and agencies support COMJTFSO in the development and execution of plans to support operations outlined herein.

(3) ( ) As the situation develops further, COMJTFSO will request augmentation forces from USCINCSO as required.

(4) ( ) Operational control (OPCON) of amphibious naval forces will pass from CINCUSACOM to USCINCSO on order. USCINCSO will pass operational control (OPCON) of these forces to COMJTFSO on order during Phase II.

(5) ( ) When established in the TIERRA CALIENTE JOA, COMJTFSO will assume OPCON of all in place and augmentation US forces except as specifically stated in this operation order (OPORD).

(6) ( ) OPCON of Marine Corps forces will be exercised by COMJTFSO directly through Commander, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) (Forward (Fwd)). after the amphibious landing force is established ashore and the commander, amphibious task force (CATF), has passed command and control of the landing force to the commander, landing force (CLF). Before the amphibious landing force is established ashore, command and control (C2) of Marine Corps forces will be exercised by COMJTFSO through COMNAVFOR.

2. ( ) Command Lines

a. ( ) Services Components

(1) ( ) COMARFOR. Commander, 21st Airborne (Abn) Corps, with headquarters (HQ) at FORT BRAGG, NC, is designated as Joint Task Force SOUTH (JTFSO) COMARFOR for this operation.

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(2) ( ) COMAFFOR. Commander, 9th Combat Air Force (CAF), with HQ located at BERGSTROM AIR FORCE BASE (AFB), TX, is designated as COMAFFOR for this plan.

(3) ( ) COMNAVFOR. Commander, Task Force (CTF) 45, with HQ afloat, is designated as the JTFSO COMNAVFOR for this operation.

(4) ( ) COMMARFOR. Commander, 1st MEF (Fwd), with HQ initially afloat and subsequently ashore, is designated as COMMARFOR for this operation. OPLAN of Marine forces (MARFOR) will pass to COMJTFSO when the landing forces have been established ashore.

(5) ( ) COMJSOTE. COMUSSOCSSO, with HQ located at ALBROOK, PANAMA, is designated COMJSOTF for this plan.

b. ( ) Other Subordinate Commands. COMJTFSO exercises joint command over the following forces as described above. Annex C.

(1) ( ) Commander, Task Force (TF) BROWN.

(2) ( ) Commander, TF BLACK.

(3) ( ) Commander, Joint Task Force (JTF) RED.

(4) ( ) Commander, TF BLUE. OPLAN. On order (OO), to be determined (TBD), appointed by COMNAVFOR.

(5) ( ) Commander TF WHITE. OPLAN

(a) ( ) When established for amphibious operations, command will be exercised initially by CTF 45 acting as CATF. OO, command will transfer ashore to Commander, 1st MEF (Fwd), acting as CLF.

(b) ( ) On completion of amphibious operations and when established ashore, TF WHITE will be disestablished and Commander, 1st MEF (Fwd), will transfer to OPLAN of Commander, TF BROWN.

(6) ( ) Joint force land component commander (JFLCC). COMJTFSO.

(7) ( ) Joint rear area commander (JRAC). TBD. Appointed by COMARFOR.

(8) ( ) Joint force air component commander (JFACC). TBD. Appointed by COMAFFOR.

(9) ( ) Commander, Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (COMJPOTF). Commander, 7th Psychological Operations Group (POG).

(10) ( ) Commander, Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (COMJCMOTF). Commander, 301st Civil Affairs (CA) Brigade.

c. ( ) Augmentation Forces. OPLAN of augmentation forces deploying by air will pass to COMJTFSO when these forces enter COMJTFSO's geographic JOA. OPLAN of augmentation forces from USCINCPAC will pass to CINCUSACOM when these forces enter CINCUSACOM's geographic area of responsibility (AOR). OPLAN of other augmentation forces approved by the JCS will pass to USCINCSO

or COMJTF SO IAW procedures stated above.

3. ( ) Support and Coordination Relationships

a. ( ) Supporting Military Forces. Basic OPORD.

b. ( ) Coordinating Authorities

(1) ( ) COMJTF SO is granted coordinating authority with all forces prior to their arrival in theater.

(2) ( ) COMAFFOR is designated as the coordinating authority for air (CAA), as the area air defense commander (AADC), and the airspace control authority (ACA) for this plan with authority as defined in Annex C.

(3) ( ) The JRAC is designated as the coordinating authority for logistics.

c. ( ) Supporting Agencies. USCINCSO will maintain responsibility for coordination with supporting defense and Government agencies. COMJTF SO will be granted direct coordination authority on a case-by-case basis.

d. ( ) Interservice Support Arrangements. Annex D.

e. ( ) Coordination With Dipomatic Agencies. USCINCSO will maintain close coordination with the chiefs of mission of the US Embassies in HONDURAS, ATLANTICA, and those Central American nations bordering HONDURAS or ATLANTICA and, when necessary, will authorize direct liaison to COMJTF SO to coordinate tactical maneuver and fire support, reception services, transportation support, and logistic support.

(f) ( ) Relationships With International and Foreign Commands. COMJTF SO will exercise OPCON over Honduran forces in cooperation with the chief of staff of the Honduran military. Subordinate commanders will exercise OPCON of the Honduran military forces assigned to their areas of operation (AOs).

5. Planning Relationships Not applicable.

t/  
LTG  
Commander

OFFICIAL:

s/

t/

COL

J3

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH  
FORT BRAGG, NC 28307  
7 December 199\_-

ANNEX Q TO JTF SOUTH OPORD 9 -5  
MEDICAL SERVICES (U)

( ) References: a. ( ) The Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims of 12 August 1949.

b. ( ) Basic OPORD.

1. ( ) Situation

a. General

(1) Purpose. This annex provides a concept of operation. assigns tasks, and provides guidance for developing an executable health service support (HSS) plan in support of operations indicated in reference b.

(2) Applicability. This annex applies to all Joint Task Force SOUTH (JTFSO) components and supporting commands.

b. Enemy Forces see Annex B.

c. Friendly Forces

(1) JTFSO surgeon identifies and defines the health service concept of support and the medical responsibilities of each service component command.

(2) All components ensure that tasks, fictions, and responsibilities identified have been properly assigned to subordinate commands capable of accomplishing them.

d. Assumptions

(1) JTFSO will have air superiority from the beginning of operations allowing full use of intratheater and intertheater aeromedical evacuation assets.

(2) US Department of State (DOS) will arrange overflight authority to allow direct aeromedical evacuation (AME) routes to the continental United States (CONUS).

(3) Adequate AME support will be available.

(4) Navy force (NAVFOR) hospital beds will be available and within rotary-wing medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) range to allow their use as part of the theater HSS system.

(5) Each component command will be able to provide echelon I and II HSS to assigned and attached personnel.

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(6) Adequate class VIII-A and VIII-B will be available from supporting and component commands.

e. Limitations

(1) Constrained strategic lift will limit the amount of medical assets that can be transported into theater in time to be used in Phases I through IV.

(2) The number of beds in theater will dictate a short (less than 5 days) theater evacuation policy.

(3) Number of airfields capable of supporting C-141s in theater will limit number of intratheater and intertheater AME locations.

(4) Terrain, distances, and quality of roads will limit ground MEDEVAC.

2. ( ) Mission. On receipt of this OPORD, JTF SO medical units will establish an effective HSS system to support the operations in defense of HONDURAS in accordance with (IAW) this annex.

3. ( ) Execution

a. Concept of Operations

(1) Transition

(a) Concept of transition from peacetime to wartime medical posture will be limited to component command medical assets and those available from Joint Task Force BRAVO (JTFB) medical element until the closure of 21st Airborne (Abn) Corps medical assets. Success depends on the rapid completion of Phases I through III in preparation for Phase IV.

(b) US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) assets for strategic deployment of medical assets from CONUS will be constrained IAW the Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL). Only minimal or emergency HSS will be provided in theater, and all patients not able to be promptly returned to duty will be aeromedically evacuated out of theater. HSS is a joint venture. Coordination and mutual medical support between component commands is directed by the JTF SO surgeon.

(c) Transition Objectives

1. Provide definitive medical care as far forward as possible.

2. Provide continuous medical care from the onset of illness, injury, or wound for expeditious RTD or evacuation from joint operations area (JOA).

3. Provide an integrated system of MEDEVAC within and out of the JOA.

(2) Responsibility

## UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

(a) HSS for Honduran forces is primarily a Honduran Armed Forces' responsibility. US medical treatment facilities may provide assistance as determined by component surgeons in constipation with the JTF SO surgeon.

(b) HSS is a service responsibility or as directed by the JTF SO surgeon or this annex.

### (3) Hospitalization

(a) Hospitalization will be joint serviced on an area support basis. Intheater hospitals will be established according to the TPF DL. Deletions or additions to the TPF DL for hospitals and ancillary support is to be determined.

(b) The Army force (ARFOR) will have primary hospital support responsibility for land component forces, to include coalition under certain circumstances.

(c) NAVFOR will have primary hospital support responsibility for Task Force 45 and US Marine forces (MARFOR) and secondary support for land component forces.

(d) Non-US treatment facilities till not be used for the hospitalization of US personnel except as directed by the JTF SO surgeon. US medical treatment facilities (MTFs) will provide only emergency medical support to save life, limb, or eyesight of refugees as resources permit (subject to change in Phase V).

(e) Hospitalization capabilities of Joint Task Force BRAVO (JTFB): 40 beds. 2 operating rooms (ORs), lab, x-ray, blood bank, 2 general surgeons, 1 orthopedic surgeon, 2 family practice physicians, 1 preventive medicine officer, 1 dentist, 1 veterinarian, and 3 registered nurses.

### (4) Patient Evacuation

(a) JTF SO surgeon's office will establish a Joint Medical Regulating Office (JMRO) for all patients leaving the theater. A joint casualty collection point (JCCP) will be at SOTO CANO.

(b) The Air Force forces (AFFOR) w\ill provide intertheater aeromedical evacuation (AME) assets, to include staging, stabilization, and preparation.

(c) ARFOR will provide intratheater AME assets for all land components. Evacuation of critical patients by helicopter from subordinate medical collection points is preferred. Use of ground ambulances is a secondary consideration.

(d) Patients aeromedically evacuated out of theater will be transported to—

1. Brooke Army Medical Center, SAN ANTONIO, Tx.

2. Gorgas Army Hospital, PANAMA (secondary).

(e) SOTO CANO Airbase is the primary aeromedical aerial port of embarkation (APOE) in the ater. TONCONTIN International Airport is secondary.

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(f) AME out of theater should be available on or about C+5.

(5) Host Nation Support

(a) Use of local national health services is discouraged and will not be used except to save life, limb, or eyesight of US personnel. Approving authority is the component command surgeon. US personnel in Honduran medical facilities will be reported to the JMRO and transferred to a US MTF as soon as possible.

(b) Significant Honduran Medical Facilities

1. TEGUCIGALPA: One 500 bed; two 50 bed (all with surgery).

2. TELA: One 50 bed (no surgery).

3. SAN PEDRO SULA: One 286 bed (with surgery).

(6) Adjunct Medical Support

(a) Mass casualties will be regulated through JMRO. NAVFOR offshore beds will be used as bathup and when AME is limited.

(b) Enemy prisoners of war (EPW), civilian internees, and detainees will be provided care only upon the direction from the National Command Authority (NCA). Medical services will conform with the standards of reference a. Patients requiring medical care will be transported to the nearest US MTF but will not be evacuated out of theater unless directed by the JTFSO surgeon. Captured enemy medical supplies will not be destroyed and will be used to the maximum extent to treat EPWs.

(c) Formerly captured US military personnel (omitted).

(7) Joint Blood Program

(a) See Appendix 2 (omitted).

(b) JTFSO surgeon will activate the Area Joint Blood Program Office (AJBPO) to coordinate whole blood and fluid requirements for the JOA. AFFOR will establish Blood Transshipment Centers (BTCs) for land components.

(8) Preventive Medicine and Veterinary Services

(a) See Appendix 8.

(b) Component command surgeons are responsible for ensuring that their respective commands are aware of medical threats. Commanders are responsible for implementing effective unit preventive medicine programs. JTFSO surgeon has overall authority for preventive medicine standards and programs.



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(c) Personnel will be immunized and receive chemoprophylaxis IAW service component directives and as outlined in appendix 8.

(d) Component surgeons will report to JTFSO surgeon the occurrence (in US personnel) of any of the diseases listed in appendix 8. Report format is to be determined (TBD).

(9) Theater Evacuation Policy

(a) JTFSO evacuation policy is 2 days. Requests for exception will be forwarded to JTFSO surgeon.

(b) Primary means for evacuation from theater is AFFOR strategic lift assets. Secondary will be through civilian air carriers.

(c) Patients will be evacuated from specified APOEs.

(10) Medical Regulating

(a) See Appendix 1 (omitted).

(b) On activation, the Area Joint Medical Regulating Office (AJMRO) will become the execution agency for patient regulation and will coordinate all patient evacuation within and out of the JOA.

(11) Ancillary Support

(a) Emergency dental, veterinary, and psychological services will be provided by component commands.

(b) Use of veterinary services for local national zoonotic and endemic diseases as directed by JTFSO surgeon. Primary veterinary services will be for US military working dogs and subsistence inspection programs.

(12) Other Areas (omitted).

b. Tasks

(1) Responsibilities

(a) JTFSO surgeon

1. Establishes joint health service plans and policies for the JOA and coordinates supporting medical plans.

2. Coordinates with surgeons of component and supporting commands for treatment, hospitalization, evacuation, and blood products.

3. Establishes AJMRO, AJBPO, and JCCP.

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(b) ARFOR Surgeon

1. Provides medical command and control for Headquarters (HQ), JTF SO; Army forces; and level III support for land components.

2. Provides class VIII support to all ARFOR and centralized medical maintenance for common biomedical equipment.

3. Provides intratheater air and ground MEDEVAC for all land components in JOA.

(c) AFFOR Surgeon

1. Provides medical command and control and levels I and II HSS for US Air Force.

2. Provides intertheater AME for all JTF SO components. Provides aeromedical evacuation liaison teams (AELT), aeromedical evacuation control center (AECC), and mobile aeromedical staging facility (MASF). Provides whole blood transshipment centers as required.

(d) NAVFOR Surgeon

1. Provides medical command and control (C<sup>2</sup>) for all US Navy and Marine Corps forces. MARFOR, once ashore, will continue to receive NAVFOR medical support unless determined that ARFOR medical support is required under land component support missions.

2. Makes available medical assets of Task Force 45, to include—

a. *Saipan* and *Nassau* (amphibious assault ship (general purpose) (LHA)): 4 OR tables, 300 beds, 0 intensive care unit (ICU) beds, lab, x-ray, blood bank, anesthesiology, and dental.

b. *Iwo Jima* amphibious assault ship (helicopter) (LPH): 2 OR tables, 100 beds, 4 ICU beds, lab, x-ray, blood bank, anesthesiology, and dental.

3. Coordinates for movement of patients from ship to JCCP for AME from JOA through AJMRO.

(2) Component-Specific Responsibilities (omitted).

c. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Direct liaison between component surgeons is authorized.

(2) Components will provide JTF SO surgeon with liaison personnel for manning the Joint Medical Operations Center (JMOC)/J1, AJBPO, and AJMRO.

(3) All components will deploy with a minimum of 3 days of supply (DofS) for class VIII.

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(4) JTF SO surgeon will coordinate with US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) surgeon on medical requirements that exceed JTF SO capabilities.

4. ( ) Administration and Logistics

a. Medical Materiel. Components will follow service directives for acquisition, use, and disposal of medical materiel. Maximum coordination and cross servicing in class VIII and biomedical equipment is directed to avoid duplication. ARFOR surgeon has overall responsibility for medical materiel cross servicing.

b. Reports. IAW Joint Pub 6-04.1.

5. ( ) Command and Control

a. Command. Commander, JTF SO, has overall command of HSS in the JOA as exercised through JTF SO surgeon. Component surgeons assume operational control (OPCON) of theater resources and other component medical assets as directed. In the event JTF SO surgeon is unable to provide centralized direction over JTF SO HSS system, ARFOR surgeon, then AFFOR surgeon will assume duties.

b. Medical Communications. MEDEVAC call signs and frequencies are found in joint signal operating instructions (JSOI). Unsecure communications is authorized except when deemed necessary to encrypt. See Annex K (omitted) for further requirements.

s/  
General  
Commander in Chief

Appendixes:  
8—Preventive Medicine



UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH  
FORT BRAGG, NC 28307  
7 December 199\_

APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX O TO JTFSO OPORD 9 -5 (U)  
PREVENTIVE MEDICINE ( )

- ( ) References:
- a. ( ) Basic OPORD.
  - b. ( ) DST-1810H-001-82, *Handbook of Diseases of Military Importance*, date unknown.
  - c. ( ) FM 8-33/NAVMEDP-5038, *Control of Communicable Diseases in Man*, 20 January 1985.
  - d. ( ) *US Medical Intelligence Center Handbook on Central America*, 1993 edition.
  - e. ( ) AR 40-562/NAVMEDCOMINST 6230.3/AFR 161-13/CG  
COMDTINST M6320.4D, *Immunizations and Chemoprophylaxis*, 7 October 1988.
  - f. ( ) FM 8-10-8, *Medical Intelligence in a Theater of Operations*, July 1989.

1. ( ) Purpose. This appendix provides the concept of operations, defines the threat, and assigns tasks for preventive medicine (PM) support of the basic plan.

2. ( ) Definitions and Assumptions (omitted).

3. ( ) Concept of Operations

a. Disease prevention is both a personal and a command responsibility. Joint Task Force SOUTH (JTFSO) components will refer to specific service directives for combating infectious diseases and for implementing effective PM programs. JTFSO surgeon will establish priorities for PM operations.

b. Reference e and the following information will govern predeployment immunoprophylactic measures to be taken.

(1) Immunization

(a) All soldiers: tetanus-diphtheria, yellow fever, plague (GG), influenza, typhoid, hepatitis A (IG).

(b) Additional for special forces: rabies (human diploid cell vaccine (HDCV)). Additional for health and food service personnel: hepatitis B.

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(2) Acclimatization to the joint operations area (JOA) must be rapid for mission success. Therefore, command information programs about the medical conditions of HONDURAS and PM programs, responsibilities, and endemic dangers will be provided to all soldiers prior to departure from the continental United States (CONUS).

(3) Chemoprophylaxis

(a) All soldiers: Chloroquine 500 milligrams (mgs) once a week beginning 1 week prior to arrival in theater and continuing for 6 week after leaving the JOA.

(b) Additional (leptospirosis): Personnel at increased risk in low-lying swamps or rivers will take doxycycline 200 mgs once a week beginning 1 week prior to being at risk and continuing for 1 week after.

c. Commander in Chief, US Southern Command (USCINCSO) surgeon and the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) will provide JTFSO surgeon with updated medical intelligence and advice concerning specific PM measures. JTFSO surgeon will collect and disseminate current medical intelligence to all US and Honduran forces in the JOA.

d. JTFSO policies concerning PM programs will supplement service component directives. Where conflicts between the two arise, Commander, Joint Task Force SOUTH (COMJTFSO), will issue an appropriate decision. General guidance in support of COMJTFSO PM operations are:

(1) Extremes of heat and humidity can be expected to affect certain biomedical equipment, storage of medical supplies (especially intravenous fluids and medications), and potable water procurement.

(2) In many areas, depending on the season, topography, and status of roads, ground evacuation will be severely limited. This will mandate a greater use of helicopters for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC).

(3) Thunderstorms, fog, and other conditions may limit use of aeromedical evacuations (AMEs) both intratheater and intertheater, especially from June through September (see Annex B).

(4) All local water sources are considered nonpotable until a competent US medical authority establishes otherwise.

e. The Army force (ARFOR) is responsible for conducting field laboratory and veterinary support of JTFSO PM operations. US Army Health Services Command (USAHSC) will provide backup support as required.

4. ( ) Health Threat

a. Health Threat Due to Climate. Heat will be the most immediate health threat. Heat injuries should be expected, particularly among nonacclimated personnel. The climate is tropical but has distinct wet and dry seasons (see Annex B). The potential for cold weather injuries may exist in mountainous areas at higher altitudes.

b. Health Threat Due to Disease

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(1) Diseases are grouped by length of incubation and mode of transmission. Within each group, diseases are in descending order of expected impact on military operations if no preventive measures are taken.

(2) Contamination via water supplies, ice, food, food handlers, and food processing makes foodborne and waterborne diseases the greatest threat to humans. Diseases with short incubation periods (usually less than 15 days) transmitted via contaminated food or water include the following:

(a) Acute diarrheal diseases (6 hours to 10 days) incidence is seasonal, with peak in summer. Distribution is countrywide. These are highly endemic and may result in significant morbidity in nonindigenous personnel. Frequent pathogens include *E. coli* (ETEC), strains resistant to antibiotics and doxycycline, *Shigella* spp; *Salmonella* spp; *Campylobacter* spp; and viral agents.

(b) Enteric protozoal diseases (1 week to several months) incidence is year-round and countrywide. Although usually causing more chronic diseases, some protozoans such as *Entamoeba histolytica*, *Giardia lamblia*, and *Cryptosporidium* spp can cause acute diarrhea.

(c) Typhoid and paratyphoid fevers (1 to 3 weeks) incidence is year-round and countrywide. They are endemic with focal outbreaks around contaminated water supplies.

(3) Short Incubation Diseases Affected by Vectors. Tropical weather and low-lying marshy areas attract large swarms of mosquitoes that may carry infectious diseases. Individual and area insecticides will be issued to all personnel and component medical units, respectively. The wearing of "domesticated pet insecticide collars" by personnel is prohibited. Diseases transmitted by mosquitoes include the following:

(a) Malaria (incubation in 12 to 14 days) incidence is year-round (slightly higher in May to December) and occurs mainly in the coastal lowlands and along the Atlantican border. Of 30,000 cases reported in 1988, 98 percent were due to vivax malaria, but falciparum malaria is more common along the ATLANTICAN border. Chloroquine-resistant falciparum has not been confirmed. Prophylaxis is indicated.

(b) Arboviral fevers (incubation in 3 to 12 days) incidence is common (as dengue fever) with primary risk from April to October. Most outbreaks reported in southern HONDURAS, but incidents have been reported along the northern coast. Arboviral encephalitides usually affect cattle; humans are rarely infected.

### (4) Short Incubation Diseases With Miscellaneous Transmission

(a) Acute respiratory diseases (incubation 1 to 10 days) is transmitted by direct and indirect contact with infectious droplets from the nose and mouth. Risk periods are year-round, and distribution is countrywide. Influenza and other respirator tract diseases are highly common and endemic.

(b) Leptospirosis (incubation in 4 to 19 days) is transmitted through skin contact with water or moist soil contaminated with urine of infected animals. Distribution is greater in low-lying areas, and peak risk is during rainy seasons. Disease is endemic in areas with cattle. Chemoprophylaxis is indicated.

(c) Sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) (incubation 2 days to 3 weeks) are obviously transmitted through sexual contact. Incidence is year-round with a prevalence slightly higher in the northern coastal

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areas. All forms of STDs are endemic at moderate levels. About 15 to 20 percent of gonorrhea may be penicillin resistant.

### (5) Diseases With Long Incubation Periods (usually more than 15 days)

(a) Viral hepatitis (15 to 180 days) is transmitted as hepatitis A through humans who have come into contact with fecally contaminated food or water and hepatitis B through humans via sexual contact or blood transfusions. Incidence is year-round and countrywide. Hepatitis A poses the greatest risk.

(b) Leishmaniasis (1 week to many months) is transmitted via the bite of an infected sand fly (which are most active at night). Peak incidence is from May to July. Most cases are reported from the eastern, central, and northwestern corners of HONDURAS. Almost all cases are cutaneous.

### (6) Diseases Endemic in the Indigenous Population

(a) AIDS has been reported with 70 percent of the cases reported from northern coastal areas. Heterosexual transmissions is implicated in the majority of cases.

(b) Rabies accounts for 5 to 10 deaths per year from contact with domestic and wild animals.

(c) Tuberculosis is sporadic.

(d) Acute hemorrhagic conjunctivitis.

### c. Health Risk Due to Plants and Animals

(1) Plants. Thickets containing Pica-pica or cowitch plants may cause contact dermatitis. These plants are found mainly in the PACIFIC lowlands. Manchineel trees and stinging nettles produce severe contact dermatitis (plants found countrywide). Sandbox trees and multiple species of Euphorbs also grow in HONDURAS and produce poisonous seeds and a contact vesicant sap.

(2) Animals (Invertebrates). Centipedes, scorpions, black widow spiders, brown recluse spiders, caterpillars, and several species of relatively large and aggressive tarantulas are found in HONDURAS. Stingrays, jellyfish, stinging anemone, coral, and hydroid in coastal waters are potential hazards.

(3) Animals (Vertebrates). The following snakes are found countrywide: coral, fer-de-lance, rattlesnake, pit viper spp, and bushmaster. The University of Costa Rica, Gorgas Army Hospital (PANAMA), USAHSC (SAN ANTONIO, Tx), and Wyeth Laboratories (Merck) are sources for antivenin.

### d. Sanitary Engineering in HONDURAS

(1) There is a high incidence of waterborne diseases associated with the consumption of locally procured water. Treatment and distribution systems for piped water are inadequate, and tap water is commonly contaminated. Water must be obtained through ARFOR channels and treated in accordance with (IAW) ARFOR directives.



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(2) Waste disposal practices are generally unsatisfactory. Untreated waste from sewage systems servicing modern sections of even large urban areas is discharged into nearby waterways. Cesspools and latrines are used in most towns. Many urban areas do not use any method of human waste disposal other than the deposit of uncovered excreta on the ground. Typically, refuse is left out in an open dump. Rotting garbage supports vectors, such as rats, which spread disease.

5. ( ) Tasks. All service components are responsible for implementing an effective PM program to cover all aspects of disease prevention, control, and treatment, JTFSO surgeon will coordinate interservice PM programs and will arrange for area support to all elements in the JOA. Incidence of any of the aforementioned threats to health will be reported immediately through command channels to the JTFSO Medical Operations Center. ARFOR is responsible for aerial spraying operations of insecticides in coordination with Honduran authorities.

6. ( ) Coordinating Instructions. Service component surgeons and commanders of all medical treatment facilities will maintain close contact with PM units, other surgeons, and hospital commanders to obtain up-to-date medical intelligence and status of any threat to personnel. Sanitation measures will uphold the highest of standards as prescribed by service component directives. MEDEVAC of patients from the JOA will be screened by attending physicians and personnel from the mobile aeromedical staging facility (MASF) prior to airlift to CONUS.



**CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION**Appendix 13. Combat Service Support Planning Data

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**1. GENERAL**

a. You will use this appendix during the corps force-projection practical exercise (lesson 4) for Army force (ARFOR) logistic planning. This data represents a compilation of several resources that would be available to staff officers serving on the ARFOR staff. It is not arranged to reflect a specific doctrinal format.

b. Some information is intentionally left blank so that you can determine the missing data. In specific places within this appendix where TBD by student appears, you will fill in the necessary information based on your analysis of logistic requirements. The information to be determined can then be integrated into the ARFOR concept of support.

c. Some logistic planning data provided in this appendix reflects updated changes from the Joint Task Force South (JTFSO) and Commander in Chief, US Southern Command (USCINCSO), plans. These changes are necessary to execute JTFSO OPORD 9\_-5.

**2. MEDICAL**

a. Class VIII. Captured class VIII enemy supplies will not be destroyed. All such materiel will be turned over to the Honduran Government. Requests for US class VIII supplies to support enemy prisoner of war (EPW) requirements must be approved through the ARFOR surgeon.

b. Evacuation Policy. JTFSO OPORD 9\_-5.

c. Local Medical Facilities. JTFSO OPORD 9\_-5.

d. Blood. JTFSO OPORD 9\_-5.

e. Dental Treatment. Initial dental treatment is limited to emergency only. Expect no routine dental services until C+ 16. Dental, veterinary, and psychological services will be provided on an area basis by the 880th Med Det, Dental Svc.

f. Collecting and Staging. Joint casualty collection point (JCCP) and the joint mobile air-evacuation staging facility (MASF): Soto Cano Air Force Base (AFB).

g. Medical Intelligence. JTFSO OPORD 9\_-5.

h. Immunization. Immunization requirements for Honduras (AR 40-562, table 3-1):

(1) All soldiers: yellow fever, tetanus-diphtheria, polio, influenza, plague (GG), typhoid.

(2) Special forces (additional): rabies (human diploid cell vaccine (HDCV)).

(3) Health and food service personnel (additional): hepatitis B.

### 3. PERSONNEL

a. Strength Figures. Appendix 12 to the M/S320C Staff Planning Book contains personnel figures (pax numbers). Figures will vary based on final flow of forces.

b. Replacements. Replacements will be for critical positions only and will be one for one, ARFOR replacement regulation organization 211th Pers Svc Bn. ARFOR replacement center will be established at (TBD by student) on or about C+(TBD by student).

c. Soldier Readiness. All soldiers will be processed for overseas movement IAW 21st Abn Corps Reg 350-X and AR 40-562, Vaccinations and regional acclimation briefings will be conducted before deployment.

d. Applicable Loss Rate Planning Factors. FM 101-10-1/2, volume 2, chapter 4 (modifications may be necessary to reflect scenario conditions).

e. Mail Policy. All personal mail will be handled IAW 21st Abn Corps field standing operating procedure (FSOP). A separate APO (TBD) will be established to handle “any service member” mail.

f. Casualty Reports. Due to the sensitivity and accuracy requirements of casualty information, all ARFOR casualty reports will be forwarded to 21st Abn Corps G1 within 24 hours.

### 4. SERVICES/LABOR

a. Mortuary. Concurrent return program is in effect. No hasty or temporary burials are authorized. JTFSO Military Sealift Command (MSC) is responsible for returning remains to joint mortuary collection point at (TBD by student) within 24 hours of incident. CONUS aerial port of debarkation (A POD) for remains: Dover AFB.

b. Personal. Bakery, laundry (less medical units), and shower services are locally contracted through JTF J4 as required.

c. Airdrop. Airdrop planning factors to be used are found in ST 101-6 under airdrop units. All preplanned requests for US Air Force (USAF)-delivered airdrop will be through the Joint Movement Center (Airlift Control). Immediate or emergency airdrop restricted to **(TBD by student)(specify units or commodities)**.

d. Local Labor. All local labor contracting will be through the JTF J5. No civilian labor is authorized to divisional areas.

c. Augmentation. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) contingency support team and US Army Materiel Command (AMC) logistic support group personnel can be expected on or about C+6. Available teams: petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) lab; aviation maintenance; materiel management; and cryptographic maintenance.

### 5. MAINTENANCE

a. Time Lines. On-site—24 hours; direct support (DS)—36 hours; corps DS—96 hours.

b. Limited communications security (COMSEC) and test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment (TMDE) maintenance are available.

c. Controlled Items. Aviation intensive management items (AIMI); 4K- and 6K-pound rough terrain forklift engines; 5-ton truck master cylinders; and high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) tires.

d. If required, ARFOR consolidated passback aircraft maintenance facility will be located at Soto Cano.

e. IAW interservice agreements, some USAF ground support equipment will be supported by 21st Corps Support Command (COSCOM) maintenance units. ARFOR units in the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) and Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) will maintain a separate maintenance system for low-density and/or unique items.

f. All nonreparable equipment or items exceeding theater time lines will be evacuated to CONUS. Maintenance evacuation collecting point: (TBD by student). Maintenance evacuation priorities: (TBD by student).

g. Army Oil Analysis Program (AOAP) is suspended for deploying units.

h. Cannibalization is authorized to DS level. No operational readiness floats are available.

i. Deploying units will reconfigure prescribed loads and authorized stockage lists (ASLs) to minimum essential maintenance only (MEMO) standards as prescribed in 21st Abn Corps FSOP.

j. Maintenance Priorities. (TBD by student). Current equipment mission capable (EMC) rate is greater than 92 percent.

## 6. TRANSPORTATION

a. General. Intheater road networks are generally poor. Congestion and other limitations on roadways require intense movement management, security, and engineer maintenance. Due to ground line of communication (LOC) limitations, expect a greater reliance on unit (versus supply point) distribution methods. Engineer assets will be needed to maintain and expand ports and main supply routes (MSRs). Remoteness of most units requires some freedrop prepackages and a greater reliance on helicopter delivery. All road networks have soft shoulders. Numerous locations are subject to washout during the rainy seasons. The mountainous interior and daily average temperatures of 82°F (28°C) will create additional demands on mobility and maintenance. (See also JTF SO OPOD 9\_-5. annex B.)

### b. Surface Transportation.

(1) Honduras has 8,950 kilometers of roads (1,700 kilometers improved paved, all-weather; 5,000 kilometers improved earth or gravel; 2,250 kilometers unimproved earth).

#### (2) Major Highways.

(a) North-south: Honduras Route 1 (two-lane paved from Puerto Cortes to San Pedro Sula to Tegucigalpa to San Lorenzo). All other routes stem from this highway.

(b) East-west: Pan-American Highway (two-lane paved from El Salvador to Atlantic).

(3) Rail transportation in Honduras is characterized by poor upkeep and nonstandard gauges. North coast rail lines connect the ports of La Ceiba, Tela, and Puerto Cortes. Some rail lines are privately owned.

(4) Inland waterways are considered insignificant for viable military use.

c. Ocean Water Terminal Operations.

(1) Puerto Cortes characteristics: two breakbulk (BB) piers-one container cargo (CC) and one general cargo; two roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) berths; adequate wharf and gantry cranes; bulk POL refined product storage (restricted to 120,000 barrels (bbls)); rail access; deep water berthing; no hazardous materials (HAZMAT) wharfage (quantity distance rules for class V shipments require mooring 2 kilometers from shore); reefer warehouse; restricted to 100,000 square meters (m<sup>2</sup>) open storage; 55,000m<sup>2</sup> container storage: clearance capacity 16,000 short tons (STONs) per day; limited lighterage service; two tugs ( 1,200 horsepower (hp)) available; 24-hour operations.

(2) San Lorenzo characteristics: one RO/RO berth; three small BB; two C-130-capable strips nearby; no rail access; docking during daylight hours only; compulsory pilotage; very limited support facilities; no lighterage service; clearance capacity 4,500 STONs per day; two 25-ton and one 140-ton cranes available; two tugs available (1,200 hp); 2,406m<sup>2</sup> general cargo warehouse; restricted to 32,913m<sup>2</sup> open storage; no HAZMAT restrictions; low tide 32 feet; 2,000 bbls bulk POL storage available.

(3) Puerto Castilla characteristics: one RO/RO berth; small C-130-capable airstrip 16 kilometers away; congested marshaling yard; reefer warehouse; poor road and rail connections: some minor lighterage service (3 tons): clearance capacity 8,000 STONs per day; compulsory pilotage; limited diesel fuel storage (restricted to 240 bbls); low tide depth 26 feet; 24-hour operations.

(4) Tela characteristics: two general cargo berths; rail access; shallow draft ( 15 feet) only; limited support facilities: clearance capacity 6,000 STONs per day; one 60-ton mounted crane; four 13-ton cranes; no lighterage service; no pilotage available; no tugs available; daylight operations only.

(5) La Ceiba characteristics: rail access; shallow draft ( 16 feet) only; limited facilities; no lighterage service; clearance capacity 5,100 STONs per day; minor bulk POL storage available (restricted to 130 bbls); compulsory pilotage.

(6) Offshore petroleum discharge facility for bulk POL will be located at **(TBD by student)**

(7) Customs clearance will be waived for incoming sea shipments IAW *Empress Nacional Portuaria* and US agreements. US Department of Agriculture (USDA) inspections are required for all outbound shipments to CONUS.

(8) No US Army lighterage is available

(9) Port support activity (PSA) will be formed at **C+(TBD by student)** and located at **(TBD by student)**. PSA manpower and equipment will be provided by 21st COSCOM units.

(10) Class V ocean terminal located at **(TBD by student)**. Seventy percent of class V will be supplied by BB ship (pre-positioned T-AKX).

(11) 1322d Mdm Port Cmd (Panama) will deploy to Honduras, administer water terminal contracts, and provide CONUS data links for sealift.

(12) Surveyed logistics over the shore (LOTS) sites are Cedeno (DK5055), La Ceiba (EN2037), Tela (DN4738), and Balfate (EN7045).

d. Air Terminals.

(1) Several airfields are available for use within the country. Each airfield varies in ramp and apron space, flight rules in effect (visual flight rules (VER)/instrument flight rules (IFR)), offload and throughput rates, bulk POL storage, covered and open storage facilities, and maintenance facilities. Only significant features are included here. Sortie rates listed below take all the aforementioned factors into account. Airfields listed as VFR or daylight only can be upgraded to 24-hour operations with tanker airlift control element (TALCE) or combat control teams (CCTs).

(a) Soto Cano AFB (Comayagua) characteristics:

1. DL3389.
2. Aircraft capable: C-5, C-141, C-130, KC-10.
3. Daylight only unless upgraded to 24 hours.
4. Reception capacity is 125 C-141-equivalent sorties 1 per 24 hours (upgraded) (without upgrade reduce both numbers by 55 percent).
5. Good maintenance and bulk fuel storage (capacity available: 25,800 bbls) facilities.
6. Covered storage available, Limited humidity-controlled and refrigerated storage available.

(b) Toncontin International (Tegucigalpa) characteristics:

1. DL8050.
2. Aircraft capable: C-130.
3. VFR daylight only unless upgraded.
4. 200 C-130 sorties (upgraded) (without upgrade reduce by 47 percent).

NOTE: The number of C-141-equivalent sorties per 24 hours reflects the (net) amount of ARFOR flights that can be accommodated at that airfield. Only ARFOR and nonunit sustainment sorties need be computed for this lesson. Above figures take into account the effect of commercial air traffic, aircraft cycle time, maximum on-the-ground loads (assuming distribution of C-141/C-5 arrivals are fairly uniform), and crew rest requirements.

5. No covered storage. Limited multifuel aviation gasoline (AVGAS) storage (capacity available: 470 bbls).

(c) La Mesa International (San Pedro Sula) characteristics:

1. DN0109.

2. Aircraft capable: C-130, C- 141, and C-5.

3. Reception capacity is 100 C-141-equivalent sorties per 24 hours.

4. No covered storage. Limited AVGAS bulk storage (capacity available: 480 bbls).

(d) Goloson International (La Ceiba) characteristics:

1. EN1740.

2. Aircraft capable: C-130, C-141, and C-5.

3. Reception capacity is 40 C-141-equivalent sorties per 24 hours.

4. Limited covered storage: Limited AVGAS bulk storage (capacity available 600 bbls).

(2) Customs clearance and quarantine requirements waived for inbound military flights. Outbound flights to CONUS remain under USDA standards.

e. Inland Motor Terminal Operations

(1) Intermodal terminals located at (TBD by student) and managed by (TBD by student).

(2) Host nation motor assets available: six heavy equipment transporters (HETs); one trailer transfer team; nine 60,000-pound commercial forklifts.

7. SUPPLY

a. Assumptions

(1) No pre-positioned war reserve materiel stocks (PPWRMS) will be available for short-term contingencies.

(2) Sufficient supplies and equipment for civil affairs missions will be available.

(3) Temporary upgrade of force activity decimators (FADs) will be given for all applicable deploying units, Department of Defense activity address codes ( DODAACs) will change as required.

b. Operational Project Stocks (OPROJ). OPROJ code: JOS-5Y998.7M.

(1) Emergency OPROJ of classes I, III(p), and selected V are available from Defense Distribution Region East at C+5 (25 STONs each commodity).



(2) Available OPROJ (additive) equipment: 3,000-gallon reverse osmosis water purification unit (ROWPU) (10 each (ea)); 500-gallon fabric drum for water (25 ea); 3,000-gallon (water) semitrailer with mounted fabric tank (10 ea); 50,000-gallon (bulk fuel) fabric bag (4 ea). OPROJ available C+4.

(3) Available OPROJ (nonaddictive) equipment: screen, mosquito, bulk roll (52 ea); portable ice machines (60 ea); mobile water chillers (50 ea); offshore multileg mooring system and ancillary equipment for tactical petroleum terminal (1 ea); dust palliative (600 gallons); and metal matting (170 pallets). OPROJ is in country.

(4) Steam cleaners, prefabricated shipping crates (FASTPACK), high-pressure pump and hose outfits, and banding kits available at C+10 under Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Retrograde Equipment Readiness Program.

c. Supply Planning Factors (extracted from Joint Logistics Factor File).

(1) For ARFOR requirements, use (lbs/person/day)—

- Class I: 4.2 (w/ration supplement sundries pack (RSSP). Ration cycle: 2-3-2/mix: MRE-MRE-MRE.
- Class II: 1.8.
- Class III(p): 0.21.
- Class III(b): see FM 101-10-1/2, volume 2, tables 2-11 through 2-15.
- Class IV: 4.
- Class V(A): 10.2; class V(W): 11.6.
- Class VI: 2.2.
- Class VII: 1.7.
- Class VIII: 0.76.
- Class IX: 1.25.

(2) For Air Force forces (AFFOR) requirements, use—

- Class I and water: Same as ARFOR.
- Class III(b) (daily estimates):

Number	Aircraft Type	Flying Hours Per Day	Gallons Per Flying Hours	Total
8	RF-4C	4	1,365	43,680
6	RF4G	4	1,575	37,800
24	F-15E	4	1,575	151,200
4	MH-60J	4	142	2,272
24	A-10	4	630	60,480
12	C-130E	4	790	37,920
Gnd spt equip		90	2	<u>46,800</u>
		(cumulative hrs)		380,152

- NOTES:
1. The 380,152 gallons per day figure begins at C+8 and is assumed to be uniform throughout the operation.
  2. Flying hours are based on two sorties per day at 2 hours per sortie.
  3. Gallons per flying hour based on reduced performance created by using JP-8. Armament, equivalent loading, weather, and altitude would also affect performance.
  4. Strategic lift refueled in air in Panama or in CONUS.
  5. Ground support equipment includes communications, generators, and wheeled vehicles.

•Class V(W): Security police ammunition will include emergency resupply only. Units deploy with their unit basic load (UBL) and are not expected to engage.

(3) For Marine force (MARFOR) requirements, use 59,286 gallons of JP-8 daily to the MARFOR 10 days *after they have arrived onshore* (they will bring 600,000 gallons or 10 days' supply with them on their initial deployment).

(4) Class X requirements furnished through US Army Security Affairs Command, New Cumberland, Pennsylvania. All other supplies to support civil-military operations will be administered under US Department of State Economic Support Fund (ESF) guidelines.

(5) Most resupply will be by air until C+20. Supply buildup to meet JTFSO stockage objectives will be by ship, which will arrive on C+20 (Puerto Cortes). The ship (FSS T-AKR) will contain approximately 30 days of supply (DofS) in the following quantities:

- Class I: 3,276 STONs.
- Class II: 468 STONs.
- Class III: 164 STONs.
- Class IV: 3,120 STONs.
- Class VI: TBD.
- Class VII: 1,326 STONs.
- Class VIII: 593 STONs.
- Class IX: 1,000 STONs.

(6) A pre-positioned ship (T-AKX) containing 38,000 STONs of conventional ammunition will arrive in the joint operations area (JOA) on C+16, location (TBD by student).

d. Breakout of Supplies Moved by Air.

- (1) DS level: 100 percent except class III and class V (30 percent).

(2) Unit to accompany troops (TAT): 100 percent (class I, meal, combat, individual (MCI): class II, common table of allowances (CTA) 50-900 for climate zone I; class V, UBL; class VIII, aid bags; class III(p), UBL.

(3) Direct support system air line of communication (ALOC) will be used to maximum extent for all eligible class II, VIII, IX, and V(L). New Cumberland is supporting depot.

e. Stockage Objectives

(1) C-day UBL levels: 3 DofS (15 DofS for class IX); DS accompanying: 4 DofS (15 DofS for class IX).

(2) See JTF SO OPORD 9\_-5, annex D.

f. Bulk Petroleum Data.

(1) Type available for planning: JP-8 (turbine fuel kerosene-type). Quantities required and storage locations **(TBD by student)**.

(2) One tanker ship, class M-BT-2 (31,300 bbls) (fully loaded draft 19 feet 3 inches), available at C+6 for bulk fuel. One tanker ship, class T-5 (190,000 bbls) (fully loaded draft 36 feet), available at C+10. C-dates available means that ships are at locations specified **(TBD by student)**. NOTE: 1 barrel equals 42 gallons.

(3) Three each C-130 "bladder birds" (aerial bulk fuel delivery system) available at C+2 (5,000-gallon capacity). Intratheater use only.

(4) KC-10A and KC-135 will support strategic airlift refueling and are intratheater wet-wing operations.

(5) ARFOR class III distribution points: **(TBD by student)**.

g. Salvage. Starting at C+7, approximately 25 percent of backhaul will be dedicated for retrograde or evacuation. Percentage goes up to 45 percent at D-day.

h. Class IV. Class IV is command regulated. All requests will be filled by 21st COSCOM materiel management center (MMC) on an exception basis.

i. Army and Air Force Exchange Service. Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) Tactical Field Exchange service will open C+21.

j. Water Supply.

(1) Consumption planning factors (less hospitals). During buildup: 12.5 gallons/person/day.

(2) Stockage objective is 2 DofS at DS and 1 DofS at unit.

(3) Nonmedical unit water standards are 85-percent potable, Primary treatment method will be chloramine. Coliform standards will be no more than 1:100 milliliters. Turbidity will be 2 national turbidity units (NTUs).

(4) Water purification distribution system, and supply points: **(TBD by student)**.

(5) Public utilities will not be used as a source for raw water.

(6) Surveyed raw water sources:

(a) Sea/brackish: Tela (DN5240), San Lorenzo (DK5082), Cedenó (DK5055), and La Ceiba (EN2043).

(b) Fresh: Agua Salada (DM2208), La Lima (DN0101), Comayagua (DL3099), Villanueva (CM2094), Tegucigalpa (DL8050), El Progreso (DN1302), and Choluteca (DK8071).

(7) Hospital water requirements (includes laundry):

(a) Mobile army surgical hospital (MASH): 8,100 gallons per day.

(b) Combat support hospital (CSH): 17,700 gallons per day.

## 8. PROTECTION OF LOGISTICS

Priorities: **(TBD by student)**. Assets to accomplish logistic base security **(TBD by student)**.

## 9. EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL

Explosive ordnance disposal is a service responsibility.

## 10. ASSAULT PACKAGE

21st COSCOM units deploying C-day to C+7 will constitute 21st Abn Corps advanced echelon (ADVON) and will support arrival/departure airfield control group (A/DACG) as outlined in 21st Abn Corps FSOP.

## 11. LOGISTICS AUTOMATION SYSTEMS AND SUPPORT

TBP.

**CORPS OPERATIONS: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION**

## Appendix 14. Relative Combat Power Comparison Chart

**MANEUVER**

<b>US/Honduran</b>		<b>Atlantican</b>	
Lt inf bde	.50	Mtz regt (BTR)	1.00
AASLT bde	.80	Inf regt	.40
Abn bde	.80	T-62 bn	1.20
Honduran inf bde	.40		
Honduran ACR	1.00		
Marine inf regt*	1.00		
Marine LAI bn	.60		
M1A1 co	.70		
M551 bn	.80		
Atk hel bn (AH-IS)	1.00	Atk hel bn (MI-24)	1.00
Atk hel bn (AH-64)	3.00		

\* Includes amphibious assault vehicles and air assault capability.


**ARTILLERY**

FA bn (105-mm, T)	.75	D-30 bn (122-mm, T)	.80
FA bn (155-mm, T)	1.50	D-20 bn (152-mm, T)	1.00
FA btry (155-mm, T)	.50	BM-21 bn (MRL, 122-mm)	2.00
Composite bn ( 155-mm, 8-in, SP)	.75	D-44 bn ( 100-mm, T)	.60
MLRS bn (corps)	6.00		

NOTE: For additional information to assist you in your analysis, refer to ST 101-5.)







S320C



CRS-BK